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author | Howard McLauchlan <hmclauchlan@fb.com> | 2018-03-22 04:59:08 +0300 |
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committer | Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> | 2018-04-02 21:16:21 +0300 |
commit | c9a211951c7c79cfb5de888d7d9550872868b086 (patch) | |
tree | 278cec14b206aa6dcaad30b9da6f19b7b4df1fc6 /mm/mempolicy.c | |
parent | 67a7acd3773a94df2e671601a288685485463cf9 (diff) | |
download | linux-c9a211951c7c79cfb5de888d7d9550872868b086.tar.xz |
bpf: whitelist all syscalls for error injection
Error injection is a useful mechanism to fail arbitrary kernel
functions. However, it is often hard to guarantee an error propagates
appropriately to user space programs. By injecting into syscalls, we can
return arbitrary values to user space directly; this increases
flexibility and robustness in testing, allowing us to test user space
error paths effectively.
The following script, for example, fails calls to sys_open() from a
given pid:
from bcc import BPF
from sys import argv
pid = argv[1]
prog = r"""
int kprobe__SyS_open(struct pt_regs *ctx, const char *pathname, int flags)
{
u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid();
if (pid == %s)
bpf_override_return(ctx, -ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
""" % pid
b = BPF(text=prog)
while 1:
b.perf_buffer_poll()
This patch whitelists all syscalls defined with SYSCALL_DEFINE and
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE for error injection. These changes are not
intended to be considered stable, and would normally be configured off.
Signed-off-by: Howard McLauchlan <hmclauchlan@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/mempolicy.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions