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| author | Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com> | 2019-05-30 04:10:30 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> | 2019-06-19 02:46:23 +0300 |
| commit | f9e3ebeea4521652318af903cddeaf033527e93e (patch) | |
| tree | 240b07f85bfba3b55f1ef69129cdb74a10fbb49f /drivers/scsi/mpt3sas | |
| parent | 821744403913d957cb52263b2016fd5bd29c30d0 (diff) | |
| download | linux-f9e3ebeea4521652318af903cddeaf033527e93e.tar.xz | |
scsi: mpt3sas_ctl: fix double-fetch bug in _ctl_ioctl_main()
In _ctl_ioctl_main(), 'ioctl_header' is fetched the first time from
userspace. 'ioctl_header.ioc_number' is then checked. The legal result is
saved to 'ioc'. Then, in condition MPT3COMMAND, the whole struct is fetched
again from the userspace. Then _ctl_do_mpt_command() is called, 'ioc' and
'karg' as inputs.
However, a malicious user can change the 'ioc_number' between the two
fetches, which will cause a potential security issues. Moreover, a
malicious user can provide a valid 'ioc_number' to pass the check in first
fetch, and then modify it in the second fetch.
To fix this, we need to recheck the 'ioc_number' in the second fetch.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Suganath Prabu S <suganath-prabu.subramani@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/scsi/mpt3sas')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c index b2bb47c14d35..5181c03e82a6 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.c @@ -2319,6 +2319,10 @@ _ctl_ioctl_main(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg, break; } + if (karg.hdr.ioc_number != ioctl_header.ioc_number) { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) == sizeof(struct mpt3_ioctl_command)) { uarg = arg; ret = _ctl_do_mpt_command(ioc, karg, &uarg->mf); |