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author | Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> | 2018-08-16 23:13:03 +0300 |
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committer | Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> | 2018-08-16 23:21:29 +0300 |
commit | 0a3173a5f09bc58a3638ecfd0a80bdbae55e123c (patch) | |
tree | d6c0bc84863cca54dfbde3b7463e5d49c82af9f1 /security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | |
parent | 92f4e77c85918eab5e5803d7e28ab89a7e6bd3a2 (diff) | |
parent | 5c60a7389d795e001c8748b458eb76e3a5b6008c (diff) | |
download | linux-0a3173a5f09bc58a3638ecfd0a80bdbae55e123c.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'linus/master' into rdma.git for-next
rdma.git merge resolution for the 4.19 merge window
Conflicts:
drivers/infiniband/core/rdma_core.c
- Use the rdma code and revise with the new spelling for
atomic_fetch_add_unless
drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c
- Replace max_sge with max_send_sge in new blk code
drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c
- Use the blk code and revise to use NULL for ib_post_recv when
appropriate
- Replace max_sge with max_recv_sge in new blk code
net/rds/ib_send.c
- Use the net code and revise to use NULL for ib_post_recv when
appropriate
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 23 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index ab6a029062a1..6dc075144508 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -115,3 +115,26 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } + +/** + * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests + * @kmod_name: kernel module name + * + * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA + * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to + * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try + * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name. + * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, + * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(). + * + * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification + * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies + * also signed with digsig. + */ +int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +{ + if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} |