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| author | James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 2017-12-11 09:01:08 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 2017-12-11 09:01:08 +0300 |
| commit | d21bd6898336a7892914d308d5e0868f0b863571 (patch) | |
| tree | f5f756c25348b5a6c1ce9ddbaa7d1ecd1bef40b0 /security | |
| parent | 34d8751fd4ffa34e85ee7e85d34168b3f3f62b42 (diff) | |
| parent | 50c4c4e268a2d7a3e58ebb698ac74da0de40ae36 (diff) | |
| download | linux-d21bd6898336a7892914d308d5e0868f0b863571.tar.xz | |
Sync to v4.15-rc3 for security subsystem developers to work against.
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
103 files changed, 932 insertions, 1523 deletions
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index f2d71cdb8e19..4d2d3782ddef 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for the kernel security code # diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore index d5b291e94264..9cdec70d72b8 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore @@ -1,6 +1,5 @@ # # Generated include files # -net_names.h capability_names.h rlim_names.h diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index dafdd387d42b..9a6b4033d52b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -1,47 +1,15 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Makefile for AppArmor Linux Security Module # obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ - resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o + resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h -# Build a lower case string table of address family names -# Transform lines from -# #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */ -# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ -# to -# [1] = "local", -# [2] = "inet", -# -# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping. -# Transforms lines from -# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ -# to -# #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet" -quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@ -cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ - sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ - 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ - echo "};" >> $@ ;\ - printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\ - sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ - 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\ - $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ - -# Build a lower case string table of sock type names -# Transform lines from -# SOCK_STREAM = 1, -# to -# [1] = "stream", -quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@ -cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\ - sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \ - -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ - echo "};" >> $@ # Build a lower case string table of capability names # Transforms lines from @@ -94,7 +62,6 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h -$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(src)/Makefile @@ -102,8 +69,3 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-rlim) -$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \ - $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \ - $(src)/Makefile - $(call cmd,make-af) - $(call cmd,make-sock) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 518d5928661b..d4fa04d91439 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ static ssize_t ns_revision_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, long last_read; int avail; - mutex_lock(&rev->ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); last_read = rev->last_read; if (last_read == rev->ns->revision) { mutex_unlock(&rev->ns->lock); @@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static ssize_t ns_revision_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, last_read != READ_ONCE(rev->ns->revision))) return -ERESTARTSYS; - mutex_lock(&rev->ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); } avail = sprintf(buffer, "%ld\n", rev->ns->revision); @@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static unsigned int ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt) unsigned int mask = 0; if (rev) { - mutex_lock(&rev->ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); poll_wait(file, &rev->ns->wait, pt); if (rev->last_read < rev->ns->revision) mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; @@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) */ inode_unlock(dir); error = simple_pin_fs(&aafs_ops, &aafs_mnt, &aafs_count); - mutex_lock(&parent->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); inode_lock_nested(dir, I_MUTEX_PARENT); if (error) goto out; @@ -1692,7 +1692,7 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) inode_unlock(dir); inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode); - mutex_lock(&parent->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_findn_ns(&parent->sub_ns, dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len)); if (!ns) { @@ -1747,7 +1747,7 @@ void __aafs_ns_rmdir(struct aa_ns *ns) __aafs_profile_rmdir(child); list_for_each_entry(sub, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) { - mutex_lock(&sub->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&sub->lock, sub->level); __aafs_ns_rmdir(sub); mutex_unlock(&sub->lock); } @@ -1877,7 +1877,7 @@ int __aafs_ns_mkdir(struct aa_ns *ns, struct dentry *parent, const char *name, /* subnamespaces */ list_for_each_entry(sub, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) { - mutex_lock(&sub->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&sub->lock, sub->level); error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(sub, ns_subns_dir(ns), NULL, NULL); mutex_unlock(&sub->lock); if (error) @@ -1921,7 +1921,7 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) /* is next namespace a child */ if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) { next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list); - mutex_lock(&next->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&next->lock, next->level); return next; } @@ -1931,7 +1931,7 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) mutex_unlock(&ns->lock); next = list_next_entry(ns, base.list); if (!list_entry_is_head(next, &parent->sub_ns, base.list)) { - mutex_lock(&next->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&next->lock, next->level); return next; } ns = parent; @@ -2039,7 +2039,7 @@ static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos) f->private = root; /* find the first profile */ - mutex_lock(&root->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&root->lock, root->level); profile = __first_profile(root, root); /* skip to position */ @@ -2202,7 +2202,6 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy), AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file), - AA_SFS_DIR("network", aa_sfs_entry_network), AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount), AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns), AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), @@ -2452,7 +2451,7 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) aafs_mnt = kern_mount(&aafs_ops); if (IS_ERR(aafs_mnt)) panic("can't set apparmorfs up\n"); - aafs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags &= ~MS_NOUSER; + aafs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags &= ~SB_NOUSER; /* Populate fs tree. */ error = entry_create_dir(&aa_sfs_entry, NULL); @@ -2492,7 +2491,7 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) ns_subrevision(root_ns) = dent; /* policy tree referenced by magic policy symlink */ - mutex_lock(&root_ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&root_ns->lock, root_ns->level); error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(root_ns, aafs_mnt->mnt_root, ".policy", aafs_mnt->mnt_root); mutex_unlock(&root_ns->lock); diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index dd754b7850a8..04ba9d0718ea 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL) + * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) * * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses @@ -316,28 +317,46 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found */ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, - struct list_head *head) + struct list_head *head, + const char **info) { int len = 0; + bool conflict = false; struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL; list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) { - if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL) + if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL && + &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns)) continue; - if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) { - unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch, - DFA_START, name); - u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); - /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ - if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { - candidate = profile; - len = profile->xmatch_len; + + if (profile->xmatch) { + if (profile->xmatch_len == len) { + conflict = true; + continue; + } else if (profile->xmatch_len > len) { + unsigned int state; + u32 perm; + + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch, + DFA_START, name); + perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); + /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ + if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { + candidate = profile; + len = profile->xmatch_len; + conflict = false; + } } } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name)) /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */ return profile; } + if (conflict) { + *info = "conflicting profile attachments"; + return NULL; + } + return candidate; } @@ -346,16 +365,17 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL) * @list: list to search (NOT NULL) * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL) + * @info: info message if there was an error * * Returns: label or NULL if no match found */ static struct aa_label *find_attach(struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list, - const char *name) + const char *name, const char **info) { struct aa_profile *profile; rcu_read_lock(); - profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list)); + profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list, info)); rcu_read_unlock(); return profile ? &profile->label : NULL; @@ -448,11 +468,11 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) /* released by caller */ new = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles, - name); + name, info); else /* released by caller */ new = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, - name); + name, info); *lookupname = name; break; } @@ -516,7 +536,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { new = find_attach(profile->ns, &profile->ns->base.profiles, - name); + name, &info); if (new) { AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label"); return new; @@ -541,9 +561,21 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, } } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { /* no exec permission - learning mode */ - struct aa_profile *new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, - false, name, - GFP_ATOMIC); + struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; + char *n = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC); + + if (n) { + /* name is ptr into buffer */ + long pos = name - buffer; + /* break per cpu buffer hold */ + put_buffers(buffer); + new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, false, n, + GFP_KERNEL); + get_buffers(buffer); + name = buffer + pos; + strcpy((char *)name, n); + kfree(n); + } if (!new_profile) { error = -ENOMEM; info = "could not create null profile"; diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index db80221891c6..e79bf44396a3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/match.h" -#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/label.h" @@ -227,18 +226,12 @@ static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old) struct aa_perms aa_compute_fperms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, struct path_cond *cond) { - struct aa_perms perms; - /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format * splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be * done at profile load */ - perms.deny = 0; - perms.kill = perms.stop = 0; - perms.complain = perms.cond = 0; - perms.hide = 0; - perms.prompt = 0; + struct aa_perms perms = { }; if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) { perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state)); @@ -567,32 +560,6 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, return error; } -static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, - struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file, - u32 request, u32 denied) -{ - struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; - int error; - - AA_BUG(!sock); - - /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */ - if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label)) - return 0; - - /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */ - error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock); - if (denied) { - /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */ - /* check every profile in file label to is cached */ - last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock)); - } - if (!error) - update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request); - - return error; -} - /** * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file * @op: operation being checked @@ -637,9 +604,6 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, denied); - else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) - error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, - denied); done: rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index ff4316e1068d..4ac095118717 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -123,20 +123,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { struct aa_label *peer; union { struct { - kuid_t ouid; const char *target; + kuid_t ouid; } fs; - struct { - int type, protocol; - struct sock *peer_sk; - void *addr; - int addrlen; - } net; int signal; - struct { - int rlim; - unsigned long max; - } rlim; }; }; struct { @@ -145,6 +135,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { long pos; } iface; struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; + struct { const char *src_name; const char *type; const char *trans; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h index 436b3a722357..6505e1ad9e23 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h @@ -19,17 +19,6 @@ #include "match.h" -/* Provide our own test for whether a write lock is held for asserts - * this is because on none SMP systems write_can_lock will always - * resolve to true, which is what you want for code making decisions - * based on it, but wrong for asserts checking that the lock is held - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP -#define write_is_locked(X) !write_can_lock(X) -#else -#define write_is_locked(X) (1) -#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ - /* * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl * which is not related to profile accesses. @@ -97,7 +86,7 @@ static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, static inline bool path_mediated_fs(struct dentry *dentry) { - return !(dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER); + return !(dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h deleted file mode 100644 index 140c8efcf364..000000000000 --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -/* - * AppArmor security module - * - * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions. - * - * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE - * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or - * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as - * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the - * License. - */ - -#ifndef __AA_NET_H -#define __AA_NET_H - -#include <net/sock.h> -#include <linux/path.h> - -#include "apparmorfs.h" -#include "label.h" -#include "perms.h" -#include "policy.h" - -#define AA_MAY_SEND AA_MAY_WRITE -#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE AA_MAY_READ - -#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN AA_MAY_DELETE - -#define AA_MAY_CONNECT AA_MAY_OPEN -#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT 0x00100000 - -#define AA_MAY_BIND 0x00200000 -#define AA_MAY_LISTEN 0x00400000 - -#define AA_MAY_SETOPT 0x01000000 -#define AA_MAY_GETOPT 0x02000000 - -#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ - AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN | \ - AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \ - AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT) - -#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ - AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\ - AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | \ - AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK | \ - AA_MAY_MPROT) - -#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \ - AA_MAY_ACCEPT) -struct aa_sk_ctx { - struct aa_label *label; - struct aa_label *peer; - struct path path; -}; - -#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security) -#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security -#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \ - struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \ - .family = (F)}; \ - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \ - ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \ - LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \ - OP); \ - NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ - aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \ - aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P) - -#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \ - DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ - (SK)->sk_protocol) - -/* struct aa_net - network confinement data - * @allow: basic network families permissions - * @audit: which network permissions to force audit - * @quiet: which network permissions to quiet rejects - */ -struct aa_net { - u16 allow[AF_MAX]; - u16 audit[AF_MAX]; - u16 quiet[AF_MAX]; -}; - - -extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[]; - -void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va); -int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, - u32 request, u16 family, int type); -int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, - int type, int protocol); -static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct common_audit_data *sa, - u32 request, - struct sock *sk) -{ - return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family, - sk->sk_type); -} -int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk); - -int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, - struct socket *sock); - - -static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new) -{ - /* NOP */ -} - -#endif /* __AA_NET_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index af04d5a7d73d..2b27bb79aec4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -135,10 +135,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask); -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, - u32 mask); +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask); + u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask); void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms); void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index 4364088a0b9e..17fe41a9cac3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ #include "file.h" #include "lib.h" #include "label.h" -#include "net.h" #include "perms.h" #include "resource.h" @@ -112,7 +111,6 @@ struct aa_data { * @policy: general match rules governing policy * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions * @caps: capabilities for the profile - * @net: network controls for the profile * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile * * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs @@ -150,7 +148,6 @@ struct aa_profile { struct aa_policydb policy; struct aa_file_rules file; struct aa_caps caps; - struct aa_net net; struct aa_rlimit rlimits; struct aa_loaddata *rawdata; @@ -223,16 +220,6 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile, return 0; } -static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile, - u16 AF) { - unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET); - u16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF); - - if (!state) - return 0; - return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2); -} - /** * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL) diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 66fb9ede9447..7ca0032e7ba9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static inline int map_signal_num(int sig) return SIGUNKNOWN; else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN) return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128; /* rt sigs mapped to 128 */ - else if (sig <= MAXMAPPED_SIG) + else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG) return sig_map[sig]; return SIGUNKNOWN; } @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied); } } - if (aad(sa)->signal <= MAXMAPPED_SIG) + if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIG) audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]); else audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d", diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index c5b99b954580..324fe5c60f87 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ void __aa_proxy_redirect(struct aa_label *orig, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!orig); AA_BUG(!new); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&labels_set(orig)->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&labels_set(orig)->lock); tmp = rcu_dereference_protected(orig->proxy->label, &labels_ns(orig)->lock); @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static bool __label_remove(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); if (new) __aa_proxy_redirect(label, new); @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static bool __label_replace(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!old); AA_BUG(!new); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); AA_BUG(new->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE); if (!label_is_stale(old)) @@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static struct aa_label *__label_insert(struct aa_labelset *ls, AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!label); AA_BUG(labels_set(label) != ls); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); AA_BUG(label->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE); /* Figure out where to put new node */ @@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ void __aa_labelset_update_subtree(struct aa_ns *ns) __labelset_update(ns); list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) { - mutex_lock(&child->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&child->lock, child->level); __aa_labelset_update_subtree(child); mutex_unlock(&child->lock); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 8818621b5d95..4d5e98e49d5e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -211,8 +211,7 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask) *str = '\0'; } -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, - u32 mask) +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask) { const char *fmt = "%s"; unsigned int i, perm = 1; @@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, } void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask) + u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask) { char str[33]; @@ -318,14 +317,11 @@ static u32 map_other(u32 x) void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, struct aa_perms *perms) { - perms->deny = 0; - perms->kill = perms->stop = 0; - perms->complain = perms->cond = 0; - perms->hide = 0; - perms->prompt = 0; - perms->allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state); - perms->audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state); - perms->quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state); + *perms = (struct aa_perms) { + .allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state), + .audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state), + .quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state), + }; /* for v5 perm mapping in the policydb, the other set is used * to extend the general perm set @@ -427,7 +423,6 @@ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { int type, error; - bool stop = false; u32 denied = request & (~perms->allow | perms->deny); if (likely(!denied)) { @@ -448,8 +443,6 @@ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, else type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED; - if (denied & perms->stop) - stop = true; if (denied == (denied & perms->hide)) error = -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 72b915dfcaf7..9a65eeaf7dfa 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" -#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" @@ -737,368 +736,6 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info, return error; } -/** - * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field - */ -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; - - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags); - if (!ctx) - return -ENOMEM; - - SK_CTX(sk) = ctx; - - return 0; -} - -/** - * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field - */ -static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - - SK_CTX(sk) = NULL; - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - aa_put_label(ctx->peer); - path_put(&ctx->path); - kfree(ctx); -} - -/** - * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field - */ -static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, - struct sock *newsk) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); - - new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); - new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); - new->path = ctx->path; - path_get(&new->path); -} - -static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type, - int protocol) -{ - AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type, - protocol); -} - - -/** - * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket - */ -static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) -{ - struct aa_label *label; - int error = 0; - - label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) - error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol); - end_current_label_crit_section(label); - - return error; -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct - * - * Note: - * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to - * move to a special kernel label - * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or - * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in - * sock_graft. - */ -static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, - int type, int protocol, int kern) -{ - struct aa_label *label; - - if (kern) { - struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); - - label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); - aa_put_ns(ns); - } else - label = aa_get_current_label(); - - if (sock->sk) { - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); - - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); - } - aa_put_label(label); - - return 0; -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket - */ -static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, - struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(!address); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address - */ -static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, - struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(!address); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen - */ -static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. - * - * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept - * has not been done. - */ -static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(!newsock); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk); -} - -static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, - struct msghdr *msg, int size) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(!msg); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket - */ -static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, - struct msghdr *msg, int size) -{ - return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message - */ -static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, - struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) -{ - return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); -} - -/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ -static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) -{ - return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) -{ - return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); -} - -/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ -static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, - int level, int optname) -{ - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); -} - -/** - * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, - int optname) -{ - return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, - level, optname); -} - -/** - * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options - */ -static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, - int optname) -{ - return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, - level, optname); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn - */ -static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) -{ - return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk - * - * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held - * - * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() - * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() - */ -static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) -{ - return 0; -} - - -static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - - if (ctx->peer) - return ctx->peer; - - return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer - * - * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, - char __user *optval, - int __user *optlen, - unsigned int len) -{ - char *name; - int slen, error = 0; - struct aa_label *label; - struct aa_label *peer; - - label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); - if (IS_ERR(peer)) { - error = PTR_ERR(peer); - goto done; - } - slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, - FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | - FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); - /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ - if (slen < 0) { - error = -ENOMEM; - } else { - if (slen > len) { - error = -ERANGE; - } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) { - error = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - if (put_user(slen, optlen)) - error = -EFAULT; -out: - kfree(name); - - } - -done: - end_current_label_crit_section(label); - - return error; -} - -/** - * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet - * @sock: the peer socket - * @skb: packet data - * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet - * - * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent - */ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, - struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) - -{ - /* TODO: requires secid support */ - return -ENOPROTOOPT; -} - -/** - * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket - * @sk: child sock - * @parent: parent socket - * - * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can - * just set sk security information off of current creating process label - * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based - * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled - * socket is shared by different tasks. - */ -static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) -{ - struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); - - if (!ctx->label) - ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); -} - static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), @@ -1133,30 +770,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), - - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, - apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, - apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), @@ -1200,11 +813,11 @@ static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { .get = param_get_aalockpolicy }; -static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); -static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); -static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); -static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. @@ -1233,7 +846,7 @@ module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running */ -bool aa_g_audit_header = 1; +bool aa_g_audit_header = true; module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); @@ -1258,7 +871,7 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. */ -bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; +bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); /* Boot time disable flag */ @@ -1338,7 +951,7 @@ static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); } -static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; @@ -1347,7 +960,7 @@ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); } -static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; @@ -1368,7 +981,7 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) return -EINVAL; } -static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; @@ -1378,7 +991,7 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); } -static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; @@ -1506,7 +1119,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) { aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); - apparmor_enabled = 0; + apparmor_enabled = false; return 0; } @@ -1562,7 +1175,7 @@ alloc_out: aa_destroy_aafs(); aa_teardown_dfa_engine(); - apparmor_enabled = 0; + apparmor_enabled = false; return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c index 82a64b58041d..ed9b4d0f9f7e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/mount.c +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c @@ -216,13 +216,12 @@ static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, static struct aa_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state) { - struct aa_perms perms; - - perms.kill = 0; - perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state); - perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state); - perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state); - perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state); + struct aa_perms perms = { + .allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state), + .audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state), + .quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state), + .xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state), + }; return perms; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c deleted file mode 100644 index 33d54435f8d6..000000000000 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,184 +0,0 @@ -/* - * AppArmor security module - * - * This file contains AppArmor network mediation - * - * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE - * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or - * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as - * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the - * License. - */ - -#include "include/apparmor.h" -#include "include/audit.h" -#include "include/context.h" -#include "include/label.h" -#include "include/net.h" -#include "include/policy.h" - -#include "net_names.h" - - -struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = { - AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), - { } -}; - -static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { - "unknown", - "send", - "receive", - "unknown", - - "create", - "shutdown", - "connect", - "unknown", - - "setattr", - "getattr", - "setcred", - "getcred", - - "chmod", - "chown", - "chgrp", - "lock", - - "mmap", - "mprot", - "unknown", - "unknown", - - "accept", - "bind", - "listen", - "unknown", - - "setopt", - "getopt", - "unknown", - "unknown", - - "unknown", - "unknown", - "unknown", - "unknown", -}; - - -/* audit callback for net specific fields */ -void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) -{ - struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - - audit_log_format(ab, " family="); - if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) - audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); - else - audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family); - audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="); - if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) - audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); - else - audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type); - audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol); - - if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0, - net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); - - if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0, - net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); - } - } - if (aad(sa)->peer) { - audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, - FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); - } -} - - -/* Generic af perm */ -int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, - u32 request, u16 family, int type) -{ - struct aa_perms perms = { }; - - AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX); - AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX); - - if (profile_unconfined(profile)) - return 0; - - perms.allow = (profile->net.allow[family] & (1 << type)) ? - ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; - perms.audit = (profile->net.audit[family] & (1 << type)) ? - ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; - perms.quiet = (profile->net.quiet[family] & (1 << type)) ? - ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; - aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); -} - -int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, - int type, int protocol) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); - - return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family, - type)); -} - -static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, - struct sock *sk) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); - - AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(!sk); - - if (unconfined(label)) - return 0; - - return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk)); -} - -int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) -{ - struct aa_label *label; - int error; - - AA_BUG(!sk); - AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - - /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */ - label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk); - end_current_label_crit_section(label); - - return error; -} - - -int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, - struct socket *sock) -{ - AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(!sock); - AA_BUG(!sock->sk); - - return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk); -} diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 4243b0c3f0e4..b0b58848c248 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat, { struct aa_profile *p, *profile; const char *bname; - char *name; + char *name = NULL; AA_BUG(!parent); @@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ name: profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - mutex_lock(&profile->ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&profile->ns->lock, profile->ns->level); p = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, bname); if (p) { aa_free_profile(profile); @@ -562,6 +562,7 @@ out: return profile; fail: + kfree(name); aa_free_profile(profile); return NULL; } @@ -905,7 +906,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, } else ns = aa_get_ns(policy_ns ? policy_ns : labels_ns(label)); - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); /* check for duplicate rawdata blobs: space and file dedup */ list_for_each_entry(rawdata_ent, &ns->rawdata_list, list) { if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) { @@ -1116,13 +1117,13 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *subj, if (!name) { /* remove namespace - can only happen if fqname[0] == ':' */ - mutex_lock(&ns->parent->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->parent->lock, ns->level); __aa_remove_ns(ns); __aa_bump_ns_revision(ns); mutex_unlock(&ns->parent->lock); } else { /* remove profile */ - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); profile = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, name)); if (!profile) { error = -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index 62a3589c62ab..b1e629cba70b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -256,7 +256,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name); if (!ns) return NULL; - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + ns->level = parent->level + 1; + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(ns, ns_subns_dir(parent), name, dir); if (error) { AA_ERROR("Failed to create interface for ns %s\n", @@ -266,7 +267,6 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, return ERR_PTR(error); } ns->parent = aa_get_ns(parent); - ns->level = parent->level + 1; list_add_rcu(&ns->base.list, &parent->sub_ns); /* add list ref */ aa_get_ns(ns); @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ struct aa_ns *aa_prepare_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name) { struct aa_ns *ns; - mutex_lock(&parent->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); /* try and find the specified ns and if it doesn't exist create it */ /* released by caller */ ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_find_ns(&parent->sub_ns, name)); @@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static void destroy_ns(struct aa_ns *ns) if (!ns) return; - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); /* release all profiles in this namespace */ __aa_profile_list_release(&ns->base.profiles); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 5a2aec358322..59a1a25b7d43 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work) struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_ns(d->ns); if (ns) { - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(d); mutex_unlock(&ns->lock); aa_put_ns(ns); @@ -275,19 +275,6 @@ fail: return 0; } -static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name) -{ - if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) { - if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16))) - return 0; - if (data) - *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos)); - e->pos += sizeof(u16); - return 1; - } - return 0; -} - static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name) { if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) { @@ -597,7 +584,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL; const char *info = "failed to unpack profile"; - size_t size = 0, ns_len; + size_t ns_len; struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 }; char *key = NULL; struct aa_data *data; @@ -730,38 +717,6 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } - size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af"); - if (size) { - - for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { - /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will - * never request - */ - if (i >= AF_MAX) { - u16 tmp; - - if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || - !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || - !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL)) - goto fail; - continue; - } - if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL)) - goto fail; - if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL)) - goto fail; - if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL)) - goto fail; - } - if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL)) - goto fail; - } - if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v7)) { - /* pre v7 policy always allowed these */ - profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff; - profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff; - } - if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) { /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */ info = "failed to unpack policydb"; diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index d8bc842594ed..cf4d234febe9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) /** * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) - * @resoure: rlimit being auditing + * @resource: rlimit being auditing * @value: value being set * @error: error value * @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task, error = fn_for_each(label, profile, audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, peer, - "cap_sys_resoure", -EACCES)); + "cap_sys_resource", -EACCES)); else error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, profile_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim)); diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 5fa839c7fb3f..4f8e09340956 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -585,13 +585,14 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data; struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data; kuid_t rootkuid; - struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; + struct user_namespace *fs_ns; memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data)); if (!inode) return -ENODATA; + fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ); if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP) diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 03c1652c9a1f..c65b39bafdfe 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * device_cgroup.c - device cgroup subsystem * @@ -14,15 +15,6 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> -#define ACC_MKNOD 1 -#define ACC_READ 2 -#define ACC_WRITE 4 -#define ACC_MASK (ACC_MKNOD | ACC_READ | ACC_WRITE) - -#define DEV_BLOCK 1 -#define DEV_CHAR 2 -#define DEV_ALL 4 /* this represents all devices */ - static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex); enum devcg_behavior { @@ -245,21 +237,21 @@ static void set_access(char *acc, short access) { int idx = 0; memset(acc, 0, ACCLEN); - if (access & ACC_READ) + if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ) acc[idx++] = 'r'; - if (access & ACC_WRITE) + if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) acc[idx++] = 'w'; - if (access & ACC_MKNOD) + if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) acc[idx++] = 'm'; } static char type_to_char(short type) { - if (type == DEV_ALL) + if (type == DEVCG_DEV_ALL) return 'a'; - if (type == DEV_CHAR) + if (type == DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) return 'c'; - if (type == DEV_BLOCK) + if (type == DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) return 'b'; return 'X'; } @@ -286,10 +278,10 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices" */ if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { - set_access(acc, ACC_MASK); + set_access(acc, DEVCG_ACC_MASK); set_majmin(maj, ~0); set_majmin(min, ~0); - seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEV_ALL), + seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEVCG_DEV_ALL), maj, min, acc); } else { list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) { @@ -308,10 +300,10 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) /** * match_exception - iterates the exception list trying to find a complete match * @exceptions: list of exceptions - * @type: device type (DEV_BLOCK or DEV_CHAR) + * @type: device type (DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK or DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) * @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all * @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all - * @access: permission mask (ACC_READ, ACC_WRITE, ACC_MKNOD) + * @access: permission mask (DEVCG_ACC_READ, DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) * * It is considered a complete match if an exception is found that will * contain the entire range of provided parameters. @@ -324,9 +316,9 @@ static bool match_exception(struct list_head *exceptions, short type, struct dev_exception_item *ex; list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) { - if ((type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK)) + if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK)) continue; - if ((type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR)) + if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)) continue; if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != