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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2009-07-31 20:54:11 +0400
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2009-08-06 03:02:23 +0400
commita2551df7ec568d87793d2eea4ca744e86318f205 (patch)
tree3bdd4257bf757d9d1d64d9d7aa10cd144cd3a657 /security/selinux
parent84336d1a77ccd2c06a730ddd38e695c2324a7386 (diff)
downloadlinux-a2551df7ec568d87793d2eea4ca744e86318f205.tar.xz
Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8a78f584f46e..5dee88362e71 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3040,7 +3040,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
* at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
* if DAC would have also denied the operation.
*/
- if (addr < mmap_min_addr) {
+ if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
if (rc)