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authorJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>2018-08-16 23:13:03 +0300
committerJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>2018-08-16 23:21:29 +0300
commit0a3173a5f09bc58a3638ecfd0a80bdbae55e123c (patch)
treed6c0bc84863cca54dfbde3b7463e5d49c82af9f1 /security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
parent92f4e77c85918eab5e5803d7e28ab89a7e6bd3a2 (diff)
parent5c60a7389d795e001c8748b458eb76e3a5b6008c (diff)
downloadlinux-0a3173a5f09bc58a3638ecfd0a80bdbae55e123c.tar.xz
Merge branch 'linus/master' into rdma.git for-next
rdma.git merge resolution for the 4.19 merge window Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/core/rdma_core.c - Use the rdma code and revise with the new spelling for atomic_fetch_add_unless drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c - Replace max_sge with max_send_sge in new blk code drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c - Use the blk code and revise to use NULL for ib_post_recv when appropriate - Replace max_sge with max_recv_sge in new blk code net/rds/ib_send.c - Use the net code and revise to use NULL for ib_post_recv when appropriate Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c23
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index ab6a029062a1..6dc075144508 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -115,3 +115,26 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
+
+/**
+ * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
+ * @kmod_name: kernel module name
+ *
+ * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
+ * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
+ * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
+ * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
+ *
+ * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
+ * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
+ * also signed with digsig.
+ */
+int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}