major) continue; @@ -343,10 +335,10 @@ static bool match_exception(struct list_head *exceptions, short type, /** * match_exception_partial - iterates the exception list trying to find a partial match * @exceptions: list of exceptions - * @type: device type (DEV_BLOCK or DEV_CHAR) + * @type: device type (DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK or DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) * @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all * @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all - * @access: permission mask (ACC_READ, ACC_WRITE, ACC_MKNOD) + * @access: permission mask (DEVCG_ACC_READ, DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) * * It is considered a partial match if an exception's range is found to * contain *any* of the devices specified by provided parameters. This is @@ -361,9 +353,9 @@ static bool match_exception_partial(struct list_head *exceptions, short type, struct dev_exception_item *ex; list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) { - if ((type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK)) + if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK)) continue; - if ((type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR)) + if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)) continue; /* * We must be sure that both the exception and the provided @@ -646,10 +638,10 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, } return 0; case 'b': - ex.type = DEV_BLOCK; + ex.type = DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK; break; case 'c': - ex.type = DEV_CHAR; + ex.type = DEVCG_DEV_CHAR; break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -702,13 +694,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) { switch (*b) { case 'r': - ex.access |= ACC_READ; + ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_READ; break; case 'w': - ex.access |= ACC_WRITE; + ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_WRITE; break; case 'm': - ex.access |= ACC_MKNOD; + ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD; break; case '\n': case '\0': @@ -805,12 +797,12 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = { * @type: device type * @major: device major number * @minor: device minor number - * @access: combination of ACC_WRITE, ACC_READ and ACC_MKNOD + * @access: combination of DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_READ and DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD * * returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted */ -static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, - short access) +int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, + short access) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; bool rc; @@ -832,37 +824,3 @@ static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, return 0; } - -int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) -{ - short type, access = 0; - - if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) - type = DEV_BLOCK; - if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) - type = DEV_CHAR; - if (mask & MAY_WRITE) - access |= ACC_WRITE; - if (mask & MAY_READ) - access |= ACC_READ; - - return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, imajor(inode), iminor(inode), - access); -} - -int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) -{ - short type; - - if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode)) - return 0; - - if (S_ISBLK(mode)) - type = DEV_BLOCK; - else - type = DEV_CHAR; - - return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), - ACC_MKNOD); - -} diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 8d1f4bf51087..04d6e462b079 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for caching inode integrity data (iint) # diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 06554c448dce..6f9e4ce568cd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -112,21 +112,25 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) { key_ref_t key; - char *data; + void *data; + loff_t size; int rc; if (!keyring[id]) return -EINVAL; - rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data); - if (rc < 0) + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, + READING_X509_CERTIFICATE); + if (rc < 0) { + pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); return rc; + } key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1), "asymmetric", NULL, data, - rc, + size, ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); @@ -139,6 +143,6 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path); key_ref_put(key); } - kfree(data); + vfree(data); return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index f5f12727771a..241aca315b0c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ #define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001 #define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002 +#define EVM_SETUP 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */ + +#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP) extern int evm_initialized; extern char *evm_hmac; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 1d32cd20009a..bcd64baf8788 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) { - pr_err("HMAC key is not set\n"); + pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n"); return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); } tfm = &hmac_tfm; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 063d38aef64e..9826c02e2db8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, #endif #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR + XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE XATTR_NAME_IMA, #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index c8dccd54d501..319cf16d6603 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, if (*ppos != 0) return 0; - sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized); + sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP)); rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp)); return rc; @@ -61,24 +61,29 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - char temp[80]; - int i; + int i, ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP)) return -EPERM; - if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) - return -EINVAL; - - if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0) - return -EFAULT; + ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); - temp[count] = '\0'; + if (ret) + return ret; - if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1)) + /* Reject invalid values */ + if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0) return -EINVAL; - evm_init_key(); + if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) { + ret = evm_init_key(); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + /* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */ + i |= EVM_SETUP; + } + + evm_initialized |= i; return count; } diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 6fc888ca468e..c84e05866052 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -200,55 +200,6 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, } /* - * integrity_read_file - read entire file content into the buffer - * - * This is function opens a file, allocates the buffer of required - * size, read entire file content to the buffer and closes the file - * - * It is used only by init code. - * - */ -int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data) -{ - struct file *file; - loff_t size; - char *buf; - int rc = -EINVAL; - - if (!path || !*path) - return -EINVAL; - - file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0); - if (IS_ERR(file)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(file); - pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); - return rc; - } - - size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); - if (size <= 0) - goto out; - - buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size); - if (rc == size) { - *data = buf; - } else { - kfree(buf); - if (rc >= 0) - rc = -EIO; - } -out: - fput(file); - return rc; -} - -/* * integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook * * Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable() diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 29f198bde02b..d921dc4f9eb0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for building Trusted Computing Group's(TCG) runtime Integrity # Measurement Architecture(IMA). diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c2edba8de35e..c7e8db0ea4c0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -199,42 +199,59 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; int result = 0; + int length; + void *tmpbuf; + u64 i_version; struct { struct ima_digest_data hdr; char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } hash; - if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) { - u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; + if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED) + goto out; - if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) { - audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; - result = -EACCES; - goto out; - } + /* + * Dectecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems + * which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial + * measurement/appraisal/audit. + */ + i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; + hash.hdr.algo = algo; - hash.hdr.algo = algo; - - result = (!buf) ? ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) : - ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); - if (!result) { - int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; - void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, - GFP_NOFS); - if (tmpbuf) { - iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; - memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); - iint->version = i_version; - iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; - } else - result = -ENOMEM; - } + /* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */ + memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest)); + + if (buf) + result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); + else + result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr); + + if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL) + goto out; + + length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; + tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS); + if (!tmpbuf) { + result = -ENOMEM; + goto out; } + + iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; + memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); + iint->version = i_version; + + /* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */ + if (!result) + iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; out: - if (result) + if (result) { + if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) + audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, result, 0); + } return result; } @@ -278,7 +295,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); - if (!result || result == -EEXIST) { + if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 809ba70fbbbf..65fbcf3c32c7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); */ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { - return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? 1 : 0; + return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; } /* @@ -320,6 +320,9 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) return; + if (iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) + return; + rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo); if (rc < 0) return; @@ -405,7 +408,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0); + xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); result = 0; } return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 802d5d20f36f..9057b163c378 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -27,11 +27,6 @@ #include "ima.h" -struct ahash_completion { - struct completion completion; - int err; -}; - /* minimum file size for ahash use */ static unsigned long ima_ahash_minsize; module_param_named(ahash_minsize, ima_ahash_minsize, ulong, 0644); @@ -196,30 +191,13 @@ static void ima_free_atfm(struct crypto_ahash *tfm) crypto_free_ahash(tfm); } -static void ahash_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err) +static inline int ahash_wait(int err, struct crypto_wait *wait) { - struct ahash_completion *res = req->data; - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) - return; - res->err = err; - complete(&res->completion); -} + err = crypto_wait_req(err, wait); -static int ahash_wait(int err, struct ahash_completion *res) -{ - switch (err) { - case 0: - break; - case -EINPROGRESS: - case -EBUSY: - wait_for_completion(&res->completion); - reinit_completion(&res->completion); - err = res->err; - /* fall through */ - default: + if (err) pr_crit_ratelimited("ahash calculation failed: err: %d\n", err); - } return err; } @@ -233,7 +211,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0; struct ahash_request *req; struct scatterlist sg[1]; - struct ahash_completion res; + struct crypto_wait wait; size_t rbuf_size[2]; hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); @@ -242,12 +220,12 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, if (!req) return -ENOMEM; - init_completion(&res.completion); + crypto_init_wait(&wait); ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - ahash_complete, &res); + crypto_req_done, &wait); - rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait); if (rc) goto out1; @@ -288,7 +266,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, * read/request, wait for the completion of the * previous ahash_update() request. */ - rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); if (rc) goto out3; } @@ -304,7 +282,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, * read/request, wait for the completion of the * previous ahash_update() request. */ - rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); if (rc) goto out3; } @@ -318,7 +296,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, active = !active; /* swap buffers, if we use two */ } /* wait for the last update request to complete */ - rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); out3: if (read) file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; @@ -327,7 +305,7 @@ out3: out2: if (!rc) { ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0); - rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &wait); } out1: ahash_request_free(req); @@ -441,6 +419,16 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) loff_t i_size; int rc; + /* + * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on + * filesystems mounted with/without DAX option. + */ + if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) { + hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; + hash->algo = ima_hash_algo; + return -EINVAL; + } + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) { @@ -527,7 +515,7 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len, { struct ahash_request *req; struct scatterlist sg; - struct ahash_completion res; + struct crypto_wait wait; int rc, ahash_rc = 0; hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); @@ -536,12 +524,12 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len, if (!req) return -ENOMEM; - init_completion(&res.completion); + crypto_init_wait(&wait); ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - ahash_complete, &res); + crypto_req_done, &wait); - rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait); if (rc) goto out; @@ -551,10 +539,10 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len, ahash_rc = crypto_ahash_update(req); /* wait for the update request to complete */ - rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); if (!rc) { ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0); - rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &wait); } out: ahash_request_free(req); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index ad491c51e833..fa540c0469da 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ bool ima_canonical_fmt; static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str) { #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN - ima_canonical_fmt = 1; + ima_canonical_fmt = true; #endif return 1; } @@ -429,10 +429,10 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) } ima_update_policy(); -#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY +#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) securityfs_remove(ima_policy); ima_policy = NULL; -#else +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); #endif return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 2aebb7984437..770654694efc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str) ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; + else + return 1; goto out; } @@ -60,6 +62,8 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str) break; } } + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return 1; out: hash_setup_done = 1; return 1; @@ -235,11 +239,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo); - if (rc != 0) { - if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) - rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES; + if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) goto out_digsig; - } if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); @@ -247,12 +248,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, if (action & IMA_MEASURE) ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); - if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) + if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, opened); if (action & IMA_AUDIT) ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); + if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) + rc = 0; out_digsig: if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) && !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) @@ -359,12 +362,12 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) */ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); + if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ -#endif return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ } return 0; @@ -406,6 +409,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ return 0; + /* permit signed certs */ + if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) + return 0; + if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) return -EACCES; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 95209a5f8595..ee4613fa5840 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) - ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1; + ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) - ima_use_secure_boot = 1; + ima_use_secure_boot = true; } return 1; @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup); static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) { - ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1; + ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; return 1; } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index a53e7e4ab06c..e1bf040fb110 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -120,8 +120,6 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void *addr, unsigned long count); -int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data); - #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 2 diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index a7a23b5541f8..6462e6654ccf 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -45,10 +45,9 @@ config BIG_KEYS bool "Large payload keys" depends on KEYS depends on TMPFS - depends on (CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG = y || CRYPTO_DRBG = y) + select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_AES - select CRYPTO_ECB - select CRYPTO_RNG + select CRYPTO_GCM help This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel (for example Kerberos ticket caches). The data may be stored out to diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 57dff0c15809..ef1581b337a3 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for key management # diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 6acb00f6f22c..929e14978c42 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* Large capacity key type * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) * @@ -16,10 +17,10 @@ #include <linux/shmem_fs.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <keys/user-type.h> #include <keys/big_key-type.h> -#include <crypto/rng.h> -#include <crypto/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/aead.h> /* * Layout of key payload words. @@ -49,7 +50,12 @@ enum big_key_op { /* * Key size for big_key data encryption */ -#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 16 +#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 32 + +/* + * Authentication tag length + */ +#define ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE 16 /* * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an @@ -64,57 +70,62 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { .destroy = big_key_destroy, .describe = big_key_describe, .read = big_key_read, + /* no ->update(); don't add it without changing big_key_crypt() nonce */ }; /* - * Crypto names for big_key data encryption + * Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption */ -static const char big_key_rng_name[] = "stdrng"; -static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "ecb(aes)"; +static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)"; /* - * Crypto algorithms for big_key data encryption + * Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption */ -static struct crypto_rng *big_key_rng; -static struct crypto_skcipher *big_key_skcipher; +static struct crypto_aead *big_key_aead; /* - * Generate random key to encrypt big_key data + * Since changing the key affects the entire object, we need a mutex. */ -static inline int big_key_gen_enckey(u8 *key) -{ - return crypto_rng_get_bytes(big_key_rng, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE); -} +static DEFINE_MUTEX(big_key_aead_lock); /* * Encrypt/decrypt big_key data */ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key) { - int ret = -EINVAL; + int ret; struct scatterlist sgio; - SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, big_key_skcipher); - - if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(big_key_skcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) { + struct aead_request *aead_req; + /* We always use a zero nonce. The reason we can get away with this is + * because we're using a different randomly generated key for every + * different encryption. Notably, too, key_type_big_key doesn't define + * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the + * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption. + */ + u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)]; + + aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!aead_req) + return -ENOMEM; + + memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce)); + sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen + (op == BIG_KEY_ENC ? ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE : 0)); + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, zero_nonce); + aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0); + + mutex_lock(&big_key_aead_lock); + if (crypto_aead_setkey(big_key_aead, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) { ret = -EAGAIN; goto error; } - - skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, big_key_skcipher); - skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - NULL, NULL); - - sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, NULL); - if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC) - ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); else - ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); - - skcipher_request_zero(req); - + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); error: + mutex_unlock(&big_key_aead_lock); + aead_request_free(aead_req); return ret; } @@ -146,16 +157,13 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) * * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key. */ - size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher)); + size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE; loff_t pos = 0; - /* prepare aligned data to encrypt */ data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen); - memset(data + datalen, 0x00, enclen - datalen); /* generate random key */ enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -163,13 +171,12 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ret = -ENOMEM; goto error; } - - ret = big_key_gen_enckey(enckey); - if (ret) + ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, ENC_KEY_SIZE); + if (unlikely(ret)) goto err_enckey; /* encrypt aligned data */ - ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, enclen, enckey); + ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, datalen, enckey); if (ret) goto err_enckey; @@ -195,7 +202,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) *path = file->f_path; path_get(path); fput(file); - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); } else { /* Just store the data in a buffer */ void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -211,9 +218,9 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) err_fput: fput(file); err_enckey: - kfree(enckey); + kzfree(enckey); error: - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); return ret; } @@ -227,7 +234,7 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) path_put(path); } - kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); + kzfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); } /* @@ -240,7 +247,7 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); - if (key_is_instantiated(key) && + if (key_is_positive(key) && (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) vfs_truncate(path, 0); } @@ -259,7 +266,7 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) path->mnt = NULL; path->dentry = NULL; } - kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); + kzfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL; } @@ -272,7 +279,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]", datalen, datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); @@ -295,7 +302,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) struct file *file; u8 *data; u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data]; - size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher)); + size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE; loff_t pos = 0; data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -328,7 +335,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) err_fput: fput(file); error: - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); } else { ret = datalen; if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], @@ -344,47 +351,31 @@ error: */ static int __init big_key_init(void) { - struct crypto_skcipher *cipher; - struct crypto_rng *rng; int ret; - rng = crypto_alloc_rng(big_key_rng_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(rng)) { - pr_err("Can't alloc rng: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(rng)); - return PTR_ERR(rng); - } - - big_key_rng = rng; - - /* seed RNG */ - ret = crypto_rng_reset(rng, NULL, crypto_rng_seedsize(rng)); - if (ret) { - pr_err("Can't reset rng: %d\n", ret); - goto error_rng; - } - /* init block cipher */ - cipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); - if (IS_ERR(cipher)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(cipher); + big_key_aead = crypto_alloc_aead(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(big_key_aead)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(big_key_aead); pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret); - goto error_rng; + return ret; + } + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret); + goto free_aead; } - - big_key_skcipher = cipher; ret = register_key_type(&key_type_big_key); if (ret < 0) { pr_err("Can't register type: %d\n", ret); - goto error_cipher; + goto free_aead; } return 0; -error_cipher: - crypto_free_skcipher(big_key_skcipher); -error_rng: - crypto_free_rng(big_key_rng); +free_aead: + crypto_free_aead(big_key_aead); return ret; } diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile index d6f8433250a5..7a44dce6f69d 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for encrypted keys # diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 69855ba0d3b3..d92cbf9687c3 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -309,6 +309,13 @@ static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_k down_read(&ukey->sem); upayload = user_key_payload_locked(ukey); + if (!upayload) { + /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */ + up_read(&ukey->sem); + key_put(ukey); + ukey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); + goto error; + } *master_key = upayload->data; *master_keylen = upayload->datalen; error: @@ -847,7 +854,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h index 47802c0de735..1809995db452 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H #define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index 87cb260e4890..7207e6094dc1 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c @@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector); /* * Reaper for links from keyrings to dead keys. */ -static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long); -static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func, 0, 0); +static void key_gc_timer_func(struct timer_list *); +static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func); -static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX; +static time64_t key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX; static struct key_type *key_gc_dead_keytype; static unsigned long key_gc_flags; @@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ struct key_type key_type_dead = { * Schedule a garbage collection run. * - time precision isn't particularly important */ -void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at) +void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at) { unsigned long expires; - time_t now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + time64_t now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); - kenter("%ld", gc_at - now); + kenter("%lld", gc_at - now); if (gc_at <= now || test_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags)) { kdebug("IMMEDIATE"); @@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ void key_schedule_gc_links(void) * Some key's cleanup time was met after it expired, so we need to get the * reaper to go through a cycle finding expired keys. */ -static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data) +static void key_gc_timer_func(struct timer_list *unused) { kenter(""); - key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX; + key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX; key_schedule_gc_links(); } @@ -129,15 +129,15 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) while (!list_empty(keys)) { struct key *key = list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link); + short state = key->state; + list_del(&key->graveyard_link); kdebug("- %u", key->serial); key_check(key); /* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */ - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) && - key->type->destroy) + if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy) key->type->destroy(key); security_key_free(key); @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) } atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) + if (state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); key_user_put(key->user); @@ -184,11 +184,11 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work) struct rb_node *cursor; struct key *key; - time_t new_timer, limit; + time64_t new_timer, limit; kenter("[%lx,%x]", key_gc_flags, gc_state); - limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + limit = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (limit > key_gc_delay) limit -= key_gc_delay; else @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work) gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1; kdebug("new pass %x", gc_state); - new_timer = LONG_MAX; + new_timer = TIME64_MAX; /* As only this function is permitted to remove things from the key * serial tree, if cursor is non-NULL then it will always point to a @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ continue_scanning: