diff options
author | Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | 2022-11-04 15:52:42 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> | 2022-11-12 12:49:26 +0300 |
commit | 3b4c7bc01727e3a465759236eeac03d0dd686da3 (patch) | |
tree | 5fc10aef048dca9af186ded2c3e59a1862522c1a /mm/shmem.c | |
parent | 9abf2313adc1ca1b6180c508c25f22f9395cc780 (diff) | |
download | linux-3b4c7bc01727e3a465759236eeac03d0dd686da3.tar.xz |
xattr: use rbtree for simple_xattrs
A while ago Vasily reported that it is possible to set a large number of
xattrs on inodes of filesystems that make use of the simple xattr
infrastructure. This includes all kernfs-based filesystems that support
xattrs (e.g., cgroupfs and tmpfs). Both cgroupfs and tmpfs can be
mounted by unprivileged users in unprivileged containers and root in an
unprivileged container can set an unrestricted number of security.*
xattrs and privileged users can also set unlimited trusted.* xattrs. As
there are apparently users that have a fairly large number of xattrs we
should scale a bit better. Other xattrs such as user.* are restricted
for kernfs-based instances to a fairly limited number.
Using a simple linked list protected by a spinlock used for set, get,
and list operations doesn't scale well if users use a lot of xattrs even
if it's not a crazy number. There's no need to bring in the big guns
like rhashtables or rw semaphores for this. An rbtree with a rwlock, or
limited rcu semanics and seqlock is enough.
It scales within the constraints we are working in. By far the most
common operation is getting an xattr. Setting xattrs should be a
moderately rare operation. And listxattr() often only happens when
copying xattrs between files or together with the contents to a new
file. Holding a lock across listxattr() is unproblematic because it
doesn't list the values of xattrs. It can only be used to list the names
of all xattrs set on a file. And the number of xattr names that can be
listed with listxattr() is limited to XATTR_LIST_MAX aka 65536 bytes. If
a larger buffer is passed then vfs_listxattr() caps it to XATTR_LIST_MAX
and if more xattr names are found it will return -E2BIG. In short, the
maximum amount of memory that can be retrieved via listxattr() is
limited.
Of course, the API is broken as documented on xattr(7) already. In the
future we might want to address this but for now this is the world we
live in and have lived for a long time. But it does indeed mean that
once an application goes over XATTR_LIST_MAX limit of xattrs set on an
inode it isn't possible to copy the file and include its xattrs in the
copy unless the caller knows all xattrs or limits the copy of the xattrs
to important ones it knows by name (At least for tmpfs, and kernfs-based
filesystems. Other filesystems might provide ways of achieving this.).
Bonus of this port to rbtree+rwlock is that we shrink the memory
consumption for users of the simple xattr infrastructure.
Also add proper kernel documentation to all the functions.
A big thanks to Paul for his comments.
Cc: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/shmem.c')
-rw-r--r-- | mm/shmem.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 8280a5cb48df..2872e6607b2c 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -3255,7 +3255,7 @@ static int shmem_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, memcpy(new_xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, xattr->name, len); - simple_xattr_list_add(&info->xattrs, new_xattr); + simple_xattr_add(&info->xattrs, new_xattr); } return 0; |