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| author | Haibo Li <haibo.li@mediatek.com> | 2023-10-09 10:37:48 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-10-18 22:12:41 +0300 |
| commit | babddbfb7d7d70ae7f10fedd75a45d8ad75fdddf (patch) | |
| tree | fbb0ab292062de8e00d02dc971364b32df60c32f /mm/kasan | |
| parent | 2820b0f09be99f6406784b03a22dfc83e858449d (diff) | |
| download | linux-babddbfb7d7d70ae7f10fedd75a45d8ad75fdddf.tar.xz | |
kasan: print the original fault addr when access invalid shadow
when the checked address is illegal,the corresponding shadow address from
kasan_mem_to_shadow may have no mapping in mmu table. Access such shadow
address causes kernel oops. Here is a sample about oops on arm64(VA
39bit) with KASAN_SW_TAGS and KASAN_OUTLINE on:
[ffffffb80aaaaaaa] pgd=000000005d3ce003, p4d=000000005d3ce003,
pud=000000005d3ce003, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 100 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-dirty #43
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __hwasan_load8_noabort+0x5c/0x90
lr : do_ib_ob+0xf4/0x110
ffffffb80aaaaaaa is the shadow address for efffff80aaaaaaaa.
The problem is reading invalid shadow in kasan_check_range.
The generic kasan also has similar oops.
It only reports the shadow address which causes oops but not
the original address.
Commit 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
introduce to kasan_non_canonical_hook but limit it to KASAN_INLINE.
This patch extends it to KASAN_OUTLINE mode.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231009073748.159228-1-haibo.li@mediatek.com
Fixes: 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
Signed-off-by: Haibo Li <haibo.li@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Haibo Li <haibo.li@mediatek.com>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/kasan')
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/report.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c index ca4b6ff080a6..3974e4549c3e 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c @@ -621,9 +621,8 @@ void kasan_report_async(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE /* - * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high + * With CONFIG_KASAN, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds @@ -659,4 +658,3 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type, orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1); } -#endif |