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author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-12-10 21:41:24 +0300 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-01-09 19:14:42 +0300 |
commit | 26a697a9a56ccba99f5ed900dcb0973ff828e75f (patch) | |
tree | 149b2e13a1f2fe1b86cd0ab4336fee9311e9ed04 /net/ipv6 | |
parent | d2dd9f1593dc4d5ceb5cf4a973ed2c6e3a49d799 (diff) | |
download | linux-26a697a9a56ccba99f5ed900dcb0973ff828e75f.tar.xz |
ipv4: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
[ Upstream commit 5648451e30a0d13d11796574919a359025d52cce ]
vr.vifi is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1616 ipmr_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1690 ipmr_compat_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'mrt->vif_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing vr.vifi before using it to index mrt->vif_table'
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions