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authorPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>2023-12-19 20:35:28 +0300
committerPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>2023-12-19 20:35:28 +0300
commit1728df7fc11bf09322852ff05e73908244011594 (patch)
treeea7b744713df95ad4abeba79cb10ef3dbd4c4730 /security/security.c
parent62ed78f3baff396bd928ee77077580c5aa940149 (diff)
parentd17aff807f845cf93926c28705216639c7279110 (diff)
downloadlinux-1728df7fc11bf09322852ff05e73908244011594.tar.xz
Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2023-12-19 Hi David, hi Jakub, hi Paolo, hi Eric, The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree. We've added 2 non-merge commits during the last 1 day(s) which contain a total of 40 files changed, 642 insertions(+), 2926 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Revert all of BPF token-related patches for now as per list discussion [0], from Andrii Nakryiko. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAHk-=wg7JuFYwGy=GOMbRCtOL+jwSQsdUaBsRWkDVYbxipbM5A@mail.gmail.com 2) Fix a syzbot-reported use-after-free read in nla_find() triggered from bpf_skb_get_nlattr_nest() helper, from Jakub Kicinski. bpf-next-for-netdev * tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: Revert BPF token-related functionality bpf: Use nla_ok() instead of checking nla_len directly ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219170359.11035-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c101
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 85 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 088a79c35c26..dcb3e7014f9b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5167,87 +5167,29 @@ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
}
/**
- * security_bpf_map_create() - Check if BPF map creation is allowed
- * @map: BPF map object
- * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF map
- * @token: BPF token used to grant user access
- *
- * Do a check when the kernel creates a new BPF map. This is also the
- * point where LSM blob is allocated for LSMs that need them.
- *
- * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
- */
-int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
- struct bpf_token *token)
-{
- return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, 0, map, attr, token);
-}
-
-/**
- * security_bpf_prog_load() - Check if loading of BPF program is allowed
- * @prog: BPF program object
- * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF program
- * @token: BPF token used to grant user access to BPF subsystem
- *
- * Perform an access control check when the kernel loads a BPF program and
- * allocates associated BPF program object. This hook is also responsible for
- * allocating any required LSM state for the BPF program.
- *
- * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
- */
-int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
- struct bpf_token *token)
-{
- return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, 0, prog, attr, token);
-}
-
-/**
- * security_bpf_token_create() - Check if creating of BPF token is allowed
- * @token: BPF token object
- * @attr: BPF syscall attributes used to create BPF token
- * @path: path pointing to BPF FS mount point from which BPF token is created
- *
- * Do a check when the kernel instantiates a new BPF token object from BPF FS
- * instance. This is also the point where LSM blob can be allocated for LSMs.
- *
- * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
- */
-int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
- struct path *path)
-{
- return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, 0, token, attr, path);
-}
-
-/**
- * security_bpf_token_cmd() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
- * requested BPF syscall command
- * @token: BPF token object
- * @cmd: BPF syscall command requested to be delegated by BPF token
+ * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob
+ * @map: bpf map
*
- * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
- * delegation of requested BPF syscall command.
+ * Initialize the security field inside bpf map.
*
* Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
*/
-int security_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd)
+int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
{
- return call_int_hook(bpf_token_cmd, 0, token, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
}
/**
- * security_bpf_token_capable() - Check if BPF token is allowed to delegate
- * requested BPF-related capability
- * @token: BPF token object
- * @cap: capabilities requested to be delegated by BPF token
+ * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob
+ * @aux: bpf program aux info struct
*
- * Do a check when the kernel decides whether provided BPF token should allow
- * delegation of requested BPF-related capabilities.
+ * Initialize the security field inside bpf program.
*
* Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
*/
-int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
+int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
- return call_int_hook(bpf_token_capable, 0, token, cap);
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
}
/**
@@ -5258,29 +5200,18 @@ int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
*/
void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
{
- call_void_hook(bpf_map_free, map);
-}
-
-/**
- * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a BPF program's LSM blob
- * @prog: BPF program struct
- *
- * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF program.
- */
-void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
-{
- call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free, prog);
+ call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
}
/**
- * security_bpf_token_free() - Free a BPF token's LSM blob
- * @token: BPF token struct
+ * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob
+ * @aux: bpf program aux info struct
*
- * Clean up the security information stored inside BPF token.
+ * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
*/
-void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
+void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
{
- call_void_hook(bpf_token_free, token);
+ call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */