diff options
| author | Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> | 2020-02-10 21:02:30 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-02-28 17:42:47 +0300 |
| commit | d6cb533da3216430fb3ed5e0c640b5aaf1002fa9 (patch) | |
| tree | 3c78ebd82cac92318cc5857137f1d80a3fabf4b1 /drivers | |
| parent | 516ceef83d43a520027c08a5dc9dd660d3c78255 (diff) | |
| download | linux-d6cb533da3216430fb3ed5e0c640b5aaf1002fa9.tar.xz | |
staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole
commit 499c405b2b80bb3a04425ba3541d20305e014d3e upstream.
In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").
Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: a2c60d42d97c ("staging: r8188eu: Add files for new driver - part 16")
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210180235.21691-2-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c index c7bf8ab26192..8ddf1aee014b 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c @@ -2859,7 +2859,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p) goto out; } - if (!p->pointer) { + if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(struct ieee_param)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } |