diff options
author | Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> | 2018-12-01 01:09:28 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-12-01 01:56:14 +0300 |
commit | 5b51072e97d587186c2f5390c8c9c1fb7e179505 (patch) | |
tree | cf44d96603bf41b0c4c8d9f32194e9bc8176dce7 /mm/userfaultfd.c | |
parent | 9e368259ad988356c4c95150fafd1a06af095d98 (diff) | |
download | linux-5b51072e97d587186c2f5390c8c9c1fb7e179505.tar.xz |
userfaultfd: shmem: allocate anonymous memory for MAP_PRIVATE shmem
Userfaultfd did not create private memory when UFFDIO_COPY was invoked
on a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping. Instead it wrote to the shmem file,
even when that had not been opened for writing. Though, fortunately,
that could only happen where there was a hole in the file.
Fix the shmem-backed implementation of UFFDIO_COPY to create private
memory for MAP_PRIVATE mappings. The hugetlbfs-backed implementation
was already correct.
This change is visible to userland, if userfaultfd has been used in
unintended ways: so it introduces a small risk of incompatibility, but
is necessary in order to respect file permissions.
An app that uses UFFDIO_COPY for anything like postcopy live migration
won't notice the difference, and in fact it'll run faster because there
will be no copy-on-write and memory waste in the tmpfs pagecache
anymore.
Userfaults on MAP_PRIVATE shmem keep triggering only on file holes like
before.
The real zeropage can also be built on a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping
through UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE and that's safe because the zeropage pte is
never dirty, in turn even an mprotect upgrading the vma permission from
PROT_READ to PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE won't make the zeropage pte writable.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-3-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/userfaultfd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | mm/userfaultfd.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c index 46c8949e5f8f..471b6457f95f 100644 --- a/mm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c @@ -380,7 +380,17 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, { ssize_t err; - if (vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma)) { + /* + * The normal page fault path for a shmem will invoke the + * fault, fill the hole in the file and COW it right away. The + * result generates plain anonymous memory. So when we are + * asked to fill an hole in a MAP_PRIVATE shmem mapping, we'll + * generate anonymous memory directly without actually filling + * the hole. For the MAP_PRIVATE case the robustness check + * only happens in the pagetable (to verify it's still none) + * and not in the radix tree. + */ + if (!(dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) { if (!zeropage) err = mcopy_atomic_pte(dst_mm, dst_pmd, dst_vma, dst_addr, src_addr, page); @@ -489,7 +499,8 @@ retry: * dst_vma. */ err = -ENOMEM; - if (vma_is_anonymous(dst_vma) && unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma))) + if (!(dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && + unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma))) goto out_unlock; while (src_addr < src_start + len) { |