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author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> | 2011-11-30 02:00:26 +0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> | 2012-01-26 05:24:48 +0400 |
commit | a141a5eb3ab45131cb168e7a561d662722b43ec3 (patch) | |
tree | f72da23ff947391cc5181842a34b39db81f1dc63 /net/sunrpc/svc.c | |
parent | 7df22768c0af8769d805f6db21144d71d91fe13d (diff) | |
download | linux-a141a5eb3ab45131cb168e7a561d662722b43ec3.tar.xz |
svcrpc: avoid memory-corruption on pool shutdown
commit b4f36f88b3ee7cf26bf0be84e6c7fc15f84dcb71 upstream.
Socket callbacks use svc_xprt_enqueue() to add an xprt to a
pool->sp_sockets list. In normal operation a server thread will later
come along and take the xprt off that list. On shutdown, after all the
threads have exited, we instead manually walk the sv_tempsocks and
sv_permsocks lists to find all the xprt's and delete them.
So the sp_sockets lists don't really matter any more. As a result,
we've mostly just ignored them and hoped they would go away.
Which has gotten us into trouble; witness for example ebc63e531cc6
"svcrpc: fix list-corrupting race on nfsd shutdown", the result of Ben
Greear noticing that a still-running svc_xprt_enqueue() could re-add an
xprt to an sp_sockets list just before it was deleted. The fix was to
remove it from the list at the end of svc_delete_xprt(). But that only
made corruption less likely--I can see nothing that prevents a
svc_xprt_enqueue() from adding another xprt to the list at the same
moment that we're removing this xprt from the list. In fact, despite
the earlier xpo_detach(), I don't even see what guarantees that
svc_xprt_enqueue() couldn't still be running on this xprt.
So, instead, note that svc_xprt_enqueue() essentially does:
lock sp_lock
if XPT_BUSY unset
add to sp_sockets
unlock sp_lock
So, if we do:
set XPT_BUSY on every xprt.
Empty every sp_sockets list, under the sp_socks locks.
Then we're left knowing that the sp_sockets lists are all empty and will
stay that way, since any svc_xprt_enqueue() will check XPT_BUSY under
the sp_lock and see it set.
And *then* we can continue deleting the xprt's.
(Thanks to Jeff Layton for being correctly suspicious of this code....)
Cc: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/svc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/svc.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc.c b/net/sunrpc/svc.c index 4d5cb99194c4..ce5f111fe325 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svc.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc.c @@ -475,7 +475,15 @@ svc_destroy(struct svc_serv *serv) printk("svc_destroy: no threads for serv=%p!\n", serv); del_timer_sync(&serv->sv_temptimer); - + /* + * The set of xprts (contained in the sv_tempsocks and + * sv_permsocks lists) is now constant, since it is modified + * only by accepting new sockets (done by service threads in + * svc_recv) or aging old ones (done by sv_temptimer), or + * configuration changes (excluded by whatever locking the + * caller is using--nfsd_mutex in the case of nfsd). So it's + * safe to traverse those lists and shut everything down: + */ svc_close_all(serv); if (serv->sv_shutdown) |