[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk

This patch implements the receive path needed to process authenticated
chunks.  Add ability to process the AUTH chunk and handle edge cases
for authenticated COOKIE-ECHO as well.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 216 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 385486360fe9..5aef4aafdfdc 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -138,6 +138,11 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_chunk(
 				     void *arg,
 				     sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands);
 
+static sctp_ierror_t sctp_sf_authenticate(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				    const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				    const sctp_subtype_t type,
+				    struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
+
 /* Small helper function that checks if the chunk length
  * is of the appropriate length.  The 'required_length' argument
  * is set to be the size of a specific chunk we are testing.
@@ -495,8 +500,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 			      (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr, chunk,
 			      &err_chunk)) {
 
-		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
-
 		/* This chunk contains fatal error. It is to be discarded.
 		 * Send an ABORT, with causes if there is any.
 		 */
@@ -521,6 +524,22 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 			sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 			error = SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM;
 		}
+
+		/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
+		 *    It should be noted that if the receiver wants to tear
+		 *    down an association in an authenticated way only, the
+		 *    handling of malformed packets should not result in
+		 *    tearing down the association.
+		 *
+		 * This means that if we only want to abort associations
+		 * in an authenticated way (i.e AUTH+ABORT), then we
+		 * can't destory this association just becuase the packet
+		 * was malformed.
+		 */
+		if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc))
+			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
+		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
 		return sctp_stop_t1_and_abort(commands, error, ECONNREFUSED,
 						asoc, chunk->transport);
 	}
@@ -699,6 +718,36 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 	if (error)
 		goto nomem_init;
 
+	/* SCTP-AUTH:  auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
+	 * is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
+	 * authentication.  We've just recreated the association using
+	 * the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
+	 * do the authentication.
+	 */
+	if (chunk->auth_chunk) {
+		struct sctp_chunk auth;
+		sctp_ierror_t ret;
+
+		/* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
+		auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
+		auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
+		auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
+		auth.chunk_hdr = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
+					    sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+		skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
+		auth.transport = chunk->transport;
+
+		ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
+
+		/* We can now safely free the auth_chunk clone */
+		kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk);
+
+		if (ret != SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR) {
+			sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
+			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+		}
+	}
+
 	repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
 	if (!repl)
 		goto nomem_init;
@@ -3653,6 +3702,156 @@ gen_shutdown:
 }
 
