diff options
author | Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> | 2018-08-16 23:13:03 +0300 |
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committer | Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> | 2018-08-16 23:21:29 +0300 |
commit | 0a3173a5f09bc58a3638ecfd0a80bdbae55e123c (patch) | |
tree | d6c0bc84863cca54dfbde3b7463e5d49c82af9f1 /fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c | |
parent | 92f4e77c85918eab5e5803d7e28ab89a7e6bd3a2 (diff) | |
parent | 5c60a7389d795e001c8748b458eb76e3a5b6008c (diff) | |
download | linux-0a3173a5f09bc58a3638ecfd0a80bdbae55e123c.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'linus/master' into rdma.git for-next
rdma.git merge resolution for the 4.19 merge window
Conflicts:
drivers/infiniband/core/rdma_core.c
- Use the rdma code and revise with the new spelling for
atomic_fetch_add_unless
drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c
- Replace max_sge with max_send_sge in new blk code
drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c
- Use the blk code and revise to use NULL for ib_post_recv when
appropriate
- Replace max_sge with max_recv_sge in new blk code
net/rds/ib_send.c
- Use the net code and revise to use NULL for ib_post_recv when
appropriate
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c | 278 |
1 files changed, 181 insertions, 97 deletions
diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c index 350119eeaecb..081f46e30556 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_sb.c @@ -96,80 +96,146 @@ xfs_perag_put( trace_xfs_perag_put(pag->pag_mount, pag->pag_agno, ref, _RET_IP_); } -/* - * Check the validity of the SB found. - */ +/* Check all the superblock fields we care about when reading one in. */ STATIC int -xfs_mount_validate_sb( - xfs_mount_t *mp, - xfs_sb_t *sbp, - bool check_inprogress, - bool check_version) +xfs_validate_sb_read( + struct xfs_mount *mp, + struct xfs_sb *sbp) { - uint32_t agcount = 0; - uint32_t rem; - - if (sbp->sb_magicnum != XFS_SB_MAGIC) { - xfs_warn(mp, "bad magic number"); - return -EWRONGFS; - } - - - if (!xfs_sb_good_version(sbp)) { - xfs_warn(mp, "bad version"); - return -EWRONGFS; - } + if (XFS_SB_VERSION_NUM(sbp) != XFS_SB_VERSION_5) + return 0; /* - * Version 5 superblock feature mask validation. Reject combinations the - * kernel cannot support up front before checking anything else. For - * write validation, we don't need to check feature masks. + * Version 5 superblock feature mask validation. Reject combinations + * the kernel cannot support up front before checking anything else. */ - if (check_version && XFS_SB_VERSION_NUM(sbp) == XFS_SB_VERSION_5) { - if (xfs_sb_has_compat_feature(sbp, - XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { - xfs_warn(mp, + if (xfs_sb_has_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { + xfs_warn(mp, "Superblock has unknown compatible features (0x%x) enabled.", - (sbp->sb_features_compat & - XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)); - xfs_warn(mp, + (sbp->sb_features_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)); + xfs_warn(mp, "Using a more recent kernel is recommended."); - } + } - if (xfs_sb_has_ro_compat_feature(sbp, - XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { - xfs_alert(mp, + if (xfs_sb_has_ro_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { + xfs_alert(mp, "Superblock has unknown read-only compatible features (0x%x) enabled.", - (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat & - XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)); - if (!(mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)) { - xfs_warn(mp, + (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat & + XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)); + if (!(mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)) { + xfs_warn(mp, "Attempted to mount read-only compatible filesystem read-write."); - xfs_warn(mp, + xfs_warn(mp, "Filesystem can only be safely mounted read only."); - return -EINVAL; - } - } - if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_feature(sbp, - XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { - xfs_warn(mp, -"Superblock has unknown incompatible features (0x%x) enabled.", - (sbp->sb_features_incompat & - XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)); - xfs_warn(mp, -"Filesystem can not be safely mounted by this kernel."); return -EINVAL; } - } else if (xfs_sb_version_hascrc(sbp)) { - /* - * We can't read verify the sb LSN because the read verifier is - * called before the log is allocated and processed. We know the - * log is set up before write verifier (!check_version) calls, - * so just check it here. - */ - if (!xfs_log_check_lsn(mp, sbp->sb_lsn)) - return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { + xfs_warn(mp, +"Superblock has unknown incompatible features (0x%x) enabled.", + (sbp->sb_features_incompat & + XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)); + xfs_warn(mp, +"Filesystem cannot be safely mounted by this kernel."); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Check all the superblock fields we care about when writing one out. */ +STATIC int +xfs_validate_sb_write( + struct xfs_mount *mp, + struct xfs_buf *bp, + struct xfs_sb *sbp) +{ + /* + * Carry out additional sb summary counter sanity checks when we write + * the superblock. We skip this in the read validator because there + * could be newer superblocks in the log and if the values are garbage + * even after replay we'll recalculate them at the end of log mount. + * + * mkfs has traditionally written zeroed counters to inprogress and + * secondary superblocks, so allow this usage to continue because + * we never read counters from such superblocks. + */ + if (XFS_BUF_ADDR(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && !sbp->sb_inprogress && + (sbp->sb_fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks || + !xfs_verify_icount(mp, sbp->sb_icount) || + sbp->sb_ifree > sbp->sb_icount)) { + xfs_warn(mp, "SB summary counter sanity check failed"); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + + if (XFS_SB_VERSION_NUM(sbp) != XFS_SB_VERSION_5) + return 0; + + /* + * Version 5 superblock feature mask validation. Reject combinations + * the kernel cannot support since we checked for unsupported bits in + * the read verifier, which means that memory is corrupt. + */ + if (xfs_sb_has_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { + xfs_warn(mp, +"Corruption detected in superblock compatible features (0x%x)!", + (sbp->sb_features_compat & XFS_SB_FEAT_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + + if (xfs_sb_has_ro_compat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { + xfs_alert(mp, +"Corruption detected in superblock read-only compatible features (0x%x)!", + (sbp->sb_features_ro_compat & + XFS_SB_FEAT_RO_COMPAT_UNKNOWN)); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_feature(sbp, XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)) { + xfs_warn(mp, +"Corruption detected in superblock incompatible features (0x%x)!", + (sbp->sb_features_incompat & + XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_UNKNOWN)); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + if (xfs_sb_has_incompat_log_feature(sbp, + XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_LOG_UNKNOWN)) { + xfs_warn(mp, +"Corruption detected in superblock incompatible log features (0x%x)!", + (sbp->sb_features_log_incompat & + XFS_SB_FEAT_INCOMPAT_LOG_UNKNOWN)); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } + + /* + * We can't read verify the sb LSN because the read verifier is called + * before the log is allocated and processed. We know the log is set up + * before write verifier calls, so check it here. + */ + if (!xfs_log_check_lsn(mp, sbp->sb_lsn)) + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + + return 0; +} + +/* Check the validity of the SB. */ +STATIC int +xfs_validate_sb_common( + struct xfs_mount *mp, + struct xfs_buf *bp, + struct xfs_sb *sbp) +{ + uint32_t agcount = 0; + uint32_t rem; + + if (sbp->sb_magicnum != XFS_SB_MAGIC) { + xfs_warn(mp, "bad magic number"); + return -EWRONGFS; + } + + if (!xfs_sb_good_version(sbp)) { + xfs_warn(mp, "bad version"); + return -EWRONGFS; } if (xfs_sb_version_has_pquotino(sbp)) { @@ -321,7 +387,12 @@ xfs_mount_validate_sb( return -EFBIG; } - if (check_inprogress && sbp->sb_inprogress) { + /* + * Don't touch the filesystem if a user tool thinks it owns the primary + * superblock. mkfs