diff options
author | Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | 2011-09-15 17:08:05 +0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | 2011-09-15 17:08:18 +0400 |
commit | e060c38434b2caa78efe7cedaff4191040b65a15 (patch) | |
tree | 407361230bf6733f63d8e788e4b5e6566ee04818 /fs/ecryptfs | |
parent | 10e4ac572eeffe5317019bd7330b6058a400dfc2 (diff) | |
parent | cc39c6a9bbdebfcf1a7dee64d83bf302bc38d941 (diff) | |
download | linux-e060c38434b2caa78efe7cedaff4191040b65a15.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'master' into for-next
Fast-forward merge with Linus to be able to merge patches
based on more recent version of the tree.
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 150 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 62 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c | 18 |
6 files changed, 107 insertions, 149 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/Kconfig b/fs/ecryptfs/Kconfig index 1cd6d9d3e29a..cc16562654de 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/Kconfig @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ config ECRYPT_FS tristate "eCrypt filesystem layer support (EXPERIMENTAL)" - depends on EXPERIMENTAL && KEYS && CRYPTO + depends on EXPERIMENTAL && KEYS && CRYPTO && (ENCRYPTED_KEYS || ENCRYPTED_KEYS=n) select CRYPTO_ECB select CRYPTO_CBC select CRYPTO_MD5 diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h index 43c7c43b06f5..b36c5572b3f3 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #define ECRYPTFS_KERNEL_H #include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/encrypted-type.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/fs_stack.h> #include <linux/namei.h> @@ -36,125 +37,18 @@ #include <linux/hash.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/backing-dev.h> +#include <linux/ecryptfs.h> -/* Version verification for shared data structures w/ userspace */ -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR 0x04 -#define ECRYPTFS_SUPPORTED_FILE_VERSION 0x03 -/* These flags indicate which features are supported by the kernel - * module; userspace tools such as the mount helper read - * ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK from a sysfs handle in order to determine - * how to behave. */ -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PASSPHRASE 0x00000001 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY 0x00000002 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH 0x00000004 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_POLICY 0x00000008 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR 0x00000010 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY 0x00000020 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_DEVMISC 0x00000040 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_HMAC 0x00000080 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_FILENAME_ENCRYPTION 0x00000100 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_GCM 0x00000200 -#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK (ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PASSPHRASE \ - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH \ - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY \ - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR \ - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY \ - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_DEVMISC \ - | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_FILENAME_ENCRYPTION) -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 64 -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSPHRASE_BYTES ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH -#define ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE 8 -#define ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE_HEX (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE*2) -/* The original signature size is only for what is stored on disk; all - * in-memory representations are expanded hex, so it better adapted to - * be passed around or referenced on the command line */ -#define ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE 8 -#define ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE*2) -#define ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES 64 -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES 512 #define ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_IV_BYTES 16 -#define ECRYPTFS_FILE_VERSION 0x03 #define ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_EXTENT_SIZE 4096 #define ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE 8192 #define ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_MSG_CTX_ELEMS 32 #define ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_SEND_TIMEOUT HZ #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_MSG_CTX_TTL (HZ*3) -#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PKI_NAME_BYTES 16 #define ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_NUM_USERS 4 #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_NUM_USERS 32768 #define ECRYPTFS_XATTR_NAME "user.ecryptfs" -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_DES3_EDE 0x02 -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_5 0x03 -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 0x04 -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_128 0x07 -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_192 0x08 -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_256 0x09 -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_TWOFISH 0x0a -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_6 0x0b - -#define RFC2440_CIPHER_RSA 0x01 - -/** - * For convenience, we may need to pass around the encrypted session - * key between kernel and userspace because the authentication token - * may not be extractable. For example, the TPM may not release the - * private key, instead requiring the encrypted data and returning the - * decrypted data. - */ -struct ecryptfs_session_key { -#define ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT 0x00000001 -#define ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_ENCRYPT 0x00000002 -#define ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY 0x00000004 -#define ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_ENCRYPTED_KEY 0x00000008 - u32 flags; - u32 encrypted_key_size; - u32 decrypted_key_size; - u8 encrypted_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES]; - u8 decrypted_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; -}; - -struct ecryptfs_password { - u32 password_bytes; - s32 hash_algo; - u32 hash_iterations; - u32 session_key_encryption_key_bytes; -#define ECRYPTFS_PERSISTENT_PASSWORD 0x01 -#define ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET 0x02 - u32 flags; - /* Iterated-hash concatenation of salt and passphrase */ - u8 session_key_encryption_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES]; - u8 signature[ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE + 1]; - /* Always in expanded hex */ - u8 salt[ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE]; -}; - -enum ecryptfs_token_types {ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD, ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY}; - -struct ecryptfs_private_key { - u32 key_size; - u32 data_len; - u8 signature[ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE + 1]; - char pki_type[ECRYPTFS_MAX_PKI_NAME_BYTES + 1]; - u8 data[]; -}; - -/* May be a password or a private key */ -struct ecryptfs_auth_tok { - u16 version; /* 8-bit major and 8-bit minor */ - u16 token_type; -#define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPT_ONLY 0x00000001 - u32 flags; - struct ecryptfs_session_key session_key; - u8 reserved[32]; - union { - struct ecryptfs_password password; - struct ecryptfs_private_key private_key; - } token; -} __attribute__ ((packed)); - void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok); extern void ecryptfs_to_hex(char *dst, char *src, size_t src_size); extern void ecryptfs_from_hex(char *dst, char *src, int dst_size); @@ -185,11 +79,47 @@ struct ecryptfs_page_crypt_context { } param; }; +#if defined(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) || defined(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS_MODULE) +static inline struct ecryptfs_auth_tok * +ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(struct key *key) +{ + if (key->type == &key_type_encrypted) + return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *) + (&((struct encrypted_key_payload *)key->payload.data)->payload_data); + else + return NULL; +} + +static inline struct key *ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key(char *sig) +{ + return request_key(&key_type_encrypted, sig, NULL); +} + +#else +static inline struct ecryptfs_auth_tok * +ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(struct key *key) +{ + return NULL; +} + +static inline struct key *ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key(char *sig) +{ + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS */ + static inline struct ecryptfs_auth_tok * ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key) { - return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *) - (((struct user_key_payload*)key->payload.data)->data); + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok; + + auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(key); + if (!auth_tok) + return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *) + (((struct user_key_payload *)key->payload.data)->data); + else + return auth_tok; } #define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE 1024 diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c index 340c657a108c..11f8582d7218 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *opaque) inode->i_ino = lower_inode->i_ino; inode->i_version++; inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ecryptfs_aops; + inode->i_mapping->backing_dev_info = inode->i_sb->s_bdi; if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) inode->i_op = &ecryptfs_symlink_iops; diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c index fa8049ecdc64..ac1ad48c2376 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c @@ -1635,11 +1635,14 @@ int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key, (*auth_tok_key) = request_key(&key_type_user, sig, NULL); if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n", - sig); - rc = process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key)); - (*auth_tok_key) = NULL; - goto out; + (*auth_tok_key) = ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key(sig); + if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n", + sig); + rc = process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key)); + (*auth_tok_key) = NULL; + goto out; + } } down_write(&(*auth_tok_key)->sem); rc = ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(*auth_tok_key, auth_tok); @@ -1868,11 +1871,6 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, * just one will be sufficient to decrypt to get the FEK. */ find_next_matching_auth_tok: found_auth_tok = 0; - if (auth_tok_key) { - up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); - key_put(auth_tok_key); - auth_tok_key = NULL; - } list_for_each_entry(auth_tok_list_item, &auth_tok_list, list) { candidate_auth_tok = &auth_tok_list_item->auth_tok; if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) { @@ -1909,14 +1907,22 @@ found_matching_auth_tok: memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key), &(matching_auth_tok->token.private_key), sizeof(struct ecryptfs_private_key)); + up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); + key_put(auth_tok_key); rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); } else if (candidate_auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) { memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.password), &(matching_auth_tok->token.password), sizeof(struct ecryptfs_password)); + up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); + key_put(auth_tok_key); rc = decrypt_passphrase_encrypted_session_key( candidate_auth_tok, crypt_stat); + } else { + up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); + key_put(auth_tok_key); + rc = -EINVAL; } if (rc) { struct ecryptfs_auth_tok_list_item *auth_tok_list_item_tmp; @@ -1956,21 +1962,18 @@ found_matching_auth_tok: out_wipe_list: wipe_auth_tok_list(&auth_tok_list); out: - if (auth_tok_key) { - up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); - key_put(auth_tok_key); - } return rc; } static int -pki_encrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, +pki_encrypt_session_key(struct key *auth_tok_key, + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec) { struct ecryptfs_msg_ctx *msg_ctx = NULL; char *payload = NULL; - size_t payload_len; + size_t payload_len = 0; struct ecryptfs_message *msg; int rc; @@ -1979,6 +1982,8 @@ pki_encrypt_session_key(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, crypt_stat->cipher, crypt_stat->key_size), crypt_stat, &payload, &payload_len); + up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); + key_put(auth_tok_key); if (rc) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error generating tag 66 packet\n"); goto out; @@ -2008,6 +2013,8 @@ out: * write_tag_1_packet - Write an RFC2440-compatible tag 1 (public key) packet * @dest: Buffer into which to write the packet * @remaining_bytes: Maximum number of bytes that can be writtn + * @auth_tok_key: The authentication token key to unlock and put when done with + * @auth_tok * @auth_tok: The authentication token used for generating the tag 1 packet * @crypt_stat: The cryptographic context * @key_rec: The key record struct for the tag 1 packet @@ -2018,7 +2025,7 @@ out: */ static int write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes, - struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, + struct key *auth_tok_key, struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, struct ecryptfs_key_record *key_rec, size_t *packet_size) { @@ -2039,12 +2046,15 @@ write_tag_1_packet(char *dest, size_t *remaining_bytes, memcpy(key_rec->enc_key, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key, auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size); + up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); + key_put(auth_tok_key); goto encrypted_session_key_set; } if (auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size == 0) auth_tok->session_key.encrypted_key_size = auth_tok->token.private_key.key_size; - rc = pki_encrypt_session_key(auth_tok, crypt_stat, key_rec); + rc = pki_encrypt_session_key(auth_tok_key, auth_tok, crypt_stat, + key_rec); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to encrypt session key via a key " "module; rc = [%d]\n", rc); @@ -2421,6 +2431,8 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, &max, auth_tok, crypt_stat, key_rec, &written); + up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); + key_put(auth_tok_key); if (rc) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error " "writing tag 3 packet\n"); @@ -2438,8 +2450,8 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, } (*len) += written; } else if (auth_tok->token_type == ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) { - rc = write_tag_1_packet(dest_base + (*len), - &max, auth_tok, + rc = write_tag_1_packet(dest_base + (*len), &max, + auth_tok_key, auth_tok, crypt_stat, key_rec, &written); if (rc) { ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error " @@ -2448,14 +2460,13 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *dest_base, } (*len) += written; } else { + up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); + key_put(auth_tok_key); ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Unsupported " "authentication token type\n"); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } - up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); - key_put(auth_tok_key); - auth_tok_key = NULL; } if (likely(max > 0)) { dest_base[(*len)] = 0x00; @@ -2468,11 +2479,6 @@ out_free: out: if (rc) (*len) = 0; - if (auth_tok_key) { - up_write(&(auth_tok_key->sem)); - key_put(auth_tok_key); - } - mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->keysig_list_mutex); return rc; } diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c index 9f1bb747d77d..b4a6befb1216 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ enum { ecryptfs_opt_sig, ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig, ecryptfs_opt_encrypted_view, ecryptfs_opt_fnek_sig, ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher, ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes, ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs, ecryptfs_opt_mount_auth_tok_only, + ecryptfs_opt_check_dev_ruid, ecryptfs_opt_err }; static const match_table_t tokens = { @@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = { {ecryptfs_opt_fn_cipher_key_bytes, "ecryptfs_fn_key_bytes=%u"}, {ecryptfs_opt_unlink_sigs, "ecryptfs_unlink_sigs"}, {ecryptfs_opt_mount_auth_tok_only, "ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only"}, + {ecryptfs_opt_check_dev_ruid, "ecryptfs_check_dev_ruid"}, {ecryptfs_opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -236,6 +238,7 @@ static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat( * ecryptfs_parse_options * @sb: The ecryptfs super block * @options: The options passed to the kernel + * @check_ruid: set to 1 if device uid should be checked against the ruid * * Parse mount options: * debug=N - ecryptfs_verbosity level for debug output @@ -251,7 +254,8 @@ static void ecryptfs_init_mount_crypt_stat( * * Returns zero on success; non-zero on error */ -static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options) +static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options, + uid_t *check_ruid) { char *p; int rc = 0; @@ -276,6 +280,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options) char *cipher_key_bytes_src; char *fn_cipher_key_bytes_src; + *check_ruid = 0; + if (!options) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -380,6 +386,9 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct ecryptfs_sb_info *sbi, char *options) mount_crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_MOUNT_AUTH_TOK_ONLY; break; + case ecryptfs_opt_check_dev_ruid: + *check_ruid = 1; + break; case ecryptfs_opt_err: default: printk(KERN_WARNING @@ -475,6 +484,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags const char *err = "Getting sb failed"; struct inode *inode; struct path path; + uid_t check_ruid; int rc; sbi = kmem_cache_zalloc(ecryptfs_sb_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -483,7 +493,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags goto out; } - rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data); + rc = ecryptfs_parse_options(sbi, raw_data, &check_ruid); if (rc) { err = "Error parsing options"; goto out; @@ -521,6 +531,15 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags "known incompatibilities\n"); goto out_free; } + + if (check_ruid && path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid != current_uid()) { + rc = -EPERM; + printk(KERN_ERR "Mount of device (uid: %d) not owned by " + "requested user (uid: %d)\n", + path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid, current_uid()); + goto out_free; + } + ecryptfs_set_superblock_lower(s, path.dentry->d_sb); s->s_maxbytes = path.dentry->d_sb->s_maxbytes; s->s_blocksize = path.dentry->d_sb->s_blocksize; diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c b/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c index 85d430963116..3745f7c2b9c2 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c @@ -39,15 +39,16 @@ int ecryptfs_write_lower(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode, char *data, loff_t offset, size_t size) { - struct ecryptfs_inode_info *inode_info; + struct file *lower_file; mm_segment_t fs_save; ssize_t rc; - inode_info = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_inode); - BUG_ON(!inode_info->lower_file); + lower_file = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_inode)->lower_file; + if (!lower_file) + return -EIO; fs_save = get_fs(); set_fs(get_ds()); - rc = vfs_write(inode_info->lower_file, data, size, &offset); + rc = vfs_write(lower_file, data, size, &offset); set_fs(fs_save); mark_inode_dirty_sync(ecryptfs_inode); return rc; @@ -225,15 +226,16 @@ out: int ecryptfs_read_lower(char *data, loff_t offset, size_t size, struct inode *ecryptfs_inode) { - struct ecryptfs_inode_info *inode_info = - ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_inode); + struct file *lower_file; mm_segment_t fs_save; ssize_t rc; - BUG_ON(!inode_info->lower_file); + lower_file = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_inode)->lower_file; + if (!lower_file) + return -EIO; fs_save = get_fs(); set_fs(get_ds()); - rc = vfs_read(inode_info->lower_file, data, size, &offset); + rc = vfs_read(lower_file, data, size, &offset); set_fs(fs_save); return rc; } |