Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next

Pull networking merge from David Miller:
 "1) Move ixgbe driver over to purely page based buffering on receive.
     From Alexander Duyck.

  2) Add receive packet steering support to e1000e, from Bruce Allan.

  3) Convert TCP MD5 support over to RCU, from Eric Dumazet.

  4) Reduce cpu usage in handling out-of-order TCP packets on modern
     systems, also from Eric Dumazet.

  5) Support the IP{,V6}_UNICAST_IF socket options, making the wine
     folks happy, from Erich Hoover.

  6) Support VLAN trunking from guests in hyperv driver, from Haiyang
     Zhang.

  7) Support byte-queue-limtis in r8169, from Igor Maravic.

  8) Outline code intended for IP_RECVTOS in IP_PKTOPTIONS existed but
     was never properly implemented, Jiri Benc fixed that.

  9) 64-bit statistics support in r8169 and 8139too, from Junchang Wang.

  10) Support kernel side dump filtering by ctmark in netfilter
      ctnetlink, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.

  11) Support byte-queue-limits in gianfar driver, from Paul Gortmaker.

  12) Add new peek socket options to assist with socket migration, from
      Pavel Emelyanov.

  13) Add sch_plug packet scheduler whose queue is controlled by
      userland daemons using explicit freeze and release commands.  From
      Shriram Rajagopalan.

  14) Fix FCOE checksum offload handling on transmit, from Yi Zou."

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1846 commits)
  Fix pppol2tp getsockname()
  Remove printk from rds_sendmsg
  ipv6: fix incorrent ipv6 ipsec packet fragment
  cpsw: Hook up default ndo_change_mtu.
  net: qmi_wwan: fix build error due to cdc-wdm dependecy
  netdev: driver: ethernet: Add TI CPSW driver
  netdev: driver: ethernet: add cpsw address lookup engine support
  phy: add am79c874 PHY support
  mlx4_core: fix race on comm channel
  bonding: send igmp report for its master
  fs_enet: Add MPC5125 FEC support and PHY interface selection
  net: bpf_jit: fix BPF_S_LDX_B_MSH compilation
  net: update the usage of CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY
  fcoe: use CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY instead of CHECKSUM_PARTIAL on tx
  net: do not do gso for CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY in netif_needs_gso
  ixgbe: Fix issues with SR-IOV loopback when flow control is disabled
  net/hyperv: Fix the code handling tx busy
  ixgbe: fix namespace issues when FCoE/DCB is not enabled
  rtlwifi: Remove unused ETH_ADDR_LEN defines
  igbvf: Use ETH_ALEN
  ...

Fix up fairly trivial conflicts in drivers/isdn/gigaset/interface.c and
drivers/net/usb/{Kconfig,qmi_wwan.c} as per David.

1 files changed, 60 insertions, 48 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 32c47de30344..deb119875fd9 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
 
-#define SMP_TIMEOUT 30000 /* 30 seconds */
+#define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
 
 static inline void swap128(u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
 {
@@ -186,8 +186,7 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 	hci_send_acl(conn->hchan, skb, 0);
 
 	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
-	schedule_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer,
-					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+	schedule_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
 }
 
 static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
@@ -217,7 +216,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 {
 	u8 dist_keys = 0;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->flags)) {
+	if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
 		dist_keys = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 	} else {
@@ -250,21 +249,27 @@ static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
 			(max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
-	smp->smp_key_size = max_key_size;
+	smp->enc_key_size = max_key_size;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason, u8 send)
 {
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
 	if (send)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
 								&reason);
 
-	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend);
-	mgmt_auth_failed(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, reason);
-	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
-	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
+	mgmt_auth_failed(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->type,
+			 hcon->dst_type, reason);
+
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags)) {
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+	}
 }
 
 #define JUST_WORKS	0x00
@@ -305,7 +310,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 			remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
 		method = JUST_WORKS;
 	else
-		method = gen_method[local_io][remote_io];
+		method = gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
 
 	/* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */
 	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM)
@@ -346,9 +351,11 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
 
 	if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
-		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst);
+		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
 	else
 		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
 						cpu_to_le32(passkey), 0);
 
 	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
@@ -377,12 +384,11 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	if (conn->hcon->out)
 		ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 0,
-				conn->src, conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst,
-				res);
+			     conn->src, conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, res);
 	else
 		ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
-				conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src,
-				res);
+			     conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src,
+			     res);
 	if (ret) {
 		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 		goto error;
@@ -417,12 +423,10 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	if (hcon->out)
 		ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, 0,
-				conn->src, hcon->dst_type, conn->dst,
-				res);
+			     conn->src, hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, res);
 	else
 		ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
-				hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src,
-				res);
+			     hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src, res);
 	if (ret) {
 		reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 		goto error;
@@ -446,16 +450,16 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, key);
 		swap128(key, stk);
 
-		memset(stk + smp->smp_key_size, 0,
-				SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->smp_key_size);
+		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+		       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
 
-		if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend)) {
+		if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags)) {
 			reason = SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 			goto error;
 		}
 
 		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk);
-		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->smp_key_size;
+		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
 	} else {
 		u8 stk[16], r[16], rand[8];
 		__le16 ediv;
@@ -469,11 +473,12 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, key);
 		swap128(key, stk);
 
-		memset(stk + smp->smp_key_size, 0,
-				SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->smp_key_size);
+		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+				SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
 
-		hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, 0, conn->dst, smp->smp_key_size,
-							ediv, rand, stk);
+		hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			    HCI_SMP_STK_SLAVE, 0, 0, stk, smp->enc_key_size,
+			    ediv, rand);
 	}
 
 	return;
@@ -506,7 +511,7 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 {
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
 
-	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend);
+	BUG_ON(!smp);
 
 	if (smp->tfm)
 		crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm);
@@ -571,7 +576,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
-	if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend))
+	if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
 		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
 
 	smp = conn->smp_chan;
@@ -584,6 +589,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)
 		auth = req->auth_req;
 
+	conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
 	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
 
 	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
@@ -698,23 +705,18 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static u8 smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 {
-	struct link_key *key;
-	struct key_master_id *master;
+	struct smp_ltk *key;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
-	key = hci_find_link_key_type(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
-						HCI_LK_SMP_LTK);
+	key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type);
 	if (!key)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND,
-					&hcon->pend))
+	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
 		return 1;
 
-	master = (void *) key->data;
-	hci_le_start_enc(hcon, master->ediv, master->rand,
-						key->val);
-	hcon->enc_key_size = key->pin_len;
+	hci_le_start_enc(hcon, key->ediv, key->rand, key->val);
+	hcon->enc_key_size = key->enc_size;
 
 	return 1;
 
@@ -733,7 +735,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->pend))
+	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
 		return 0;
 
 	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
@@ -772,7 +774,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 		if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
 			goto done;
 
-	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->pend))
+	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
 		return 0;
 
 	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
@@ -817,13 +819,19 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 authenticated;
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
-	hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, 1, conn->dst, smp->smp_key_size,
-						rp->ediv, rp->rand, smp->tk);
-
+	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
+	authenticated = (conn->hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
+	hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+		    HCI_SMP_LTK, 1, authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+		    rp->ediv, rp->rand);
 	smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1);
+	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -908,7 +916,7 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force);
 
-	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend))
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
 		return 0;
 
 	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
@@ -933,6 +941,8 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
 	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
 		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
 		struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+		struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+		u8 authenticated;
 		__le16 ediv;
 
 		get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
@@ -941,8 +951,10 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
 
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
 
-		hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, 1, conn->dst, smp->smp_key_size,
-						ediv, ident.rand, enc.ltk);
+		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+		hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			    HCI_SMP_LTK_SLAVE, 1, authenticated,
+			    enc.ltk, smp->enc_key_size, ediv, ident.rand);
 
 		ident.ediv = cpu_to_le16(ediv);
 
@@ -982,7 +994,7 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
 	}
 
 	if (conn->hcon->out || force) {
-		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend);
+		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
 		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
 		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
 	}