diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-10-29 21:36:49 +0400 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-10-29 21:36:49 +0400 |
commit | 435f49a518c78eec8e2edbbadd912737246cbe20 (patch) | |
tree | 106df2617d42ace231e2fa9fcf1e0fd1075874ea /fs/read_write.c | |
parent | f56f44001cb5b40089deac094dbb74e5c9f64d81 (diff) | |
download | linux-435f49a518c78eec8e2edbbadd912737246cbe20.tar.xz |
readv/writev: do the same MAX_RW_COUNT truncation that read/write does
We used to protect against overflow, but rather than return an error, do
what read/write does, namely to limit the total size to MAX_RW_COUNT.
This is not only more consistent, but it also means that any broken
low-level read/write routine that still keeps counts in 'int' can't
break.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/read_write.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/read_write.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c index 9cd9d148105d..431a0ed610c8 100644 --- a/fs/read_write.c +++ b/fs/read_write.c @@ -243,8 +243,6 @@ bad: * them to something that fits in "int" so that others * won't have to do range checks all the time. */ -#define MAX_RW_COUNT (INT_MAX & PAGE_CACHE_MASK) - int rw_verify_area(int read_write, struct file *file, loff_t *ppos, size_t count) { struct inode *inode; @@ -584,65 +582,71 @@ ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector, unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned long fast_segs, struct iovec *fast_pointer, struct iovec **ret_pointer) - { +{ unsigned long seg; - ssize_t ret; + ssize_t ret; struct iovec *iov = fast_pointer; - /* - * SuS says "The readv() function *may* fail if the iovcnt argument - * was less than or equal to 0, or greater than {IOV_MAX}. Linux has - * traditionally returned zero for zero segments, so... - */ + /* + * SuS says "The readv() function *may* fail if the iovcnt argument + * was less than or equal to 0, or greater than {IOV_MAX}. Linux has + * traditionally returned zero for zero segments, so... + */ if (nr_segs == 0) { ret = 0; - goto out; + goto out; } - /* - * First get the "struct iovec" from user memory and - * verify all the pointers - */ + /* + * First get the "struct iovec" from user memory and + * verify all the pointers + */ if (nr_segs > UIO_MAXIOV) { ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; + goto out; } if (nr_segs > fast_segs) { - iov = kmalloc(nr_segs*sizeof(struct iovec), GFP_KERNEL); + iov = kmalloc(nr_segs*sizeof(struct iovec), GFP_KERNEL); if (iov == NULL) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; + goto out; } - } + } if (copy_from_user(iov, uvector, nr_segs*sizeof(*uvector))) { ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; + goto out; } - /* + /* * According to the Single Unix Specification we should return EINVAL * if an element length is < 0 when cast to ssize_t or if the * total length would overflow the ssize_t return value of the * system call. - */ + * + * Linux caps all read/write calls to MAX_RW_COUNT, and avoids the + * overflow case. + */ ret = 0; - for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) { - void __user *buf = iov[seg].iov_base; - ssize_t len = (ssize_t)iov[seg].iov_len; + for (seg = 0; seg < nr_segs; seg++) { + void __user *buf = iov[seg].iov_base; + ssize_t len = (ssize_t)iov[seg].iov_len; /* see if we we're about to use an invalid len or if * it's about to overflow ssize_t */ - if (len < 0 || (ret + len < ret)) { + if (len < 0) { ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; + goto out; } if (unlikely(!access_ok(vrfy_dir(type), buf, len))) { ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; + goto out; + } + if (len > MAX_RW_COUNT - ret) { + len = MAX_RW_COUNT - ret; + iov[seg].iov_len = len; } - ret += len; - } + } out: *ret_pointer = iov; return ret; |