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author | Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> | 2015-02-23 17:17:13 +0300 |
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committer | Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> | 2016-03-21 04:17:55 +0300 |
commit | 59c8392ffcf3d6e39dcdd558e0354afc545f4c91 (patch) | |
tree | 1b8a4bdbdbf6f54afffd58d878d11f11e6d4c281 /crypto/blowfish_common.c | |
parent | 9793b7bc42a334c7cc4af947e2ecdafb76b3a73d (diff) | |
download | linux-59c8392ffcf3d6e39dcdd558e0354afc545f4c91.tar.xz |
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
commit 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac upstream.
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/blowfish_common.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions