diff options
author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2009-02-04 17:07:00 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-02-06 01:05:31 +0300 |
commit | 4af4662fa4a9dc62289c580337ae2506339c4729 (patch) | |
tree | faec95258d2456eb35515f289eb688914ce3b54f /security | |
parent | bab739378758a1e2b2d7ddcee7bc06cf4c591c3c (diff) | |
download | linux-4af4662fa4a9dc62289c580337ae2506339c4729.tar.xz |
integrity: IMA policy
Support for a user loadable policy through securityfs
with support for LSM specific policy data.
- free invalid rule in ima_parse_add_rule()
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 67 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 293 |
4 files changed, 386 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 2a761c8ac996..3d2b6ee778a0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -47,3 +47,9 @@ config IMA_AUDIT auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on the kernel command line. +config IMA_LSM_RULES + bool + depends on IMA && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK) + default y + help + Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 9c280cc73004..42706b554921 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -137,4 +137,28 @@ enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK }; int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask); void ima_init_policy(void); void ima_update_policy(void); +int ima_parse_add_rule(char *); +void ima_delete_rules(void); + +/* LSM based policy rules require audit */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES + +#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init +#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match + +#else + +static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 4f25be768b50..95ef1caa64b5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -19,9 +19,11 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/rculist.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> #include "ima.h" +static int valid_policy = 1; #define TMPBUFLEN 12 static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val) @@ -237,11 +239,66 @@ static struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { .release = seq_release, }; +static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *data; + int rc; + + if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + if (*ppos != 0) { + /* No partial writes. */ + return -EINVAL; + } + data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen)) { + kfree(data); + return -EFAULT; + } + *(data + datalen) = '\0'; + rc = ima_parse_add_rule(data); + if (rc < 0) { + datalen = -EINVAL; + valid_policy = 0; + } + + kfree(data); + return datalen; +} + static struct dentry *ima_dir; static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements; static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; static struct dentry *violations; +static struct dentry *ima_policy; + +/* + * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules. + * + * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now + * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file. + */ +static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + if (!valid_policy) { + ima_delete_rules(); + return 0; + } + ima_update_policy(); + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); + ima_policy = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { + .write = ima_write_policy, + .release = ima_release_policy +}; int ima_fs_init(void) { @@ -276,13 +333,20 @@ int ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(violations)) goto out; - return 0; + ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR, + ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measure_policy_ops); + if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) + goto out; + return 0; out: securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); securityfs_remove(ima_dir); + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); return -1; } @@ -293,4 +357,5 @@ void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void) securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); securityfs_remove(ima_dir); + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 7c3d1ffb1472..bd453603e2c3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/magic.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -24,7 +25,12 @@ #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 #define IMA_UID 0x0008 -enum ima_action { DONT_MEASURE, MEASURE }; +enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE }; + +#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 +enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, + LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE +}; struct ima_measure_rule_entry { struct list_head list; @@ -34,8 +40,15 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry { int mask; unsigned long fsmagic; uid_t uid; + struct { + void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ + int type; /* audit type */ + } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; }; +/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be + * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid + */ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, @@ -54,8 +67,11 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { }; static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules); +static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules); static struct list_head *ima_measure; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex); + /** * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule. * @rule: a pointer to a rule @@ -69,6 +85,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) { struct task_struct *tsk = current; + int i; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func) return false; @@ -79,6 +96,39 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid) return false; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { + int rc; + u32 osid, sid; + + if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) + continue; + + switch (i) { + case LSM_OBJ_USER: + case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: + case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, + rule->lsm[i].type, + AUDIT_EQUAL, + rule->lsm[i].rule, + NULL); + break; + case LSM_SUBJ_USER: + case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: + case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); + rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, + rule->lsm[i].type, + AUDIT_EQUAL, + rule->lsm[i].rule, + NULL); + default: + break; + } + if (!rc) + return false; + } return true; } @@ -112,9 +162,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) /** * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. * - * (Could use the default_rules directly, but in policy patch * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the - * the new measure_policy_rules.) + * the new measure_policy_rules. */ void ima_init_policy(void) { @@ -124,3 +173,241 @@ void ima_init_policy(void) list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules); ima_measure = &measure_default_rules; } + +/** + * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules + * + * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new + * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be + * added to the policy. + */ +void ima_update_policy(void) +{ + const char *op = "policy_update"; + const char *cause = "already exists"; + int result = 1; + int audit_info = 0; + + if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) { + ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules; + cause = "complete"; + result = 0; + } + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, + NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info); +} + +enum { + Opt_err = -1, + Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure, + Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, + Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, + Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid +}; + +static match_table_t policy_tokens = { + {Opt_measure, "measure"}, + {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"}, + {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"}, + {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"}, + {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"}, + {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"}, + {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"}, + {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"}, + {Opt_func, "func=%s"}, + {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, + {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, + {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, + char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) +{ + int result; + + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; + result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, + AUDIT_EQUAL, args, + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + return result; +} + +static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + char *p; + int result = 0; + + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS); + + entry->action = -1; + while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) { + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + int token; + unsigned long lnum; + + if (result < 0) + break; + if (!*p) + continue; + token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args); + switch (token) { + case Opt_measure: + audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure"); + entry->action = MEASURE; + break; + case Opt_dont_measure: + audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure"); + entry->action = DONT_MEASURE; + break; + case Opt_func: + audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); + if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = PATH_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) + entry->func = FILE_MMAP; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) + entry->func = BPRM_CHECK; + else + result = -EINVAL; + if (!result) + entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC; + break; + case Opt_mask: + audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from); + if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) + entry->mask = MAY_EXEC; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) + entry->mask = MAY_WRITE; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0) + entry->mask = MAY_READ; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) + entry->mask = MAY_APPEND; + else + result = -EINVAL; + if (!result) + entry->flags |= IMA_MASK; + break; + case Opt_fsmagic: + audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from); + result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, + &entry->fsmagic); + if (!result) + entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; + break; + case Opt_uid: + audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from); + result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); + if (!result) { + entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum; + if (entry->uid != lnum) + result = -EINVAL; + else + entry->flags |= IMA_UID; + } + break; + case Opt_obj_user: + audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_OBJ_USER, + AUDIT_OBJ_USER); + break; + case Opt_obj_role: + audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_OBJ_ROLE, + AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE); + break; + case Opt_obj_type: + audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_OBJ_TYPE, + AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE); + break; + case Opt_subj_user: + audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_SUBJ_USER, + AUDIT_SUBJ_USER); + break; + case Opt_subj_role: + audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, + AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE); + break; + case Opt_subj_type: + audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from); + result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, + LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, + AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); + break; + case Opt_err: + printk(KERN_INFO "%s: unknown token: %s\n", + __FUNCTION__, p); + break; + } + } + if (entry->action == UNKNOWN) + result = -EINVAL; + + audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", result); + audit_log_end(ab); + return result; +} + +/** + * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules + * @rule - ima measurement policy rule + * + * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers. + * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure. + */ +int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) +{ + const char *op = "add_rule"; + struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; + int result = 0; + int audit_info = 0; + + /* Prevent installed policy from changing */ + if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) { + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, + NULL, op, "already exists", + -EACCES, audit_info); + return -EACCES; + } + + entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!entry) { + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, + NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); + + result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry); + if (!result) { + mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules); + mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); + } else + kfree(entry); + return result; +} + +/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */ +void ima_delete_rules() +{ + struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; + + mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) { + list_del(&entry->list); + kfree(entry); + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); +} |