summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/selinux/ss/services.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-07-05 21:26:35 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-07-05 21:26:35 +0300
commite24dd9ee5399747b71c1d982a484fc7601795f31 (patch)
tree14fcec8728916092a9f6dbeb0f2b8d5c5a4e5c9a /security/selinux/ss/services.c
parent7391786a64dcfe9c609a1f8e2204c1abf42ded23 (diff)
parentc4758fa59285fe4dbfeab4364a6957936d040fbf (diff)
downloadlinux-e24dd9ee5399747b71c1d982a484fc7601795f31.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris: - a major update for AppArmor. From JJ: * several bug fixes and cleanups * the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of securityfs symlinks * it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries. * This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top of this. - Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map permission. From Paul: "While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12), the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes. Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2 labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy capabilities on policy load" There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs. - Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a cap_capable call in privilege check. - TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements. - Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files. - IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from the boot command line. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits) apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join seccomp: Clean up core dump logic IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature ima: Simplify policy_func_show. integrity: Small code improvements ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size() ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers ima: introduce ima_parse_buf() ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list ima: use memdup_user_nul ima: fix up #endif comments IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled() ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/ss/services.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c108
1 files changed, 108 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 60d9b0252321..2f02fa67ec2e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -70,6 +70,15 @@
#include "ebitmap.h"
#include "audit.h"
+/* Policy capability names */
+char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
+ "network_peer_controls",
+ "open_perms",
+ "extended_socket_class",
+ "always_check_network",
+ "cgroup_seclabel"
+};
+
int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
int selinux_policycap_openperm;
int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
@@ -1986,6 +1995,9 @@ bad:
static void security_load_policycaps(void)
{
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
@@ -1997,6 +2009,17 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
+ pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n",
+ selinux_policycap_names[i],
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i));
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) {
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+ pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n",
+ i);
+ }
}
static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
@@ -2031,9 +2054,11 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (!ss_initialized) {
avtab_cache_init();
+ ebitmap_cache_init();
rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
if (rc) {
avtab_cache_destroy();
+ ebitmap_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
@@ -2044,6 +2069,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
+ ebitmap_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
@@ -2051,6 +2077,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
+ ebitmap_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
@@ -2210,6 +2237,87 @@ out:
}
/**
+ * security_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
+ * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
+ * @dev_name: device name
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
+ !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+ dev_name,
+ IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
* security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
* @name: interface name
* @if_sid: interface SID