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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-05-02 01:32:18 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-05-02 01:32:18 +0300 |
commit | e6f0bf09f0669b3c2cd77fa906830123279a0a21 (patch) | |
tree | 57aed6ff25d40e31f129b934403c7fac7a8cc8c8 /security | |
parent | 10a3efd0fee5e881b1866cf45950808575cb0f24 (diff) | |
parent | 781a5739489949fd0f32432a9da17f7ddbccf1cc (diff) | |
download | linux-e6f0bf09f0669b3c2cd77fa906830123279a0a21.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin
keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well.
Also six trivial changes and bug fixes"
* tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies
ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments.
ima: Fix function name error in comment.
ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring
ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key
keys: cleanup build time module signing keys
ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value
ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/iint.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 |
5 files changed, 15 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 250fb0836156..3b06a01bd0fd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, } else { if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]); + if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA) + load_module_cert(keyring[id]); } return err; diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 0ba01847e836..fca8a9409e4a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) static void init_once(void *foo) { - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo; + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = (struct integrity_iint_cache *) foo; memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b85d9e429426..906c1d8e0b71 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } /** - * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. + * ima_file_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND * @@ -606,6 +606,9 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise; + if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); if (!must_appraise) @@ -636,6 +639,9 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int must_appraise; + if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); if (!must_appraise) @@ -780,6 +786,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } + break; default: break; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 4f8cb155e4fd..fd5d46e511f1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule); + break; default: break; } @@ -836,6 +837,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) add_rules(default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + break; default: break; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index e22e510ae92d..4e081e650047 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -494,8 +494,8 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf) } } - entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) : - le32_to_cpu(*(hdr[HDR_PCR].data)); + entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) : + le32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data)); ret = ima_restore_measurement_entry(entry); if (ret < 0) break; |