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author | Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> | 2017-10-03 03:21:39 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | 2017-10-10 14:18:06 +0300 |
commit | de8cd83e91bc3ee212b3e6ec6e4283af9e4ab269 (patch) | |
tree | 06e8053d973743baf71afe8e347fc91df7b05c13 /include/linux/audit.h | |
parent | 8a5776a5f49812d29fe4b2d0a2d71675c3facf3f (diff) | |
download | linux-de8cd83e91bc3ee212b3e6ec6e4283af9e4ab269.tar.xz |
audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.
It would be used something like this in user space code:
response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));
When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.
A sample event looks like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2
Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.
Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/audit.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/audit.h | 10 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index cb708eb8accc..d66220dac364 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ extern int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old); extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags); extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name); +extern void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response); static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { @@ -452,6 +453,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name) __audit_log_kern_module(name); } +static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response) +{ + if (!audit_dummy_context()) + __audit_fanotify(response); +} + extern int audit_n_rules; extern int audit_signals; #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ @@ -568,6 +575,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name) { } +static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response) +{ } + static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { } #define audit_n_rules 0 |