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authorJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>2018-08-16 23:13:03 +0300
committerJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>2018-08-16 23:21:29 +0300
commit0a3173a5f09bc58a3638ecfd0a80bdbae55e123c (patch)
treed6c0bc84863cca54dfbde3b7463e5d49c82af9f1 /fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
parent92f4e77c85918eab5e5803d7e28ab89a7e6bd3a2 (diff)
parent5c60a7389d795e001c8748b458eb76e3a5b6008c (diff)
downloadlinux-0a3173a5f09bc58a3638ecfd0a80bdbae55e123c.tar.xz
Merge branch 'linus/master' into rdma.git for-next
rdma.git merge resolution for the 4.19 merge window Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/core/rdma_core.c - Use the rdma code and revise with the new spelling for atomic_fetch_add_unless drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c - Replace max_sge with max_send_sge in new blk code drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c - Use the blk code and revise to use NULL for ib_post_recv when appropriate - Replace max_sge with max_recv_sge in new blk code net/rds/ib_send.c - Use the net code and revise to use NULL for ib_post_recv when appropriate Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c278
1 files changed, 181 insertions, 97 deletions
diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
index 350119eeaecb..081f46e30556 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c
@@ -96,80 +96,146 @@ xfs_perag_put(
trace_xfs_perag_put(pag->pag_mount, pag->pag_agno, ref, _RET_IP_);
}
-/*
- * Check the validity of the SB found.
- */
+/* Check all the superblock fields we care about when reading one in. */
STATIC int
-xfs_mount_validate_sb(
- xfs_mount_t *mp,
- xfs_sb_t *sbp,
- bool check_inprogress,
- bool check_version)
+xfs_validate_sb_read(
+ struct xfs_mount *mp,
+ struct xfs_sb *sbp)
{
- uint32_t agcount = 0;
- uint32_t rem;
-
- if (sbp->sb_magicnum != XFS_SB_MAGIC) {
- xfs_warn(mp, "bad magic number");
- return -EWRONGFS;
- }
-
-
- if (!xfs_sb_good_version(sbp)) {
- xfs_warn(mp, "bad version");
- return -EWRONGFS;
- }
+ if (XFS_SB_VERSION_NUM(sbp) != XFS_SB_VERSION_5)
+ return 0;
/*
- * Version 5 superblock feature mask validation. Reject combinations the
- * kernel cannot support up front before checking anything else. For
- * write validation, we don't need to check feature masks.
+ * Version 5 superblock feature mask validation. Reject combinations
+ * the kernel cannot support up front before checking anything else.
*/
- if (check_version && XFS_SB_VERSION_NUM(sbp) == XFS_SB_VERSION_5) {
- if (xfs_sb_has_compat_feature(sbp,
- XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
- xfs_warn(mp,
+ if (xfs_sb_has_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
+ xfs_warn(mp,
"Superblock has unknown compatible features (0x%x) enabled.",
- (sbp->sb_features_compat &
- XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
- xfs_warn(mp,
+ (sbp->sb_features_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
+ xfs_warn(mp,
"Using a more recent kernel is recommended.");
- }
+ }
- if (xfs_sb_has_ro_compat_feature(sbp,
- XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
- xfs_alert(mp,
+ if (xfs_sb_has_ro_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
+ xfs_alert(mp,
"Superblock has unknown read-only compatible features (0x%x) enabled.",
- (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat &
- XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
- if (!(mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)) {
- xfs_warn(mp,
+ (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat &
+ XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
+ if (!(mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)) {
+ xfs_warn(mp,
"Attempted to mount read-only compatible filesystem read-write.");
- xfs_warn(mp,
+ xfs_warn(mp,
"Filesystem can only be safely mounted read only.");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- }
- if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_feature(sbp,
- XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
- xfs_warn(mp,
-"Superblock has unknown incompatible features (0x%x) enabled.",
- (sbp->sb_features_incompat &
- XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN));
- xfs_warn(mp,
-"Filesystem can not be safely mounted by this kernel.");
return -EINVAL;
}
- } else if (xfs_sb_version_hascrc(sbp)) {
- /*
- * We can't read verify the sb LSN because the read verifier is
- * called before the log is allocated and processed. We know the
- * log is set up before write verifier (!check_version) calls,
- * so just check it here.
- */
- if (!xfs_log_check_lsn(mp, sbp->sb_lsn))
- return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+ if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
+ xfs_warn(mp,
+"Superblock has unknown incompatible features (0x%x) enabled.",
+ (sbp->sb_features_incompat &
+ XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN));
+ xfs_warn(mp,
+"Filesystem cannot be safely mounted by this kernel.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check all the superblock fields we care about when writing one out. */
+STATIC int
+xfs_validate_sb_write(
+ struct xfs_mount *mp,
+ struct xfs_buf *bp,
+ struct xfs_sb *sbp)
+{
+ /*
+ * Carry out additional sb summary counter sanity checks when we write
+ * the superblock. We skip this in the read validator because there
+ * could be newer superblocks in the log and if the values are garbage
+ * even after replay we'll recalculate them at the end of log mount.
+ *
+ * mkfs has traditionally written zeroed counters to inprogress and
+ * secondary superblocks, so allow this usage to continue because
+ * we never read counters from such superblocks.
+ */
+ if (XFS_BUF_ADDR(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && !sbp->sb_inprogress &&
+ (sbp->sb_fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks ||
+ !xfs_verify_icount(mp, sbp->sb_icount) ||
+ sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount)) {
+ xfs_warn(mp, "SB summary counter sanity check failed");
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
+ if (XFS_SB_VERSION_NUM(sbp) != XFS_SB_VERSION_5)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Version 5 superblock feature mask validation. Reject combinations
+ * the kernel cannot support since we checked for unsupported bits in
+ * the read verifier, which means that memory is corrupt.
+ */
+ if (xfs_sb_has_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
+ xfs_warn(mp,
+"Corruption detected in superblock compatible features (0x%x)!",
+ (sbp->sb_features_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
+ if (xfs_sb_has_ro_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
+ xfs_alert(mp,
+"Corruption detected in superblock read-only compatible features (0x%x)!",
+ (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat &
+ XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN));
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+ if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)) {
+ xfs_warn(mp,
+"Corruption detected in superblock incompatible features (0x%x)!",
+ (sbp->sb_features_incompat &
+ XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN));
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+ if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_log_feature(sbp,
+ XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_LOG_UNKNOWN)) {
+ xfs_warn(mp,
+"Corruption detected in superblock incompatible log features (0x%x)!",
+ (sbp->sb_features_log_incompat &
+ XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_LOG_UNKNOWN));
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We can't read verify the sb LSN because the read verifier is called
+ * before the log is allocated and processed. We know the log is set up
+ * before write verifier calls, so check it here.
+ */
+ if (!xfs_log_check_lsn(mp, sbp->sb_lsn))
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check the validity of the SB. */
+STATIC int
+xfs_validate_sb_common(
+ struct xfs_mount *mp,
+ struct xfs_buf *bp,
+ struct xfs_sb *sbp)
+{
+ uint32_t agcount = 0;
+ uint32_t rem;
+
+ if (sbp->sb_magicnum != XFS_SB_MAGIC) {
+ xfs_warn(mp, "bad magic number");
+ return -EWRONGFS;
+ }
+
+ if (!xfs_sb_good_version(sbp)) {
+ xfs_warn(mp, "bad version");
+ return -EWRONGFS;
}
if (xfs_sb_version_has_pquotino(sbp)) {
@@ -321,7 +387,12 @@ xfs_mount_validate_sb(
return -EFBIG;
}
- if (check_inprogress && sbp->sb_inprogress) {
+ /*
+ * Don't touch the filesystem if a user tool thinks it owns the primary
+ * superblock. mkfs doesn't clear the flag from secondary supers, so
+ * we don't check them at all.
+ */
+ if (XFS_BUF_ADDR(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && sbp->sb_inprogress) {
xfs_warn(mp, "Offline file system operation in progress!");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
@@ -596,29 +667,6 @@ xfs_sb_to_disk(
}
}
-static int
-xfs_sb_verify(
- struct xfs_buf *bp,
- bool check_version)
-{
- struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount;
- struct xfs_sb sb;
-
- /*
- * Use call variant which doesn't convert quota flags from disk
- * format, because xfs_mount_validate_sb checks the on-disk flags.
- */
- __xfs_sb_from_disk(&sb, XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp), false);
-
- /*
- * Only check the in progress field for the primary superblock as
- * mkfs.xfs doesn't clear it from secondary superblocks.
- */
- return xfs_mount_validate_sb(mp, &sb,
- bp->b_maps[0].bm_bn == XFS_SB_DADDR,
- check_version);
-}
-
/*
* If the superblock has the CRC feature bit set or the CRC field is non-null,
* check that the CRC is valid. We check the CRC field is non-null because a
@@ -633,11 +681,12 @@ xfs_sb_verify(
*/
static void
xfs_sb_read_verify(
- struct xfs_buf *bp)
+ struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
- struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount;
- struct xfs_dsb *dsb = XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp);
- int error;
+ struct xfs_sb sb;
+ struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount;
+ struct xfs_dsb *dsb = XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp);
+ int error;
/*
* open code the version check to avoid needing to convert the entire
@@ -657,7 +706,16 @@ xfs_sb_read_verify(
}
}
}
- error = xfs_sb_verify(bp, true);
+
+ /*
+ * Check all the superblock fields. Don't byteswap the xquota flags
+ * because _verify_common checks the on-disk values.
+ */
+ __xfs_sb_from_disk(&sb, XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp), false);
+ error = xfs_validate_sb_common(mp, bp, &sb);
+ if (error)
+ goto out_error;
+ error = xfs_validate_sb_read(mp, &sb);
out_error:
if (error == -EFSCORRUPTED || error == -EFSBADCRC)
@@ -691,15 +749,22 @@ static void
xfs_sb_write_verify(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
+ struct xfs_sb sb;
struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount;
struct xfs_buf_log_item *bip = bp->b_log_item;
int error;
- error = xfs_sb_verify(bp, false);
- if (error) {
- xfs_verifier_error(bp, error, __this_address);
- return;
- }
+ /*
+ * Check all the superblock fields. Don't byteswap the xquota flags
+ * because _verify_common checks the on-disk values.
+ */
+ __xfs_sb_from_disk(&sb, XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp), false);
+ error = xfs_validate_sb_common(mp, bp, &sb);
+ if (error)
+ goto out_error;
+ error = xfs_validate_sb_write(mp, bp, &sb);
+ if (error)
+ goto out_error;
if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
return;
@@ -708,6 +773,10 @@ xfs_sb_write_verify(
XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp)->sb_lsn = cpu_to_be64(bip->bli_item.li_lsn);
xfs_buf_update_cksum(bp, XFS_SB_CRC_OFF);
+ return;
+
+out_error:
+ xfs_verifier_error(bp, error, __this_address);
}
const struct xfs_buf_ops xfs_sb_buf_ops = {
@@ -804,6 +873,7 @@ xfs_initialize_perag_data(
uint64_t bfree = 0;
uint64_t bfreelst = 0;
uint64_t btree = 0;
+ uint64_t fdblocks;
int error;
for (index = 0; index < agcount; index++) {
@@ -827,17 +897,31 @@ xfs_initialize_perag_data(
btree += pag->pagf_btreeblks;
xfs_perag_put(pag);
}
+ fdblocks = bfree + bfreelst + btree;
+
+ /*
+ * If the new summary counts are obviously incorrect, fail the
+ * mount operation because that implies the AGFs are also corrupt.
+ * Clear BAD_SUMMARY so that we don't unmount with a dirty log, which
+ * will prevent xfs_repair from fixing anything.
+ */
+ if (fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks || ifree > ialloc) {
+ xfs_alert(mp, "AGF corruption. Please run xfs_repair.");
+ error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* Overwrite incore superblock counters with just-read data */
spin_lock(&mp->m_sb_lock);
sbp->sb_ifree = ifree;
sbp->sb_icount = ialloc;
- sbp->sb_fdblocks = bfree + bfreelst + btree;
+ sbp->sb_fdblocks = fdblocks;
spin_unlock(&mp->m_sb_lock);
xfs_reinit_percpu_counters(mp);
-
- return 0;
+out:
+ mp->m_flags &= ~XFS_MOUNT_BAD_SUMMARY;
+ return error;
}
/*