if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER) { if (key->expiry > limit && key->expiry < new_timer) { - kdebug("will expire %x in %ld", + kdebug("will expire %x in %lld", key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit); new_timer = key->expiry; } @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ maybe_resched: */ kdebug("pass complete"); - if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time_t)LONG_MAX) { + if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time64_t)TIME64_MAX) { new_timer += key_gc_delay; key_schedule_gc(new_timer); } diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 1c02c6547038..9f8208dc0e55 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct keyring_search_context { int skipped_ret; bool possessed; key_ref_t result; - struct timespec now; + time64_t now; }; extern bool key_default_cmp(const struct key *key, @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx); extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx); -extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check); +extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring); extern int install_user_keyrings(void); extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *); @@ -169,10 +169,10 @@ extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork); extern struct work_struct key_gc_work; extern unsigned key_gc_delay; -extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit); +extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit); extern void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *dead_type); -extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at); +extern void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at); extern void key_schedule_gc_links(void); extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype); @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id); /* * Determine whether a key is dead. */ -static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time_t limit) +static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time64_t limit) { return key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) | diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 83da68d98b40..d97c9394b5dd 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -54,10 +54,10 @@ void __key_check(const struct key *key) struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid) { struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user; - struct rb_node *parent = NULL; - struct rb_node **p; + struct rb_node *parent, **p; try_again: + parent = NULL; p = &key_user_tree.rb_node; spin_lock(&key_user_lock); @@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA; if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN) key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN; + if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING) + key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING; #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC; @@ -400,6 +402,18 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen) EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve); /* + * Change the key state to being instantiated. + */ +static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, int reject_error) +{ + /* Commit the payload before setting the state; barrier versus + * key_read_state(). + */ + smp_store_release(&key->state, + (reject_error < 0) ? reject_error : KEY_IS_POSITIVE); +} + +/* * Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically. Must be * called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked. The target key's * semaphore need not be locked as instantiation is serialised by @@ -422,14 +436,14 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* instantiate the key */ ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep); if (ret == 0) { /* mark the key as being instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) awaken = 1; @@ -446,7 +460,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, if (authkey) key_revoke(authkey); - if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) { + if (prep->expiry != TIME64_MAX) { key->expiry = prep->expiry; key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay); } @@ -492,7 +506,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, prep.data = data; prep.datalen = datalen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -556,7 +570,6 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, struct key *authkey) { struct assoc_array_edit *edit; - struct timespec now; int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0; key_check(key); @@ -575,15 +588,11 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - key->reject_error = -error; - smp_wmb(); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); - now = current_kernel_time(); - key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; + mark_key_instantiated(key, -error); + key->expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) @@ -699,16 +708,13 @@ found_kernel_type: void key_set_timeout(struct key *key, unsigned timeout) { - struct timespec now; - time_t expiry = 0; + time64_t expiry = 0; /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */ down_write(&key->sem); - if (timeout > 0) { - now = current_kernel_time(); - expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; - } + if (timeout > 0) + expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout; key->expiry = expiry; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); @@ -750,8 +756,8 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, ret = key->type->update(key, prep); if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */ + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); up_write(&key->sem); @@ -827,7 +833,6 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_check(keyring); - key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION)) restrict_link = keyring->restrict_link; @@ -839,7 +844,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (index_key.type->preparse) { ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) { @@ -934,6 +939,16 @@ error: */ __key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit); + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) { + ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true); + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref_put(key_ref); + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_free_prep; + } + } + key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); goto error_free_prep; } @@ -973,7 +988,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -984,8 +999,8 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */ + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); up_write(&key->sem); @@ -1007,8 +1022,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); */ void key_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct timespec now; - time_t time; + time64_t time; key_check(key); @@ -1023,8 +1037,7 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key) key->type->revoke(key); /* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */ - now = current_kernel_time(); - time = now.tv_sec; + time = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) { key->revoked_at = time; key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay); diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index ab0b337c84b4..1ffe60bb2845 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -766,12 +766,16 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) + goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */ + /* see if we can read it directly */ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ); if (ret == 0) goto can_read_key; if (ret != -EACCES) - goto error; + goto error2; /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be @@ -896,7 +900,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group) atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys); } @@ -1406,11 +1410,9 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id) } ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; + if (ret == 0) + ret = authkey->serial; key_put(authkey); - - ret = authkey->serial; error: return ret; } @@ -1586,9 +1588,8 @@ error_keyring: * The caller must have Setattr permission to change keyring restrictions. * * The requested type name may be a NULL pointer to reject all attempts - * to link to the keyring. If _type is non-NULL, _restriction can be - * NULL or a pointer to a string describing the restriction. If _type is - * NULL, _restriction must also be NULL. + * to link to the keyring. In this case, _restriction must also be NULL. + * Otherwise, both _type and _restriction must be non-NULL. * * Returns 0 if successful. */ @@ -1596,7 +1597,6 @@ long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id, const char __user *_type, const char __user *_restriction) { key_ref_t key_ref; - bool link_reject = !_type; char type[32]; char *restriction = NULL; long ret; @@ -1605,31 +1605,29 @@ long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id, const char __user *_type, if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) return PTR_ERR(key_ref); + ret = -EINVAL; if (_type) { + if (!_restriction) + goto error; + ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type)); if (ret < 0) goto error; - } - - if (_restriction) { - if (!_type) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto error; - } restriction = strndup_user(_restriction, PAGE_SIZE); if (IS_ERR(restriction)) { ret = PTR_ERR(restriction); goto error; } + } else { + if (_restriction) + goto error; } - ret = keyring_restrict(key_ref, link_reject ? NULL : type, restriction); + ret = keyring_restrict(key_ref, _type ? type : NULL, restriction); kfree(restriction); - error: key_ref_put(key_ref); - return ret; } diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index de81793f9920..d0bccebbd3b5 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) else seq_puts(m, "[anon]"); - if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) { + if (key_is_positive(keyring)) { if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree); else @@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) } struct keyring_read_iterator_context { - size_t qty; + size_t buflen; size_t count; key_serial_t __user *buffer; }; @@ -435,9 +435,9 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data) int ret; kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}", - key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->qty); + key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen); - if (ctx->count >= ctx->qty) + if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen) return 1; ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer); @@ -459,38 +459,33 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { struct keyring_read_iterator_context ctx; - unsigned long nr_keys; - int ret; + long ret; kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(keyring), buflen); if (buflen & (sizeof(key_serial_t) - 1)) return -EINVAL; - nr_keys = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree; - if (nr_keys == 0) - return 0; - - /* Calculate how much data we could return */ - ctx.qty = nr_keys * sizeof(key_serial_t); - - if (!buffer || !buflen) - return ctx.qty; - - if (buflen > ctx.qty) - ctx.qty = buflen; - - /* Copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the buffer */ - ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer; - ctx.count = 0; - ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, keyring_read_iterator, &ctx); - if (ret < 0) { - kleave(" = %d [iterate]", ret); - return ret; + /* Copy as many key IDs as fit into the buffer */ + if (buffer && buflen) { + ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer; + ctx.buflen = buflen; + ctx.count = 0; + ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, + keyring_read_iterator, &ctx); + if (ret < 0) { + kleave(" = %ld [iterate]", ret); + return ret; + } } - kleave(" = %zu [ok]", ctx.count); - return ctx.count; + /* Return the size of the buffer needed */ + ret = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree * sizeof(key_serial_t); + if (ret <= buflen) + kleave("= %ld [ok]", ret); + else + kleave("= %ld [buffer too small]", ret); + return ret; } /* @@ -557,7 +552,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) { struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data; const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - unsigned long kflags = key->flags; + unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); + short state = READ_ONCE(key->state); kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -569,6 +565,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) /* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */ if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { + time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) { ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); @@ -576,7 +574,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) goto skipped; } - if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + if (expiry && ctx->now >= expiry) { if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED)) ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED); kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret); @@ -601,9 +599,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ - if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { - smp_rmb(); - ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error); + if (state < 0) { + ctx->result = ERR_PTR(state); kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret); goto skipped; } @@ -837,10 +834,10 @@ found: key = key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result); key_check(key); if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME)) { - key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; - keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; + key->last_used_at = ctx->now; + keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now; while (sp > 0) - stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; + stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now; } kleave(" = true"); return true; @@ -901,7 +898,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, } rcu_read_lock(); - ctx->now = current_kernel_time(); + ctx->now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx)) __key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result)); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1101,15 +1098,15 @@ found: /* * Find a keyring with the specified name. * - * All named keyrings in the current user namespace are searched, provided they - * grant Search permission directly to the caller (unless this check is - * skipped). Keyrings whose usage points have reached zero or who have been - * revoked are skipped. + * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a + * user in the current user namespace are considered. If @uid_keyring is %true, + * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session + * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller. * * Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being * incremented on success. -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found. */ -struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) +struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring) { struct key *keyring; int bucket; @@ -1137,17 +1134,22 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0) continue; - if (!skip_perm_check && - key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0), - KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) - continue; + if (uid_keyring) { + if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING, + &keyring->flags)) + continue; + } else { + if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0), + KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) + continue; + } /* we've got a match but we might end up racing with * key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead' * (ie. it has a zero usage count) */ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage)) continue; - keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + keyring->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds(); goto out; } } @@ -1487,7 +1489,7 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring) static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data) { struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - time_t *limit = iterator_data; + time64_t *limit = iterator_data; if (key_is_dead(key, *limit)) return false; @@ -1498,7 +1500,7 @@ static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data) static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) { const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - time_t *limit = iterator_data; + time64_t *limit = iterator_data; key_check(key); return key_is_dead(key, *limit); @@ -1510,7 +1512,7 @@ static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) * Not called with any locks held. The keyring's key struct will not be * deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it. */ -void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit) +void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit) { int result; diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index 732cc0beffdf..f68dc04d614e 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission); */ int key_validate(const struct key *key) { - unsigned long flags = key->flags; + unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); + time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED)) return -ENOKEY; @@ -99,9 +100,8 @@ int key_validate(const struct key *key) return -EKEYREVOKED; /* check it hasn't expired */ - if (key->expiry) { - struct timespec now = current_kernel_time(); - if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) + if (expiry) { + if (ktime_get_real_seconds() >= expiry) return -EKEYEXPIRED; } diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index bf08d02b6646..fbc4af5c6c9f 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -178,16 +178,18 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); - struct timespec now; - unsigned long timo; + unsigned long flags; key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; + time64_t now, expiry; char xbuf[16]; + short state; + u64 timo; int rc; struct keyring_search_context ctx = { .index_key.type = key->type, .index_key.description = key->description, - .cred = current_cred(), + .cred = m->file->f_cred, .match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed, .match_data.raw_data = key, .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, @@ -207,51 +209,51 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } } - /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming - * non-possession) - * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our - * access to __current_cred() safe - */ + /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */ rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW); if (rc < 0) return 0; - now = current_kernel_time(); + now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); rcu_read_lock(); /* come up with a suitable timeout value */ - if (key->expiry == 0) { + expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + if (expiry == 0) { memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5); - } else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + } else if (now >= expiry) { memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5); } else { - timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec; + timo = expiry - now; if (timo < 60) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llus", timo); else if (timo < 60*60) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lum", timo / 60); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llum", div_u64(timo, 60)); else if (timo < 60*60*24) - sprintf(xbuf, "%luh", timo / (60*60)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%lluh", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60)); else if (timo < 60*60*24*7) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lud", timo / (60*60*24)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llud", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24)); else - sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%lluw", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24 * 7)); } -#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \ - (test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-') + state = key_read_state(key); + +#define showflag(FLAGS, LETTER, FLAG) \ + ((FLAGS & (1 << FLAG)) ? LETTER : '-') + flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ", key->serial, - showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED), - showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), - showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), - showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), - showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), - showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE), - showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), + state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-', + showflag(flags, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), + showflag(flags, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), + showflag(flags, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), + showflag(flags, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), + state < 0 ? 'N' : '-', + showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), refcount_read(&key->usage), xbuf, key->perm, diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 86bced9fdbdf..d5b25e535d3a 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID, cred, user_keyring_perm, - KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, + KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING | + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring); @@ -94,7 +95,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID, cred, user_keyring_perm, - KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, + KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING | + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring); @@ -728,7 +730,7 @@ try_again: ret = -EIO; if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) + key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) goto invalid_key; /* check the permissions */ @@ -736,7 +738,7 @@ try_again: if (ret < 0) goto invalid_key; - key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + key->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds(); error: put_cred(ctx.cred); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 63e63a42db3c..114f7408feee 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -251,11 +251,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info, * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the * caller must release. */ -static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) +static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) { struct request_key_auth *rka; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey; + int ret; kenter("%p", dest_keyring); @@ -264,6 +265,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) /* the caller supplied one */ key_get(dest_keyring); } else { + bool do_perm_check = true; + /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we * find one that we actually have */ switch (cred->jit_keyring) { @@ -278,8 +281,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring); up_read(&authkey->sem); - if (dest_keyring) + if (dest_keyring) { + do_perm_check = false; break; + } } case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING: @@ -314,11 +319,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) default: BUG(); } + + /* + * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential + * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and + * joining a keyring only requires Search permission. + * + * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so + * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add + * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. + */ + if (dest_keyring && do_perm_check) { + ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1), + KEY_NEED_WRITE); + if (ret) { + key_put(dest_keyring); + return ret; + } + } } *_dest_keyring = dest_keyring; kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring)); - return; + return 0; } /* @@ -444,11 +467,15 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); - if (!user) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + if (ret) + goto error; - construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); + if (!user) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; + } ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key); key_user_put(user); @@ -463,7 +490,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, } else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { ret = 0; } else { - goto couldnt_alloc_key; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; } key_put(dest_keyring); @@ -473,8 +500,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, construction_failed: key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL); key_put(key); -couldnt_alloc_key: +error_put_dest_keyring: key_put(dest_keyring); +error: kleave(" = %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } @@ -546,9 +574,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); if (dest_keyring) { - construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); ret = key_link(dest_keyring, key); - key_put(dest_keyring); if (ret < 0) { key_put(key); key = ERR_PTR(ret); @@ -595,10 +621,9 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr) intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); if (ret) return -ERESTARTSYS; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { - smp_rmb(); - return key->reject_error; - } + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; return key_validate(key); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index afe9d22ab361..424e1d90412e 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); } @@ -120,6 +120,18 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) } } +static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka) +{ + if (!rka) + return; + key_put(rka->target_key); + key_put(rka->dest_keyring); + if (rka->cred) + put_cred(rka->cred); + kfree(rka->callout_info); + kfree(rka); +} + /* * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key. */ @@ -129,15 +141,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key) kenter("{%d}", key->serial); - if (rka->cred) { - put_cred(rka->cred); - rka->cred = NULL; - } - - key_put(rka->target_key); - key_put(rka->dest_keyring); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); + free_request_key_auth(rka); } /* @@ -151,22 +155,18 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, const struct cred *cred = current->cred; struct key *authkey = NULL; char desc[20]; - int ret; + int ret = -ENOMEM; kenter("%d,", target->serial); /* allocate a auth record */ - rka = kmalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rka) { - kleave(" = -ENOMEM"); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - rka->callout_info = kmalloc(callout_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rka->callout_info) { - kleave(" = -ENOMEM"); - kfree(rka); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } + rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rka) + goto error; + rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rka->callout_info) + goto error_free_rka; + rka->callout_len = callout_len; /* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of * another process */ @@ -176,8 +176,12 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, /* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're * servicing is already instantiated */ - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) - goto auth_key_revoked; + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, + &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) { + up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); + ret = -EKEYREVOKED; + goto error_free_rka; + } irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred); @@ -193,8 +197,6 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, rka->target_key = key_get(target); rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring); - memcpy(rka->callout_info, callout_info, callout_len); - rka->callout_len = callout_len; /* allocate the auth key */ sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial); @@ -205,32 +207,22 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(authkey)) { ret = PTR_ERR(authkey); - goto error_alloc; + goto error_free_rka; } /* construct the auth key */ ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0) - goto error_inst; + goto error_put_authkey; kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage)); return authkey; -auth_key_revoked: - up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); - kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED"); - return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); - -error_inst: - key_revoke(authkey); +error_put_authkey: key_put(authkey); -error_alloc: - key_put(rka->target_key); - key_put(rka->dest_keyring); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); +error_free_rka: + free_request_key_auth(rka); +error: kleave("= %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index ddfaebf60fc8..98aa89ff7bfd 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) char *datablob; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; p = key->payload.data[0]; if (!p->migratable) @@ -1147,20 +1147,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, p = dereference_key_locked(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; - if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) - return 2 * p->blob_len; - ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; } - kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h index ff001a5dcb24..8d5fe9eafb22 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.h +++ b/security/keys/trusted.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H #define __TRUSTED_KEY_H diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 3d8c68eba516..9f558bedba23 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* attach the new data, displacing the old */ key->expiry = prep->expiry; - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) zap = dereference_key_locked(key); rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]); prep->payload.data[0] = NULL; @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy); void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen); } diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c index f728728f193b..94d2b0cf0e7b 100644 --- a/security/min_addr.c +++ b/security/min_addr.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/security.h> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4bf0f571b4ef..1cd8526cb0b7 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ * (at your option) any later version. */ +#include <linux/bpf.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -1703,3 +1704,34 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, actx); } #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); +} +int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); +} +int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); +} +int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); +} +int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); +} +void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); +} +void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index ff5895ede96f..c7161f8792b2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree. # diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index f5d304736852..8644d864e3c1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/shm.h> +#include <linux/bpf.