diff options
| author | Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> | 2018-03-05 19:47:56 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2018-03-20 23:58:17 +0300 |
| commit | 6b6bc6205d98796361962ee282a063f18ba8dc57 (patch) | |
| tree | b9e6f6492606000e1d8826b4eb2c882726c61722 /security/selinux/xfrm.c | |
| parent | 0619f0f5e36f12e100ef294f5980cfe7c93ff23e (diff) | |
| download | linux-6b6bc6205d98796361962ee282a063f18ba8dc57.tar.xz | |
selinux: wrap AVC state
Wrap the AVC state within the selinux_state structure and
pass it explicitly to all AVC functions. The AVC private state
is encapsulated in a selinux_avc structure that is referenced
from the selinux_state.
This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or
APIs (userspace or LSM).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/xfrm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index a5ac27de571f..91dc3783ed94 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, if (rc) goto err; - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); if (rc) goto err; @@ -142,7 +143,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) if (!ctx) return 0; - return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); } @@ -164,7 +166,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) return -EINVAL; - rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL); return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc); } @@ -203,7 +206,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */ - return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, + return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL) ? 0 : 1); } @@ -422,7 +426,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ - return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, + sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad); } @@ -465,6 +470,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended, * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */ - return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, + return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad); } |