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authorQasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>2025-02-14 00:05:53 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2025-04-10 15:39:40 +0300
commit0beddc2a3f9b9cf7d8887973041e36c2d0fa3652 (patch)
tree7aa8d90db9b840d1e53c6f3856057d646240e764 /scripts/generate_rust_analyzer.py
parentb47584c556444cf7acb66b26a62cbc348eb92b78 (diff)
downloadlinux-0beddc2a3f9b9cf7d8887973041e36c2d0fa3652.tar.xz
jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()
commit fdf480da5837c23b146c4743c18de97202fcab37 upstream. During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs "ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump(). Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped: int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)); Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads "size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328). The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned type), this is then stored inside a variable called "int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() on each iteration: for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) { linelen = min(remaining, rowsize); remaining -= rowsize; hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize, linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii); ... } The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following for loop: for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { if (linebuflen < lx + 2) goto overflow2; ch = ptr[j]; ... } To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)" before it is utilised. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e6e7e4279d046613bc5 Fixes: d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/generate_rust_analyzer.py')
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