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author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2015-10-13 05:13:41 +0300 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2015-10-13 05:13:41 +0300 |
commit | c1bf5fe03184f782f2a6827cf314ae58834865da (patch) | |
tree | ce888633783880b3970d2270fc1428fbbb84259e /net/core | |
parent | 0fa28877b26641cca56b607ccec1fcbda7ae09c6 (diff) | |
parent | bf5088773faffc4a052b95aa978a1660bf5f3f8d (diff) | |
download | linux-c1bf5fe03184f782f2a6827cf314ae58834865da.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'bpf-unprivileged'
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
bpf: unprivileged
v1-v2:
- this set logically depends on cb patch
"bpf: fix cb access in socket filter programs":
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/527391/
which is must have to allow unprivileged programs.
Thanks Daniel for finding that issue.
- refactored sysctl to be similar to 'modules_disabled'
- dropped bpf_trace_printk
- split tests into separate patch and added more tests
based on discussion
v1 cover letter:
I think it is time to liberate eBPF from CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
As was discussed when eBPF was first introduced two years ago
the only piece missing in eBPF verifier is 'pointer leak detection'
to make it available to non-root users.
Patch 1 adds this pointer analysis.
The eBPF programs, obviously, need to see and operate on kernel addresses,
but with these extra checks they won't be able to pass these addresses
to user space.
Patch 2 adds accounting of kernel memory used by programs and maps.
It changes behavoir for existing root users, but I think it needs
to be done consistently for both root and non-root, since today
programs and maps are only limited by number of open FDs (RLIMIT_NOFILE).
Patch 2 accounts program's and map's kernel memory as RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.
Unprivileged eBPF is only meaningful for 'socket filter'-like programs.
eBPF programs for tracing and TC classifiers/actions will stay root only.
In parallel the bpf fuzzing effort is ongoing and so far
we've found only one verifier bug and that was already fixed.
The 'constant blinding' pass also being worked on.
It will obfuscate constant-like values that are part of eBPF ISA
to make jit spraying attacks even harder.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core')
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/filter.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 5f4cf1cffed3..0b00094932ab 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -1640,7 +1640,8 @@ sk_filter_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) case BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns: return &bpf_ktime_get_ns_proto; case BPF_FUNC_trace_printk: - return bpf_get_trace_printk_proto(); + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return bpf_get_trace_printk_proto(); default: return NULL; } |