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -1814,6 +1815,10 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid); +#endif + /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to access an inode in a given way. Check access to the descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to @@ -1844,6 +1849,12 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred)); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif + /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ rc = 0; if (av) @@ -2164,6 +2175,12 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, return rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; @@ -2918,13 +2935,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, { const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; - u32 sid, newsid, clen; + u32 newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; - sid = tsec->sid; newsid = tsec->create_sid; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), @@ -3124,27 +3140,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); } -static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, - sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) { - if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { - if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) - return -EPERM; - } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { - /* A different attribute in the security namespace. - Restrict to administrator. */ - return -EPERM; - } - } - - /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the - ordinary setattr permission. */ - return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); -} - static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); @@ -3167,8 +3162,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) - return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { + rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the + ordinary setattr permission. */ + return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); + } sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) @@ -3191,18 +3193,17 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; - const char *str; /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ if (value) { - str = value; + const char *str = value; + if (str[size - 1] == '\0') audit_size = size - 1; else audit_size = size; } else { - str = ""; audit_size = 0; } ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); @@ -3282,8 +3283,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) - return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { + int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the + ordinary setattr permission. */ + return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); + } /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ @@ -3978,8 +3986,8 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } -int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, - unsigned int flags) +static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, + unsigned int flags) { u32 av = 0; @@ -6252,6 +6260,139 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, + unsigned int size) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + int ret; + + switch (cmd) { + case BPF_MAP_CREATE: + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, + NULL); + break; + case BPF_PROG_LOAD: + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, + NULL); + break; + default: + ret = 0; + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) +{ + u32 av = 0; + + if (fmode & FMODE_READ) + av |= BPF__MAP_READ; + if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE) + av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE; + return av; +} + +/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see + * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf + * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and + * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode. + * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to + * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in + * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files. + */ +static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + struct bpf_map *map; + int ret; + + if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { + map = file->private_data; + bpfsec = map->security; + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { + prog = file->private_data; + bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = map->security; + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bpfsec) + return -ENOMEM; + + bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); + map->security = bpfsec; + + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; + + map->security = NULL; + kfree(bpfsec); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bpfsec) + return -ENOMEM; + + bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); + aux->security = bpfsec; + + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security; + + aux->security = NULL; + kfree(bpfsec); +} +#endif + static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), @@ -6471,6 +6612,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free), +#endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index a5004e9de11a..57d61cf36500 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Access vector cache interface for object managers. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h index 37d57dadd476..3bcc72769b87 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Access vector cache interface for the security server. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 35ffb29a69cb..acdee7795297 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include <linux/capability.h> #define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \ @@ -237,6 +238,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "access", NULL } }, { "infiniband_endport", { "manage_subnet", NULL } }, + { "bpf", + {"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} }, { NULL } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h index a59b64e3fd02..4f93f697f71c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ static const char *initial_sid_to_string[] = { diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 1649cd18eb0b..3d54468ce334 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ struct pkey_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of pkey */ }; +struct bpf_security_struct { + u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/ +}; + extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 28dfb2f93e4d..02f0412d42f2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Security server interface. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 36a7ce9e11ff..1f173a7a4daa 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c index 771c96afe1d5..c91543a617ac 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c @@ -361,7 +361,6 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list * *ret_list = NULL; - len = 0; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h index 33ae2aec4f36..4e563be9ef5f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in * order for one or more permissions to be granted. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h index a2c0f37c42ae..2260c44a568c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A security context is a set of security attributes * associated with each subject and object controlled diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index fc28149a4f2e..b6a78b09235c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index da1325dda550..edf4fa39c60a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an * arbitrary number of bits. Extensible bitmaps are diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index 686c3917064c..fe25b3fb2154 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the hash table type. * @@ -9,6 +10,8 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include "hashtab.h" +static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep; + struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key), int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2), u32 size) @@ -57,7 +60,7 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum) if (cur && (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) == 0)) return -EEXIST; - newnode = kzalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_KERNEL); + newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!newnode) return -ENOMEM; newnode->key = key; @@ -106,7 +109,7 @@ void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h) while (cur) { temp = cur; cur = cur->next; - kfree(temp); + kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, temp); } h->htable[i] = NULL; } @@ -148,7 +151,7 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info) slots_used = 0; max_chain_len = 0; - for (slots_used = max_chain_len = i = 0; i < h->size; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) { cur = h->htable[i]; if (cur) { slots_used++; @@ -166,3 +169,14 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info) info->slots_used = slots_used; info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len; } +void hashtab_cache_init(void) +{ + hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node", + sizeof(struct hashtab_node), + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); +} + +void hashtab_cache_destroy(void) +{ + kmem_cache_destroy(hashtab_node_cachep); +} diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h index 009fb5e06172..6183ee2a2e7a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between * key values and datum values. The type of the key values @@ -84,4 +85,8 @@ int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h, /* Fill info with some hash table statistics */ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info); +/* Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node */ +void hashtab_cache_init(void); +void hashtab_cache_destroy(void); + #endif /* _SS_HASHTAB_H */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index d9dc34f4fade..ad982ce8bfa4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index 0f0a1d65b2ce..131d76266ea5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h index 47f3702cd596..068e0d7809db 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e4a1c0dc561a..33cfe5d3d6cb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -2060,10 +2060,12 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) if (!ss_initialized) { avtab_cache_init(); ebitmap_cache_init(); + hashtab_cache_init(); rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp); if (rc) { avtab_cache_destroy(); ebitmap_cache_destroy(); + hashtab_cache_destroy(); goto out; } @@ -2075,6 +2077,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); ebitmap_cache_destroy(); + hashtab_cache_destroy(); goto out; } @@ -2083,6 +2086,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) policydb_destroy(&policydb); avtab_cache_destroy(); ebitmap_cache_destroy(); + hashtab_cache_destroy(); goto out; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h index 3d9fa9556b4f..356bdd36cf6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Implementation of the security services. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index 6ae08efc5ae7..5be31b7af225 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the SID table type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h index de5d0ea583d2..a1a1d2617b6f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table * of security context structures indexed by SID value. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c index d1a6745849a7..dc2ce94165d3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the symbol table type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h index 0bc12d587d3a..d75fcafe7281 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol * strings and datum values. The type of the datum values diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 569f28034116..14cc7940b36d 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) * @inode: the object * @name: attribute name * @buffer: where to put the result - * @alloc: unused + * @alloc: duplicate memory * * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code */ @@ -1486,43 +1486,38 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, struct super_block *sbp; struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode; struct smack_known *isp; - int ilen; - int rc = 0; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) { + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) isp = smk_of_inode(inode); - ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known); - *buffer = isp->smk_known; - return ilen; - } + else { + /* + * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. + */ + sbp = ip->i_sb; + if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; - /* - * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. - */ - sbp = ip->i_sb; - if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + sock = SOCKET_I(ip); + if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; - sock = SOCKET_I(ip); - if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) - isp = ssp->smk_in; - else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) - isp = ssp->smk_out; - else - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) + isp = ssp->smk_in; + else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) + isp = ssp->smk_out; + else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } - ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known); - if (rc == 0) { - *buffer = isp->smk_known; - rc = ilen; + if (alloc) { + *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*buffer == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; } - return rc; + return strlen(isp->smk_known); } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile index 65dbcb2fd850..b7c6a7ffc058 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile +++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o network.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o targets += builtin-policy.h diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c index a51edfbe593b..0f73fe30e37a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/audit.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index c19970db89c4..25eed4b0b0e8 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/common.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index d9628d1635b2..7adccdd8e36d 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * security/tomoyo/common.h * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c index 6c4528d4b48f..8d0e1b9c9c57 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/condition.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c index 00d223e9fb37..f6758dad981f 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/domain.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/environ.c b/security/tomoyo/environ.c index ad4c6e18a437..7f0a471f19b2 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/environ.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/environ.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/environ.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c index 223f21ffa632..2a374b4da8f5 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/file.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/file.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/gc.c b/security/tomoyo/gc.c index 540bc29e1b5a..e22bea811c57 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/gc.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/gc.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/gc.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/group.c b/security/tomoyo/group.c index 944ad77d8fba..21b0cc3a7e1a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/group.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/group.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/group.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c index 078fac0bb4c5..81b951652051 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/load_policy.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c index 1598b559ac42..12477e0b0a11 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/memory.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/memory.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c index 14b53fb2a0cf..807fd91dbb54 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/mount.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/network.c b/security/tomoyo/network.c index 6c02ac478247..cd6932e5225c 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/network.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/network.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/network.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c index a97b275ca3af..6ff8c21e4fff 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/realpath.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c index 06ab41b1ff28..49393c2a3f8b 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index d25b705360e0..213b8c593668 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c index cac431d381d2..d3d9d9f1edb0 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/util.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/util.c * |