summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-02-01 00:07:35 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-02-01 00:07:35 +0300
commit3c29548f87f9545f2f3c1cd1a784fae8ad2d53ba (patch)
treea6ee072fea6f32e40fad48319ddf3cc3eca53dcb /security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
parente1c70f32386c4984ed8ca1a7aedb9bbff9ed3414 (diff)
parent36447456e1cca853188505f2a964dbbeacfc7a7a (diff)
downloadlinux-3c29548f87f9545f2f3c1cd1a784fae8ad2d53ba.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "This contains a mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and new functionality. Of note is the integrity cache locking fix, file change detection, and support for a new EVM portable and immutable signature type. The re-introduction of the integrity cache lock (iint) fixes the problem of attempting to take the i_rwsem shared a second time, when it was previously taken exclusively. Defining atomic flags resolves the original iint/i_rwsem circular locking - accessing the file data vs. modifying the file metadata. Although it fixes the O_DIRECT problem as well, a subsequent patch is needed to remove the explicit O_DIRECT prevention. For performance reasons, detecting when a file has changed and needs to be re-measured, re-appraised, and/or re-audited, was limited to after the last writer has closed, and only if the file data has changed. Detecting file change is based on i_version. For filesystems that do not support i_version, remote filesystems, or userspace filesystems, the file was measured, appraised and/or audited once and never re-evaluated. Now local filesystems, which do not support i_version or are not mounted with the i_version option, assume the file has changed and are required to re-evaluate the file. This change does not address detecting file change on remote or userspace filesystems. Unlike file data signatures, which can be included and distributed in software packages (eg. rpm, deb), the existing EVM signature, which protects the file metadata, could not be included in software packages, as it includes file system specific information (eg. i_ino, possibly the UUID). This pull request defines a new EVM portable and immutable file metadata signature format, which can be included in software packages" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: ima/policy: fix parsing of fsuuid ima: Use i_version only when filesystem supports it integrity: remove unneeded initializations in integrity_iint_cache entries ima: log message to module appraisal error ima: pass filename to ima_rdwr_violation_check() ima: Fix line continuation format ima: support new "hash" and "dont_hash" policy actions ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock EVM: Add support for portable signature format EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata ima: relax requiring a file signature for new files with zero length
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c6ae42266270..08fe405338e1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ err_out:
*/
int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
{
- int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
+ int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;