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authorJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>2024-01-08 09:41:39 +0300
committerJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>2024-01-08 09:41:39 +0300
commitc7ec4f2d684e17d69bbdd7c4324db0ef5daac26a (patch)
treea9ede2eb380993373e62a9f35f6e56fb9899e0a9 /drivers/net/xen-netback
parent0dd3ee31125508cd67f7e7172247f05b7fd1753a (diff)
downloadlinux-c7ec4f2d684e17d69bbdd7c4324db0ef5daac26a.tar.xz
xen-netback: don't produce zero-size SKB frags
While frontends may submit zero-size requests (wasting a precious slot), core networking code as of at least 3ece782693c4b ("sock: skb_copy_ubufs support for compound pages") can't deal with SKBs when they have all zero-size fragments. Respond to empty requests right when populating fragments; all further processing is fragment based and hence won't encounter these empty requests anymore. In a way this should have been that way from the beginning: When no data is to be transferred for a particular request, there's not even a point in validating the respective grant ref. That's no different from e.g. passing NULL into memcpy() when at the same time the size is 0. This is XSA-448 / CVE-2023-46838. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback')
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c44
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index 88f760a7cbc3..d7503aef599f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -463,12 +463,25 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
}
for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; nr_slots > 0 && shinfo->nr_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS;
- shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++, nr_slots--) {
+ nr_slots--) {
+ if (unlikely(!txp->size)) {
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->response_lock, flags);
+ make_tx_response(queue, txp, 0, XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY);
+ push_tx_responses(queue);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->response_lock, flags);
+ ++txp;
+ continue;
+ }
+
index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++);
pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index];
xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp,
txp == first ? extra_count : 0, gop);
frag_set_pending_idx(&frags[shinfo->nr_frags], pending_idx);
+ ++shinfo->nr_frags;
+ ++gop;
if (txp == first)
txp = txfrags;
@@ -481,20 +494,39 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
shinfo = skb_shinfo(nskb);
frags = shinfo->frags;
- for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots;
- shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) {
+ for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; ++txp) {
+ if (unlikely(!txp->size)) {
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->response_lock, flags);
+ make_tx_response(queue, txp, 0,
+ XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY);
+ push_tx_responses(queue);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->response_lock,
+ flags);
+ continue;
+ }
+
index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++);
pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index];
xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, 0,
gop);
frag_set_pending_idx(&frags[shinfo->nr_frags],
pending_idx);
+ ++shinfo->nr_frags;
+ ++gop;
}
- skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb;
- } else if (nskb) {
+ if (shinfo->nr_frags) {
+ skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb;
+ nskb = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (nskb) {
/* A frag_list skb was allocated but it is no longer needed
- * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above.
+ * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above or some
+ * were empty.
*/
kfree_skb(nskb);
}