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author | Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> | 2017-03-17 23:51:20 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> | 2017-03-29 15:29:08 +0300 |
commit | 457ae7268b29c33dee1c0feb143a15f6029d177b (patch) | |
tree | a1ebc64a816a1da2a67e01d928582b41eb48a611 /fs/btrfs/send.c | |
parent | ce0dcee626c482183b42d45b6ea43198c7223fc7 (diff) | |
download | linux-457ae7268b29c33dee1c0feb143a15f6029d177b.tar.xz |
Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check
This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.
I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am
rubbish at writing integer overflow checks... There are two issues.
First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit
systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size. The other
issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow
the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the
access_ok():
alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1);
sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ added comment ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/btrfs/send.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/btrfs/send.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c index 456c8901489b..a60d5bfb8a49 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/send.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c @@ -6305,8 +6305,13 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, void __user *arg_) goto out; } + /* + * Check that we don't overflow at later allocations, we request + * clone_sources_count + 1 items, and compare to unsigned long inside + * access_ok. + */ if (arg->clone_sources_count > - ULLONG_MAX / sizeof(*arg->clone_sources)) { + ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct clone_root) - 1) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } |