diff options
| author | Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> | 2022-05-18 15:28:41 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2022-06-09 11:21:21 +0300 |
| commit | efdefbe8b7564602ab446474788225a1f2a323b5 (patch) | |
| tree | 52e7ad0b527e07f5c90807fcb990ba8cdd7364e6 /fs | |
| parent | 2221a2d41018da2de6957093afa17bb57eda93a0 (diff) | |
| download | linux-efdefbe8b7564602ab446474788225a1f2a323b5.tar.xz | |
f2fs: fix to do sanity check for inline inode
commit 677a82b44ebf263d4f9a0cfbd576a6ade797a07b upstream.
Yanming reported a kernel bug in Bugzilla kernel [1], which can be
reproduced. The bug message is:
The kernel message is shown below:
kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:611!
Call Trace:
evict+0x282/0x4e0
__dentry_kill+0x2b2/0x4d0
dput+0x2dd/0x720
do_renameat2+0x596/0x970
__x64_sys_rename+0x78/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215895
The bug is due to fuzzed inode has both inline_data and encrypted flags.
During f2fs_evict_inode(), as the inode was deleted by rename(), it
will cause inline data conversion due to conflicting flags. The page
cache will be polluted and the panic will be triggered in clear_inode().
Try fixing the bug by doing more sanity checks for inline data inode in
sanity_check_inode().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ming Yan <yanming@tju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao.yu@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/f2fs/inline.c | 29 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/f2fs/inode.c | 3 |
3 files changed, 26 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index 273795ba8fc0..1066725c3c5d 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -3735,6 +3735,7 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *f2fs_inode_entry_slab; * inline.c */ bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode); +bool f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(struct inode *inode); bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode); void f2fs_do_read_inline_data(struct page *page, struct page *ipage); void f2fs_truncate_inline_inode(struct inode *inode, diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inline.c b/fs/f2fs/inline.c index 1d7dafdaffe3..f97c23ec93ce 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c @@ -14,21 +14,40 @@ #include "node.h" #include <trace/events/f2fs.h> -bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode) +static bool support_inline_data(struct inode *inode) { if (f2fs_is_atomic_file(inode)) return false; - if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) return false; - if (i_size_read(inode) > MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode)) return false; + return true; +} - if (f2fs_post_read_required(inode)) +bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode) +{ + if (!support_inline_data(inode)) return false; - return true; + return !f2fs_post_read_required(inode); +} + +bool f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(struct inode *inode) +{ + if (!f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) + return false; + + if (!support_inline_data(inode)) + return true; + + /* + * used by sanity_check_inode(), when disk layout fields has not + * been synchronized to inmem fields. + */ + return (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && + (file_is_encrypt(inode) || file_is_verity(inode) || + (F2FS_I(inode)->i_flags & F2FS_COMPR_FL))); } bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index 6e788506c921..87752550f78c 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -272,8 +272,7 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page) } } - if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) && - (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))) { + if (f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(inode)) { set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK); f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx, mode=%u) should not have inline_data, run fsck to fix", __func__, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode); |