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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-10-13 00:39:38 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-10-13 00:39:38 +0300 |
commit | 778ce723e93ee803ef5883619fe2391e00dbc209 (patch) | |
tree | 861f03223f34780fecce597b45588118236874d7 /arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | |
parent | 1440f576022887004f719883acb094e7e0dd4944 (diff) | |
parent | 7880672bdc975daa586e8256714d9906d30c615e (diff) | |
download | linux-778ce723e93ee803ef5883619fe2391e00dbc209.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'for-linus-6.1-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:
- Some minor typo fixes
- A fix of the Xen pcifront driver for supporting the device model to
run in a Linux stub domain
- A cleanup of the pcifront driver
- A series to enable grant-based virtio with Xen on x86
- A cleanup of Xen PV guests to distinguish between safe and faulting
MSR accesses
- Two fixes of the Xen gntdev driver
- Two fixes of the new xen grant DMA driver
* tag 'for-linus-6.1-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
xen: Kconfig: Fix spelling mistake "Maxmium" -> "Maximum"
xen/pv: support selecting safe/unsafe msr accesses
xen/pv: refactor msr access functions to support safe and unsafe accesses
xen/pv: fix vendor checks for pmu emulation
xen/pv: add fault recovery control to pmu msr accesses
xen/virtio: enable grant based virtio on x86
xen/virtio: use dom0 as default backend for CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT
xen/virtio: restructure xen grant dma setup
xen/pcifront: move xenstore config scanning into sub-function
xen/gntdev: Accommodate VMA splitting
xen/gntdev: Prevent leaking grants
xen/virtio: Fix potential deadlock when accessing xen_grant_dma_devices
xen/virtio: Fix n_pages calculation in xen_grant_dma_map(unmap)_page()
xen/xenbus: Fix spelling mistake "hardward" -> "hardware"
xen-pcifront: Handle missed Connected state
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 101 |
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c index 9b1a58dda935..f82857e48815 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c @@ -108,11 +108,21 @@ struct tls_descs { */ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc); +static __read_mostly bool xen_msr_safe = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_PV_MSR_SAFE); + +static int __init parse_xen_msr_safe(char *str) +{ + if (str) + return strtobool(str, &xen_msr_safe); + return -EINVAL; +} +early_param("xen_msr_safe", parse_xen_msr_safe); + static void __init xen_pv_init_platform(void) { /* PV guests can't operate virtio devices without grants. */ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO)) - virtio_set_mem_acc_cb(virtio_require_restricted_mem_acc); + virtio_set_mem_acc_cb(xen_virtio_restricted_mem_acc); populate_extra_pte(fix_to_virt(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP)); @@ -917,14 +927,18 @@ static void xen_write_cr4(unsigned long cr4) native_write_cr4(cr4); } -static u64 xen_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, int *err) +static u64 xen_do_read_msr(unsigned int msr, int *err) { - u64 val; + u64 val = 0; /* Avoid uninitialized value for safe variant. */ if (pmu_msr_read(msr, &val, err)) return val; - val = native_read_msr_safe(msr, err); + if (err) + val = native_read_msr_safe(msr, err); + else + val = native_read_msr(msr); + switch (msr) { case MSR_IA32_APICBASE: val &= ~X2APIC_ENABLE; @@ -933,23 +947,39 @@ static u64 xen_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, int *err) return val; } -static int xen_write_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high) +static void set_seg(unsigned int which, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, + int *err) { - int ret; - unsigned int which; - u64 base; + u64 base = ((u64)high << 32) | low; - ret = 0; + if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(which, base) == 0) + return; + if (err) + *err = -EIO; + else + WARN(1, "Xen set_segment_base(%u, %llx) failed\n", which, base); +} + +/* + * Support write_msr_safe() and write_msr() semantics. + * With err == NULL write_msr() semantics are selected. + * Supplying an err pointer requires err to be pre-initialized with 0. + */ +static void xen_do_write_msr(unsigned int msr, unsigned int low, + unsigned int high, int *err) +{ switch (msr) { - case MSR_FS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_FS; goto set; - case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_GS_USER; goto set; - case MSR_GS_BASE: which = SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL; goto set; - - set: - base = ((u64)high << 32) | low; - if (HYPERVISOR_set_segment_base(which, base) != 0) - ret = -EIO; + case MSR_FS_BASE: + set_seg(SEGBASE_FS, low, high, err); + break; + + case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE: + set_seg(SEGBASE_GS_USER, low, high, err); + break; + + case MSR_GS_BASE: + set_seg(SEGBASE_GS_KERNEL, low, high, err); break; case MSR_STAR: @@ -965,31 +995,42 @@ static int xen_write_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high) break; default: - if (!pmu_msr_write(msr, low, high, &ret)) - ret = native_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high); + if (!pmu_msr_write(msr, low, high, err)) { + if (err) + *err = native_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high); + else + native_write_msr(msr, low, high); + } } +} - return ret; +static u64 xen_read_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, int *err) +{ + return xen_do_read_msr(msr, err); +} + +static int xen_write_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned int low, + unsigned int high) +{ + int err = 0; + + xen_do_write_msr(msr, low, high, &err); + + return err; } static u64 xen_read_msr(unsigned int msr) { - /* - * This will silently swallow a #GP from RDMSR. It may be worth - * changing that. - */ int err; - return xen_read_msr_safe(msr, &err); + return xen_do_read_msr(msr, xen_msr_safe ? &err : NULL); } static void xen_write_msr(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high) { - /* - * This will silently swallow a #GP from WRMSR. It may be worth - * changing that. - */ - xen_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high); + int err; + + xen_do_write_msr(msr, low, high, xen_msr_safe ? &err : NULL); } /* This is called once we have the cpu_possible_mask */ |