Merge branch 'master' of /pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6

1 files changed, 105 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index c5e412a00b17..808cbdc193d3 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
@@ -195,12 +196,32 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
 	return result;
 }
 
-#define MAY_PTRACE(task) \
-	(task == current || \
-	(task->parent == current && \
-	(task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && \
-	 (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) && \
-	 security_ptrace(current,task) == 0))
+/*
+ * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
+ */
+static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	/*
+	 * A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
+	 * to use system calls instead of load instructions.
+	 */
+	if (task == current)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If current is actively ptrace'ing, and would also be
+	 * permitted to freshly attach with ptrace now, permit it.
+	 */
+	if (task->parent == current && (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) &&
+	    task_is_stopped_or_traced(task) &&
+	    ptrace_may_attach(task))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Noone else is allowed.
+	 */
+	return -EPERM;
+}
 
 struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
 {
@@ -722,7 +743,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
 	if (!task)
 		goto out_no_task;
 
-	if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+	if (check_mem_permission(task))
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -748,7 +769,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
 
 		this_len = (count > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : count;
 		retval = access_process_vm(task, src, page, this_len, 0);
-		if (!retval || !MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task)) {
+		if (!retval || check_mem_permission(task)) {
 			if (!ret)
 				ret = -EIO;
 			break;
@@ -792,7 +813,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!task)
 		goto out_no_task;
 
-	if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+	if (check_mem_permission(task))
 		goto out;
 
 	copied = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1181,6 +1202,81 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_sched_operations = {
 
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * We added or removed a vma mapping the executable. The vmas are only mapped
+ * during exec and are not mapped with the mmap system call.
+ * Callers must hold down_write() on the mm's mmap_sem for these
+ */
+void added_exe_file_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	mm->num_exe_file_vmas++;
+}
+
+void removed_exe_file_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	mm->num_exe_file_vmas--;
+	if ((mm->num_exe_file_vmas == 0) && mm->exe_file){
+		fput(mm->exe_file);
+		mm->exe_file = NULL;
+	}
+
+}
+
+void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
+{
+	if (new_exe_file)
+		get_file(new_exe_file);
+	if (mm->exe_file)
+		fput(mm->exe_file);
+	mm->exe_file = new_exe_file;
+	mm->num_exe_file_vmas = 0;
+}
+
+struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	struct file *exe_file;
+
+	/* We need mmap_sem to protect against races with removal of
+	 * VM_EXECUTABLE vmas */
+	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	exe_file = mm->exe_file;
+	if (exe_file)
+		get_file(exe_file);
+	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	return exe_file;
+}
+
+void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *newmm)
+{
+	/* It's safe to write the exe_file pointer without exe_file_lock because
+	 * this is called during fork when the task is not yet in /proc */
+	newmm->exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(oldmm);
+}
+
+static int proc_exe_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *exe_path)
+{
+	struct task_struct *task;
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
+	struct file *exe_file;
+
+	task = get_proc_task(inode);
+	if (!task)
+		return -ENOENT;
+	mm = get_task_mm(task);
+	put_task_struct(task);
+	if (!mm)
+		return -ENOENT;
+	exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
+	mmput(mm);
+	if (exe_file) {
+		*exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
+		path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
+		fput(exe_file);
+		return 0;
+	} else
+		return -ENOENT;
+}
+
 static void *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;