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author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-01-24 03:54:38 +0400 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-01-24 04:36:57 +0400 |
commit | 3e2a4c183ace8708c69f589505fb82bb63010ade (patch) | |
tree | e201c3d60f39bbe3ba5026417d454553ad2fe073 /crypto/internal.h | |
parent | 93e9ef83f40603535ffe6b60498149e75f33aa8f (diff) | |
download | linux-3e2a4c183ace8708c69f589505fb82bb63010ade.tar.xz |
test: check copy_to/from_user boundary validation
To help avoid an architecture failing to correctly check kernel/user
boundaries when handling copy_to_user, copy_from_user, put_user, or
get_user, perform some simple tests and fail to load if any of them
behave unexpectedly.
Specifically, this is to make sure there is a way to notice if things
like what was fixed in commit 8404663f81d2 ("ARM: 7527/1: uaccess:
explicitly check __user pointer when !CPU_USE_DOMAINS") ever regresses
again, for any architecture.
Additionally, adds new "user" selftest target, which loads this module.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/internal.h')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions