diff options
author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2012-10-16 01:02:07 +0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> | 2012-12-14 06:35:24 +0400 |
commit | 2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839 (patch) | |
tree | b8190d17aa5d59508f8c979ce0160f21bef89500 /security/capability.c | |
parent | 2f3238aebedb243804f58d62d57244edec4149b2 (diff) | |
download | linux-2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839.tar.xz |
security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/capability.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index b14a30c234b8..0fe5a026aef8 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) return 0; } +static int cap_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) +{ + return 0; +} + static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return 0; @@ -967,6 +972,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid); |