 /*
+ * SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receving authenticated chukns
+ *
+ *    The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in the HMAC
+ *    Identifier field.  If this algorithm was not specified by the
+ *    receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk
+ *    during association setup, the AUTH chunk and all chunks after it MUST
+ *    be discarded and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
+ *    defined in Section 4.1.
+ *
+ *    If an endpoint with no shared key receives a Shared Key Identifier
+ *    other than 0, it MUST silently discard all authenticated chunks.  If
+ *    the endpoint has at least one endpoint pair shared key for the peer,
+ *    it MUST use the key specified by the Shared Key Identifier if a
+ *    key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier.  If no
+ *    endpoint pair shared key has been configured for that Shared Key
+ *    Identifier, all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded.
+ *
+ * Verification Tag:  8.5 Verification Tag [Normal verification]
+ *
+ * The return value is the disposition of the chunk.
+ */
+static sctp_ierror_t sctp_sf_authenticate(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				    const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				    const sctp_subtype_t type,
+				    struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
+{
+	struct sctp_authhdr *auth_hdr;
+	struct sctp_hmac *hmac;
+	unsigned int sig_len;
+	__u16 key_id;
+	__u8 *save_digest;
+	__u8 *digest;
+
+	/* Pull in the auth header, so we can do some more verification */
+	auth_hdr = (struct sctp_authhdr *)chunk->skb->data;
+	chunk->subh.auth_hdr = auth_hdr;
+	skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(struct sctp_authhdr));
+
+	/* Make sure that we suport the HMAC algorithm from the auth
+	 * chunk.
+	 */
+	if (!sctp_auth_asoc_verify_hmac_id(asoc, auth_hdr->hmac_id))
+		return SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_HMAC;
+
+	/* Make sure that the provided shared key identifier has been
+	 * configured
+	 */
+	key_id = ntohs(auth_hdr->shkey_id);
+	if (key_id != asoc->active_key_id && !sctp_auth_get_shkey(asoc, key_id))
+		return SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_KEYID;
+
+
+	/* Make sure that the length of the signature matches what
+	 * we expect.
+	 */
+	sig_len = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_auth_chunk_t);
+	hmac = sctp_auth_get_hmac(ntohs(auth_hdr->hmac_id));
+	if (sig_len != hmac->hmac_len)
+		return SCTP_IERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION;
+
+	/* Now that we've done validation checks, we can compute and
+	 * verify the hmac.  The steps involved are:
+	 *  1. Save the digest from the chunk.
+	 *  2. Zero out the digest in the chunk.
+	 *  3. Compute the new digest
+	 *  4. Compare saved and new digests.
+	 */
+	digest = auth_hdr->hmac;
+	skb_pull(chunk->skb, sig_len);
+
+	save_digest = kmemdup(digest, sig_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!save_digest)
+		goto nomem;
+
+	memset(digest, 0, sig_len);
+
+	sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(asoc, chunk->skb,
+				(struct sctp_auth_chunk *)chunk->chunk_hdr,
+				GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+	/* Discard the packet if the digests do not match */
+	if (memcmp(save_digest, digest, sig_len)) {
+		kfree(save_digest);
+		return SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG;
+	}
+
+	kfree(save_digest);
+	chunk->auth = 1;
+
+	return SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR;
+nomem:
+	return SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
+}
+
+sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_eat_auth(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				    const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+				    const sctp_subtype_t type,
+				    void *arg,
+				    sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
+{
+	struct sctp_authhdr *auth_hdr;
+	struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+	struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk;
+	sctp_ierror_t error;
+
+	if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
+		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
+				SCTP_NULL());
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+	}
+
+	/* Make sure that the AUTH chunk has valid length.  */
+	if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk)))
+		return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+						  commands);
+
+	auth_hdr = (struct sctp_authhdr *)chunk->skb->data;
+	error = sctp_sf_authenticate(ep, asoc, type, chunk);
+	switch (error) {
+		case SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_HMAC:
+			/* Generate the ERROR chunk and discard the rest
+			 * of the packet
+			 */
+			err_chunk = sctp_make_op_error(asoc, chunk,
+							SCTP_ERROR_UNSUP_HMAC,
+							&auth_hdr->hmac_id,
+							sizeof(__u16));
+			if (err_chunk) {
+				sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
+						SCTP_CHUNK(err_chunk));
+			}
+			/* Fall Through */
+		case SCTP_IERROR_AUTH_BAD_KEYID:
+		case SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG:
+			return sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+			break;
+		case SCTP_IERROR_PROTO_VIOLATION:
+			return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(ep, asoc, type, arg,
+							  commands);
+			break;
+		case SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
+			return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
+		default:
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
+}
+
+/*
  * Process an unknown chunk.
  *
  * Section: 3.2. Also, 2.1 in the implementor's guide.
@@ -3857,6 +4056,20 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation(
 	if (!abort)
 		goto nomem;
 
+	/* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3:
+	 *    It should be noted that if the receiver wants to tear
+	 *    down an association in an authenticated way only, the
+	 *    handling of malformed packets should not result in
+	 *    tearing down the association.
+	 *
+	 * This means that if we only want to abort associations
+	 * in an authenticated way (i.e AUTH+ABORT), then we
+	 * can't destory this association just becuase the packet
+	 * was malformed.
+	 */
+	if (sctp_auth_recv_cid(SCTP_CID_ABORT, asoc))
+		goto discard;
+
 	if (asoc) {
 		sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
 		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
@@ -3894,6 +4107,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_abort_violation(
 		SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
 	}
 
+discard:
 	sctp_sf_pdiscard(ep, asoc, SCTP_ST_CHUNK(0), arg, commands);
 
 	SCTP_INC_STATS(SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);