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authorRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>2020-04-27 13:31:28 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2020-05-27 17:42:51 +0300
commitfa63cb9b6ddaa6142cea2b47f0ed0450f48e7f77 (patch)
tree2075a42a0b3140938997d24848e22d1f2145221a /security
parent9bf1124865112379911b97c0c79a8d2277442a5e (diff)
downloadlinux-fa63cb9b6ddaa6142cea2b47f0ed0450f48e7f77.tar.xz
ima: Fix return value of ima_write_policy()
[ Upstream commit 2e3a34e9f409ebe83d1af7cd2f49fca7af97dfac ] This patch fixes the return value of ima_write_policy() when a new policy is directly passed to IMA and the current policy requires appraisal of the file containing the policy. Currently, if appraisal is not in ENFORCE mode, ima_write_policy() returns 0 and leads user space applications to an endless loop. Fix this issue by denying the operation regardless of the appraisal mode. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.10.x Fixes: 19f8a84713edc ("ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c3
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 2c4e83f6409e..d37f9ac46670 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -340,8 +340,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
"policy_update", "signed policy required",
1, 0);
- if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
- result = -EACCES;
+ result = -EACCES;
} else {
result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
}