diff options
| author | Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> | 2011-03-24 02:43:20 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-03-24 05:47:05 +0300 |
| commit | 8409cca7056113bee3236cb6a8e4d8d4d1eef102 (patch) | |
| tree | d9f1ced0d47070fcdf8b399021f33770c150b1ec /include/linux | |
| parent | 39fd33933b0209e4b6254743f2cede07c5ad4c52 (diff) | |
| download | linux-8409cca7056113bee3236cb6a8e4d8d4d1eef102.tar.xz | |
userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces
ptrace is allowed to tasks in the same user namespace according to the
usual rules (i.e. the same rules as for two tasks in the init user
namespace). ptrace is also allowed to a user namespace to which the
current task the has CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability.
Changelog:
Dec 31: Address feedback by Eric:
. Correct ptrace uid check
. Rename may_ptrace_ns to ptrace_capable
. Also fix the cap_ptrace checks.
Jan 1: Use const cred struct
Jan 11: use task_ns_capable() in place of ptrace_capable().
Feb 23: same_or_ancestore_user_ns() was not an appropriate
check to constrain cap_issubset. Rather, cap_issubset()
only is meaningful when both capsets are in the same
user_ns.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/capability.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 7c9c82903012..2ec4a8cc86a5 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -553,6 +553,8 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a, */ #define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), &init_user_ns, (cap)) == 0) +#define has_ns_capability(t, ns, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (ns), (cap)) == 0) + /** * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited) * @t: The task in question |