doesn't clear the flag from secondary supers, so + * we don't check them at all. + */ + if (XFS_BUF_ADDR(bp) == XFS_SB_DADDR && sbp->sb_inprogress) { xfs_warn(mp, "Offline file system operation in progress!"); return -EFSCORRUPTED; } @@ -596,29 +667,6 @@ xfs_sb_to_disk( } } -static int -xfs_sb_verify( - struct xfs_buf *bp, - bool check_version) -{ - struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount; - struct xfs_sb sb; - - /* - * Use call variant which doesn't convert quota flags from disk - * format, because xfs_mount_validate_sb checks the on-disk flags. - */ - __xfs_sb_from_disk(&sb, XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp), false); - - /* - * Only check the in progress field for the primary superblock as - * mkfs.xfs doesn't clear it from secondary superblocks. - */ - return xfs_mount_validate_sb(mp, &sb, - bp->b_maps[0].bm_bn == XFS_SB_DADDR, - check_version); -} - /* * If the superblock has the CRC feature bit set or the CRC field is non-null, * check that the CRC is valid. We check the CRC field is non-null because a @@ -633,11 +681,12 @@ xfs_sb_verify( */ static void xfs_sb_read_verify( - struct xfs_buf *bp) + struct xfs_buf *bp) { - struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount; - struct xfs_dsb *dsb = XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp); - int error; + struct xfs_sb sb; + struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount; + struct xfs_dsb *dsb = XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp); + int error; /* * open code the version check to avoid needing to convert the entire @@ -657,7 +706,16 @@ xfs_sb_read_verify( } } } - error = xfs_sb_verify(bp, true); + + /* + * Check all the superblock fields. Don't byteswap the xquota flags + * because _verify_common checks the on-disk values. + */ + __xfs_sb_from_disk(&sb, XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp), false); + error = xfs_validate_sb_common(mp, bp, &sb); + if (error) + goto out_error; + error = xfs_validate_sb_read(mp, &sb); out_error: if (error == -EFSCORRUPTED || error == -EFSBADCRC) @@ -691,15 +749,22 @@ static void xfs_sb_write_verify( struct xfs_buf *bp) { + struct xfs_sb sb; struct xfs_mount *mp = bp->b_target->bt_mount; struct xfs_buf_log_item *bip = bp->b_log_item; int error; - error = xfs_sb_verify(bp, false); - if (error) { - xfs_verifier_error(bp, error, __this_address); - return; - } + /* + * Check all the superblock fields. Don't byteswap the xquota flags + * because _verify_common checks the on-disk values. + */ + __xfs_sb_from_disk(&sb, XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp), false); + error = xfs_validate_sb_common(mp, bp, &sb); + if (error) + goto out_error; + error = xfs_validate_sb_write(mp, bp, &sb); + if (error) + goto out_error; if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb)) return; @@ -708,6 +773,10 @@ xfs_sb_write_verify( XFS_BUF_TO_SBP(bp)->sb_lsn = cpu_to_be64(bip->bli_item.li_lsn); xfs_buf_update_cksum(bp, XFS_SB_CRC_OFF); + return; + +out_error: + xfs_verifier_error(bp, error, __this_address); } const struct xfs_buf_ops xfs_sb_buf_ops = { @@ -804,6 +873,7 @@ xfs_initialize_perag_data( uint64_t bfree = 0; uint64_t bfreelst = 0; uint64_t btree = 0; + uint64_t fdblocks; int error; for (index = 0; index < agcount; index++) { @@ -827,17 +897,31 @@ xfs_initialize_perag_data( btree += pag->pagf_btreeblks; xfs_perag_put(pag); } + fdblocks = bfree + bfreelst + btree; + + /* + * If the new summary counts are obviously incorrect, fail the + * mount operation because that implies the AGFs are also corrupt. + * Clear BAD_SUMMARY so that we don't unmount with a dirty log, which + * will prevent xfs_repair from fixing anything. + */ + if (fdblocks > sbp->sb_dblocks || ifree > ialloc) { + xfs_alert(mp, "AGF corruption. Please run xfs_repair."); + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto out; + } /* Overwrite incore superblock counters with just-read data */ spin_lock(&mp->m_sb_lock); sbp->sb_ifree = ifree; sbp->sb_icount = ialloc; - sbp->sb_fdblocks = bfree + bfreelst + btree; + sbp->sb_fdblocks = fdblocks; spin_unlock(&mp->m_sb_lock); xfs_reinit_percpu_counters(mp); - - return 0; +out: + mp->m_flags &= ~XFS_MOUNT_BAD_SUMMARY; + return error; } /* |