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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2018-09-07 22:16:24 +0300
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2018-10-10 19:56:14 +0300
commit691115c3513ec83edf68ba6575ae85630bc94b8b (patch)
tree8e77e6e14650f10a67a314380362f9430254e151 /security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
parente6123c524064a571616ec978b1317f1696eff0ae (diff)
downloadlinux-691115c3513ec83edf68ba6575ae85630bc94b8b.tar.xz
vfs: require i_size <= SIZE_MAX in kernel_read_file()
On 32-bit systems, the buffer allocated by kernel_read_file() is too small if the file size is > SIZE_MAX, due to truncation to size_t. Fortunately, since the 'count' argument to kernel_read() is also truncated to size_t, only the allocated space is filled; then, -EIO is returned since 'pos != i_size' after the read loop. But this is not obvious and seems incidental. We should be more explicit about this case. So, fail early if i_size > SIZE_MAX. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions