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| author | Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> | 2020-02-06 14:42:01 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2020-02-14 09:48:37 +0300 |
| commit | c9cc0517bba9f0213f1e55172feceb99e5512daf (patch) | |
| tree | b6c2154760a9ccc9e2ebba416625203ad66aa542 /lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | |
| parent | 872d92dec353a8d30fa186892cd5ea3e17ca75d3 (diff) | |
| download | linux-c9cc0517bba9f0213f1e55172feceb99e5512daf.tar.xz | |
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - prevent integer overflow on large input
This code assigns src_len (size_t) to sl (int), which causes problems
when src_len is very large. Probably nobody in the kernel should be
passing this much data to chacha20poly1305 all in one go anyway, so I
don't think we need to change the algorithm or introduce larger types
or anything. But we should at least error out early in this case and
print a warning so that we get reports if this does happen and can look
into why anybody is possibly passing it that much data or if they're
accidently passing -1 or similar.
Fixes: d95312a3ccc0 ("crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement crypt_from_sg() routine")
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c index 6d83cafebc69..ad0699ce702f 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c +++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c @@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(struct scatterlist *src, __le64 lens[2]; } b __aligned(16); + if (WARN_ON(src_len > INT_MAX)) + return false; + chacha_load_key(b.k, key); b.iv[0] = 0; |