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authorAdam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>2017-06-03 10:35:06 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2017-06-09 12:07:36 +0300
commit6987dc8a70976561d22450b5858fc9767788cc1c (patch)
tree83afa7420dbee39116d3953d5ea260cb76443861 /drivers/tty
parentcc1e66f92bf52abfcb55bbb8d6f48fa7a922b7ce (diff)
downloadlinux-6987dc8a70976561d22450b5858fc9767788cc1c.tar.xz
vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls
Only read access is checked before this call. Actually, at the moment this is not an issue, as every in-tree arch does the same manual checks for VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE, relying on the MMU to tell them apart, but this wasn't the case in the past and may happen again on some odd arch in the future. If anyone cares about 3.7 and earlier, this is a security hole (untested) on real 80386 CPUs. Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7- Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/tty')
-rw-r--r--drivers/tty/vt/vt.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
index 9c9945284bcf..bacc48b0b4b8 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
@@ -2709,13 +2709,13 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)
* related to the kernel should not use this.
*/
data = vt_get_shift_state();
- ret = __put_user(data, p);
+ ret = put_user(data, p);
break;
case TIOCL_GETMOUSEREPORTING:
console_lock(); /* May be overkill */
data = mouse_reporting();
console_unlock();
- ret = __put_user(data, p);
+ ret = put_user(data, p);
break;
case TIOCL_SETVESABLANK:
console_lock();
@@ -2724,7 +2724,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned long arg)
break;
case TIOCL_GETKMSGREDIRECT:
data = vt_get_kmsg_redirect();
- ret = __put_user(data, p);
+ ret = put_user(data, p);
break;
case TIOCL_SETKMSGREDIRECT:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {