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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2008-02-28 20:58:40 +0300
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2008-04-18 14:26:06 +0400
commitb0c636b99997c8594da6a46e166ce4fcf6956fda (patch)
tree16308f0324846cd8c19180b6a45793268dd16f50 /security/selinux/ss/services.c
parentd4ee4231a3a8731576ef0e0a7e1225e4fde1e659 (diff)
downloadlinux-b0c636b99997c8594da6a46e166ce4fcf6956fda.tar.xz
SELinux: create new open permission
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to /tmp/output than if the program tried to directly open /tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/ss/services.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 26de2be0c8e2..4a14348de876 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
+int selinux_policycap_openperm;
/*
* This is declared in avc.c
@@ -1308,6 +1309,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
{
selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
+ selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
}
extern void selinux_complete_init(void);