SUNRPC: Consider qop when looking up pseudoflavors

The NFSv4 SECINFO operation returns a list of security flavors that
the server supports for a particular share.  An NFSv4 client is
supposed to pick a pseudoflavor it supports that corresponds to one
of the flavors returned by the server.

GSS flavors in this list have a GSS tuple that identify a specific
GSS pseudoflavor.

Currently our client ignores the GSS tuple's "qop" value.  A
matching pseudoflavor is chosen based only on the OID and service
value.

So far this omission has not had much effect on Linux.  The NFSv4
protocol currently supports only one qop value: GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
also known as zero.

However, if an NFSv4 server happens to return something other than
zero in the qop field, our client won't notice.  This could cause
the client to behave in incorrect ways that could have security
implications.

Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h
index aba7687ca884..96e5a81a54d7 100644
--- a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h
+++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct gss_ctx {
 
 #define GSS_C_NO_BUFFER		((struct xdr_netobj) 0)
 #define GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT	((struct gss_ctx *) 0)
+#define GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT	(0)
 
 /*XXX  arbitrary length - is this set somewhere? */
 #define GSS_OID_MAX_LEN 32
@@ -68,12 +69,14 @@ u32 gss_unwrap(
 u32 gss_delete_sec_context(
 		struct gss_ctx		**ctx_id);
 
-u32 gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(struct gss_api_mech *, u32 service);
+rpc_authflavor_t gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(struct gss_api_mech *, u32 qop,
+					u32 service);
 u32 gss_pseudoflavor_to_service(struct gss_api_mech *, u32 pseudoflavor);
 char *gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(struct gss_api_mech *, u32 service);
 
 struct pf_desc {
 	u32	pseudoflavor;
+	u32	qop;
 	u32	service;
 	char	*name;
 	char	*auth_domain_name;