diff options
author | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2020-05-12 17:16:29 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2020-05-19 17:42:22 +0300 |
commit | 8c0637e950d68933a67f7438f779d79b049b5e5c (patch) | |
tree | 3a0e17ac6d3dac7dad70f78b9e3e69cb6a2d4e7f /security/selinux | |
parent | e7d553d69cf63aec7de0f38fed49ccbb30922e1e (diff) | |
download | linux-8c0637e950d68933a67f7438f779d79b049b5e5c.tar.xz |
keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.
The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:
(1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
being unset.
(2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).
(3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
(4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.
(5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
calls.
The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.
[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
permits. However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
of the notifications patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 37 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 4c037c2545c1..196acaccbfdd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -6561,20 +6561,43 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, - unsigned perm) + enum key_need_perm need_perm) { struct key *key; struct key_security_struct *ksec; - u32 sid; + u32 perm, sid; - /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the - permission check. No serious, additional covert channels - appear to be created. */ - if (perm == 0) + switch (need_perm) { + case KEY_NEED_VIEW: + perm = KEY__VIEW; + break; + case KEY_NEED_READ: + perm = KEY__READ; + break; + case KEY_NEED_WRITE: + perm = KEY__WRITE; + break; + case KEY_NEED_SEARCH: + perm = KEY__SEARCH; + break; + case KEY_NEED_LINK: + perm = KEY__LINK; + break; + case KEY_NEED_SETATTR: + perm = KEY__SETATTR; + break; + case KEY_NEED_UNLINK: + case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE: + case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE: + case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK: return 0; + default: + WARN_ON(1); + return -EPERM; - sid = cred_sid(cred); + } + sid = cred_sid(cred); key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ksec = key->security; |