diff options
| author | Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> | 2017-04-20 18:31:30 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2017-05-23 17:23:22 +0300 |
| commit | db59000ab760f8d77b07b7f2898ff61110f88607 (patch) | |
| tree | df6808b9f383cc449bff7630f8448319acaa475c /security/selinux | |
| parent | 46be14d2b6fbc20c9e7008ec8c28b40609ef6f22 (diff) | |
| download | linux-db59000ab760f8d77b07b7f2898ff61110f88607.tar.xz | |
selinux: only invoke capabilities and selinux for CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks
SELinux uses CAP_MAC_ADMIN to control the ability to get or set a raw,
uninterpreted security context unknown to the currently loaded security
policy. When performing these checks, we only want to perform a base
capabilities check and a SELinux permission check. If any other
modules that implement a capable hook are stacked with SELinux, we do
not want to require them to also have to authorize CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
since it may have different implications for their security model.
Rework the CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks within SELinux to only invoke the
capabilities module and the SELinux permission checking.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 735609b19e76..dddb81e06d2d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3107,6 +3107,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } +static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) +{ + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT; + + if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit)) + return false; + if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true)) + return false; + return true; +} + static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { @@ -3138,7 +3150,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; const char *str; @@ -3264,13 +3276,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the * in-core context value, not a denial. */ - error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); - if (!error) - error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true); isec = inode_security(inode); - if (!error) + if (has_cap_mac_admin(false)) error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, &size); else @@ -5919,7 +5926,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) } error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; size_t audit_size; |