diff options
| author | Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> | 2018-01-30 04:02:59 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-02-13 14:36:00 +0300 |
| commit | c3193fd49f6f0a9b378379f8fd3a95f01172d477 (patch) | |
| tree | 778dd5166b6edbf8856d9b249bbf25f2d710b1f3 /arch | |
| parent | 398a39311c0b67ff1d886f9861ae5251f8a7cad4 (diff) | |
| download | linux-c3193fd49f6f0a9b378379f8fd3a95f01172d477.tar.xz | |
x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
(cherry picked from commit 2fbd7af5af8665d18bcefae3e9700be07e22b681)
The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation.
While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it
does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory
relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache
behavior.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417984.33451.1216731042505722161.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/common.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index bd1d1027384f..b0cd306dc527 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/context_tracking.h> #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/uprobes.h> #include <asm/desc.h> @@ -277,7 +278,8 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs) * regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls. */ if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) { - regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK]( + nr = array_index_nospec(nr & __SYSCALL_MASK, NR_syscalls); + regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr]( regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9); } @@ -313,6 +315,7 @@ static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs) } if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) { + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, IA32_NR_syscalls); /* * It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation * takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that |