diff options
author | Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> | 2008-12-17 07:24:15 +0300 |
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committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2009-01-01 02:07:37 +0300 |
commit | be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d (patch) | |
tree | 3a770f4cc676efeba443b28caa1ad195eeff49bc /security | |
parent | 6a94cb73064c952255336cc57731904174b2c58f (diff) | |
download | linux-be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d.tar.xz |
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available.
Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying
operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 57 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 66 |
3 files changed, 132 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index d9f47ce7e207..9438535d7fd0 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -81,6 +81,15 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM IPSec. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_PATH + bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" + depends on SECURITY + help + This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement pathname based access controls. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES bool "File POSIX Capabilities" default n diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 2dce66fcb992..c545bd1300b5 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -263,6 +263,53 @@ static void cap_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) *secid = 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +static int cap_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + unsigned int dev) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, + unsigned int time_attrs) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; @@ -883,6 +930,16 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mknod); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mkdir); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rmdir); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_unlink); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_symlink); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate); +#endif set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d85dbb37c972..678d4d07b852 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -355,6 +355,72 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH +int security_path_mknod(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + unsigned int dev) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->path_mknod(path, dentry, mode, dev); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); + +int security_path_mkdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->path_mkdir(path, dentry, mode); +} + +int security_path_rmdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->path_rmdir(path, dentry); +} + +int security_path_unlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->path_unlink(path, dentry); +} + +int security_path_symlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->path_symlink(path, dentry, old_name); +} + +int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); +} + +int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) || + (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode)))) + return 0; + return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, + new_dentry); +} + +int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, + unsigned int time_attrs) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs); +} +#endif + int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) |