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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-17 23:30:06 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-17 23:30:06 +0300 |
commit | 1d966eb4d6326a2521073174e9710713e9846e8b (patch) | |
tree | 5bb60aa0c8d82cd44116b12cb7a325ff61329da2 /arch/x86/mm | |
parent | 9a4ba2ab08a2cefd8fa2b6829219093fbed4df75 (diff) | |
parent | 45d55e7bac4028af93f5fa324e69958a0b868e96 (diff) | |
download | linux-1d966eb4d6326a2521073174e9710713e9846e8b.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes:
- A rather involved set of memory hardware encryption fixes to
support the early loading of microcode files via the initrd. These
are larger than what we normally take at such a late -rc stage, but
there are two mitigating factors: 1) much of the changes are
limited to the SME code itself 2) being able to early load
microcode has increased importance in the post-Meltdown/Spectre
era.
- An IRQ vector allocator fix
- An Intel RDT driver use-after-free fix
- An APIC driver bug fix/revert to make certain older systems boot
again
- A pkeys ABI fix
- TSC calibration fixes
- A kdump fix"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/apic/vector: Fix off by one in error path
x86/intel_rdt/cqm: Prevent use after free
x86/mm: Encrypt the initrd earlier for BSP microcode update
x86/mm: Prepare sme_encrypt_kernel() for PAGE aligned encryption
x86/mm: Centralize PMD flags in sme_encrypt_kernel()
x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME PGD mapping
x86/mm: Clean up register saving in the __enc_copy() assembly code
x86/idt: Mark IDT tables __initconst
Revert "x86/apic: Remove init_bsp_APIC()"
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix fill_sig_info_pkey
x86/tsc: Print tsc_khz, when it differs from cpu_khz
x86/tsc: Fix erroneous TSC rate on Skylake Xeon
x86/tsc: Future-proof native_calibrate_tsc()
kdump: Write the correct address of mem_section into vmcoreinfo
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 356 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 80 |
3 files changed, 308 insertions, 135 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 06fe3d51d385..b3e40773dce0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -172,14 +172,15 @@ is_prefetch(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long addr) * 6. T1 : reaches here, sees vma_pkey(vma)=5, when we really * faulted on a pte with its pkey=4. */ -static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, u32 *pkey) +static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_signo, int si_code, siginfo_t *info, + u32 *pkey) { /* This is effectively an #ifdef */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) return; /* Fault not from Protection Keys: nothing to do */ - if (si_code != SEGV_PKUERR) + if ((si_code != SEGV_PKUERR) || (si_signo != SIGSEGV)) return; /* * force_sig_info_fault() is called from a number of @@ -218,7 +219,7 @@ force_sig_info_fault(int si_signo, int si_code, unsigned long address, lsb = PAGE_SHIFT; info.si_addr_lsb = lsb; - fill_sig_info_pkey(si_code, &info, pkey); + fill_sig_info_pkey(si_signo, si_code, &info, pkey); force_sig_info(si_signo, &info, tsk); } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 391b13402e40..3ef362f598e3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -464,37 +464,62 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size) set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT); } -static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start, - unsigned long end) +struct sme_populate_pgd_data { + void *pgtable_area; + pgd_t *pgd; + + pmdval_t pmd_flags; + pteval_t pte_flags; + unsigned long paddr; + + unsigned long vaddr; + unsigned long vaddr_end; +}; + +static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size; pgd_t *pgd_p; - pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK; - pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK; + pgd_start = ppd->vaddr & PGDIR_MASK; + pgd_end = ppd->vaddr_end & PGDIR_MASK; - pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1); - pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t); + pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(pgd_t); - pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start); + pgd_p = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr); memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size); } -#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC -#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC -#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC -#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) +#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC +#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC +#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC +#define PMD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC + +#define PMD_FLAGS_LARGE (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) + +#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC PMD_FLAGS_LARGE +#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PMD_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \ + (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT)) + +#define PMD_FLAGS_ENC (PMD_FLAGS_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC) + +#define PTE_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) + +#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC PTE_FLAGS +#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PTE_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \ + (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT)) + +#define PTE_FLAGS_ENC (PTE_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC) -static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area, - unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val) +static pmd_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { pgd_t *pgd_p; p4d_t *p4d_p; pud_t *pud_p; pmd_t *pmd_p; - pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr); + pgd_p = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr); if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) p4d_p = (p4d_t *)(native_pgd_val(*pgd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); @@ -504,15 +529,15 @@ static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area, pgd_t pgd; if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { - p4d_p = pgtable_area; + p4d_p = ppd->pgtable_area; memset(p4d_p, 0, sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D; + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D; pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)p4d_p + PGD_FLAGS); } else { - pud_p = pgtable_area; + pud_p = ppd->pgtable_area; memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD; + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD; pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)pud_p + PGD_FLAGS); } @@ -520,58 +545,160 @@ static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area, } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { - p4d_p += p4d_index(vaddr); + p4d_p += p4d_index(ppd->vaddr); if (native_p4d_val(*p4d_p)) { pud_p = (pud_t *)(native_p4d_val(*p4d_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); } else { p4d_t p4d; - pud_p = pgtable_area; + pud_p = ppd->pgtable_area; memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD; + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD; p4d = native_make_p4d((pudval_t)pud_p + P4D_FLAGS); native_set_p4d(p4d_p, p4d); } } - pud_p += pud_index(vaddr); + pud_p += pud_index(ppd->vaddr); if (native_pud_val(*pud_p)) { if (native_pud_val(*pud_p) & _PAGE_PSE) - goto out; + return NULL; pmd_p = (pmd_t *)(native_pud_val(*pud_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); } else { pud_t pud; - pmd_p = pgtable_area; + pmd_p = ppd->pgtable_area; memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD; + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD; pud = native_make_pud((pmdval_t)pmd_p + PUD_FLAGS); native_set_pud(pud_p, pud); } - pmd_p += pmd_index(vaddr); + return pmd_p; +} + +static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + pmd_t *pmd_p; + + pmd_p = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd); + if (!pmd_p) + return; + + pmd_p += pmd_index(ppd->vaddr); if (!native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) || !(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE)) - native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(pmd_val)); + native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags)); +} -out: - return pgtable_area; +static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + pmd_t *pmd_p; + pte_t *pte_p; + + pmd_p = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd); + if (!pmd_p) + return; + + pmd_p += pmd_index(ppd->vaddr); + if (native_pmd_val(*pmd_p)) { + if (native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE) + return; + + pte_p = (pte_t *)(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); + } else { + pmd_t pmd; + + pte_p = ppd->pgtable_area; + memset(pte_p, 0, sizeof(*pte_p) * PTRS_PER_PTE); + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte_p) * PTRS_PER_PTE; + + pmd = native_make_pmd((pteval_t)pte_p + PMD_FLAGS); + native_set_pmd(pmd_p, pmd); + } + + pte_p += pte_index(ppd->vaddr); + if (!native_pte_val(*pte_p)) + native_set_pte(pte_p, native_make_pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags)); +} + +static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) { + sme_populate_pgd_large(ppd); + + ppd->vaddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; + ppd->paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; + } +} + +static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) { + sme_populate_pgd(ppd); + + ppd->vaddr += PAGE_SIZE; + ppd->paddr += PAGE_SIZE; + } +} + +static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd, + pmdval_t pmd_flags, pteval_t pte_flags) +{ + unsigned long vaddr_end; + + ppd->pmd_flags = pmd_flags; + ppd->pte_flags = pte_flags; + + /* Save original end value since we modify the struct value */ + vaddr_end = ppd->vaddr_end; + + /* If start is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */ + ppd->vaddr_end = ALIGN(ppd->vaddr, PMD_PAGE_SIZE); + __sme_map_range_pte(ppd); + + /* Create PMD entries */ + ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end & PMD_PAGE_MASK; + __sme_map_range_pmd(ppd); + + /* If end is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */ + ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end; + __sme_map_range_pte(ppd); +} + +static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC); +} + +static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC); +} + +static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP); } static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len) { - unsigned long p4d_size, pud_size, pmd_size; + unsigned long p4d_size, pud_size, pmd_size, pte_size; unsigned long total; /* * Perform a relatively simplistic calculation of the pagetable - * entries that are needed. That mappings will be covered by 2MB - * PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required + * entries that are needed. Those mappings will be covered mostly + * by 2MB PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required * number of P4D, PUD and PMD structures needed to perform the - * mappings. Incrementing the count for each covers the case where - * the addresses cross entries. + * mappings. For mappings that are not 2MB aligned, PTE mappings + * would be needed for the start and end portion of the address range + * that fall outside of the 2MB alignment. This results in, at most, + * two extra pages to hold PTE entries for each range that is mapped. + * Incrementing the count for each covers the case where the addresses + * cross entries. */ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { p4d_size = (ALIGN(len, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1; @@ -585,8 +712,9 @@ static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len) } pmd_size = (ALIGN(len, PUD_SIZE) / PUD_SIZE) + 1; pmd_size *= sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD; + pte_size = 2 * sizeof(pte_t) * PTRS_PER_PTE; - total = p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size; + total = p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size + pte_size; /* * Now calculate the added pagetable structures needed to populate @@ -610,29 +738,29 @@ static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len) return total; } -void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) +void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len; unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len; unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len; + unsigned long initrd_start, initrd_end, initrd_len; + struct sme_populate_pgd_data ppd; unsigned long pgtable_area_len; - unsigned long paddr, pmd_flags; unsigned long decrypted_base; - void *pgtable_area; - pgd_t *pgd; if (!sme_active()) return; /* - * Prepare for encrypting the kernel by building new pagetables with - * the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the kernel in place. + * Prepare for encrypting the kernel and initrd by building new + * pagetables with the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the + * kernel in place. * * One range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied - * by the kernel as encrypted. + * by the kernel and initrd as encrypted. * * Another range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied - * by the kernel as decrypted and write-protected. + * by the kernel and initrd as decrypted and write-protected. * * The use of write-protect attribute will prevent any of the * memory from being cached. @@ -643,6 +771,20 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) kernel_end = ALIGN(__pa_symbol(_end), PMD_PAGE_SIZE); kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start; + initrd_start = 0; + initrd_end = 0; + initrd_len = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD + initrd_len = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_size | + ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_size << 32); + if (initrd_len) { + initrd_start = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_image | + ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_image << 32); + initrd_end = PAGE_ALIGN(initrd_start + initrd_len); + initrd_len = initrd_end - initrd_start; + } +#endif + /* Set the encryption workarea to be immediately after the kernel */ workarea_start = kernel_end; @@ -665,16 +807,21 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) */ pgtable_area_len = sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD; pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_end - kernel_start) * 2; + if (initrd_len) + pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(initrd_len) * 2; /* PUDs and PMDs needed in the current pagetables for the workarea */ pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_len + pgtable_area_len); /* * The total workarea includes the executable encryption area and - * the pagetable area. + * the pagetable area. The start of the workarea is already 2MB + * aligned, align the end of the workarea on a 2MB boundary so that + * we don't try to create/allocate PTE entries from the workarea + * before it is mapped. */ workarea_len = execute_len + pgtable_area_len; - workarea_end = workarea_start + workarea_len; + workarea_end = ALIGN(workarea_start + workarea_len, PMD_PAGE_SIZE); /* * Set the address to the start of where newly created pagetable @@ -683,45 +830,30 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) * pagetables and when the new encrypted and decrypted kernel * mappings are populated. */ - pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end; + ppd.pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end; /* * Make sure the current pagetable structure has entries for * addressing the workarea. */ - pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa(); - paddr = workarea_start; - while (paddr < workarea_end) { - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr, - paddr + PMD_FLAGS); - - paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; - } + ppd.pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa(); + ppd.paddr = workarea_start; + ppd.vaddr = workarea_start; + ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end; + sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd); /* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */ native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3()); /* * A new pagetable structure is being built to allow for the kernel - * to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will then be - * populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and decrypted - * kernel mappings are created. + * and initrd to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will + * then be populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and + * decrypted kernel mappings are created. */ - pgd = pgtable_area; - memset(pgd, 0, sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD; - - /* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */ - pmd_flags = PMD_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC; - paddr = kernel_start; - while (paddr < kernel_end) { - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr, - paddr + pmd_flags); - - paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; - } + ppd.pgd = ppd.pgtable_area; + memset(ppd.pgd, 0, sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD); + ppd.pgtable_area += sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD; /* * A different PGD index/entry must be used to get different @@ -730,47 +862,79 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) * the base of the mapping. */ decrypted_base = (pgd_index(workarea_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1); + if (initrd_len) { + unsigned long check_base; + + check_base = (pgd_index(initrd_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1); + decrypted_base = max(decrypted_base, check_base); + } decrypted_base <<= PGDIR_SHIFT; + /* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */ + ppd.paddr = kernel_start; + ppd.vaddr = kernel_start; + ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end; + sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd); + /* Add decrypted, write-protected kernel (non-identity) mappings */ - pmd_flags = (PMD_FLAGS & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT); - paddr = kernel_start; - while (paddr < kernel_end) { - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr + decrypted_base, - paddr + pmd_flags); - - paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; + ppd.paddr = kernel_start; + ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base; + ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base; + sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd); + + if (initrd_len) { + /* Add encrypted initrd (identity) mappings */ + ppd.paddr = initrd_start; + ppd.vaddr = initrd_start; + ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end; + sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd); + /* + * Add decrypted, write-protected initrd (non-identity) mappings + */ + ppd.paddr = initrd_start; + ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base; + ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base; + sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd); } /* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */ - paddr = workarea_start; - while (paddr < workarea_end) { - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr, - paddr + PMD_FLAGS); + ppd.paddr = workarea_start; + ppd.vaddr = workarea_start; + ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end; + sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd); - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr + decrypted_base, - paddr + PMD_FLAGS); - - paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; - } + ppd.paddr = workarea_start; + ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base; + ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base; + sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd); /* Perform the encryption */ sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base, - kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)pgd); + kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)ppd.pgd); + + if (initrd_len) + sme_encrypt_execute(initrd_start, initrd_start + decrypted_base, + initrd_len, workarea_start, + (unsigned long)ppd.pgd); /* * At this point we are running encrypted. Remove the mappings for * the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove * the PGD entry/entries. */ - sme_clear_pgd(pgd, kernel_start + decrypted_base, - kernel_end + decrypted_base); + ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base; + ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base; + sme_clear_pgd(&ppd); + + if (initrd_len) { + ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base; + ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base; + sme_clear_pgd(&ppd); + } - sme_clear_pgd(pgd, workarea_start + decrypted_base, - workarea_end + decrypted_base); + ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base; + ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base; + sme_clear_pgd(&ppd); /* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */ native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3()); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S index 730e6d541df1..01f682cf77a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute) /* * Entry parameters: - * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping - * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping - * RDX - length of kernel + * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted mapping + * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted mapping + * RDX - length to encrypt * RCX - virtual address of the encryption workarea, including: * - stack page (PAGE_SIZE) * - encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE) @@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute) addq $PAGE_SIZE, %rax /* Workarea encryption routine */ push %r12 - movq %rdi, %r10 /* Encrypted kernel */ - movq %rsi, %r11 /* Decrypted kernel */ - movq %rdx, %r12 /* Kernel length */ + movq %rdi, %r10 /* Encrypted area */ + movq %rsi, %r11 /* Decrypted area */ + movq %rdx, %r12 /* Area length */ /* Copy encryption routine into the workarea */ movq %rax, %rdi /* Workarea encryption routine */ @@ -52,10 +52,10 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute) rep movsb /* Setup registers for call */ - movq %r10, %rdi /* Encrypted kernel */ - movq %r11, %rsi /* Decrypted kernel */ + movq %r10, %rdi /* Encrypted area */ + movq %r11, %rsi /* Decrypted area */ movq %r8, %rdx /* Pagetables used for encryption */ - movq %r12, %rcx /* Kernel length */ + movq %r12, %rcx /* Area length */ movq %rax, %r8 /* Workarea encryption routine */ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %r8 /* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */ @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ ENDPROC(sme_encrypt_execute) ENTRY(__enc_copy) /* - * Routine used to encrypt kernel. + * Routine used to encrypt memory in place. * This routine must be run outside of the kernel proper since * the kernel will be encrypted during the process. So this * routine is defined here and then copied to an area outside @@ -79,19 +79,19 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy) * during execution. * * On entry the registers must be: - * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping - * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping + * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted mapping + * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted mapping * RDX - address of the pagetables to use for encryption - * RCX - length of kernel + * RCX - length of area * R8 - intermediate copy buffer * * RAX - points to this routine * - * The kernel will be encrypted by copying from the non-encrypted - * kernel space to an intermediate buffer and then copying from the - * intermediate buffer back to the encrypted kernel space. The physical - * addresses of the two kernel space mappings are the same which - * results in the kernel being encrypted "in place". + * The area will be encrypted by copying from the non-encrypted + * memory space to an intermediate buffer and then copying from the + * intermediate buffer back to the encrypted memory space. The physical + * addresses of the two mappings are the same which results in the area + * being encrypted "in place". */ /* Enable the new page tables */ mov %rdx, %cr3 @@ -103,47 +103,55 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy) orq $X86_CR4_PGE, %rdx mov %rdx, %cr4 + push %r15 + push %r12 + + movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save area length */ + movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted area address */ + movq %rsi, %r11 /* Save decrypted area address */ + /* Set the PAT register PA5 entry to write-protect */ - push %rcx movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx rdmsr - push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */ + mov %rdx, %r15 /* Save original PAT value */ andl $0xffff00ff, %edx /* Clear PA5 */ orl $0x00000500, %edx /* Set PA5 to WP */ wrmsr - pop %rdx /* RDX contains original PAT value */ - pop %rcx - - movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save kernel length */ - movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted kernel address */ - movq %rsi, %r11 /* Save decrypted kernel address */ wbinvd /* Invalidate any cache entries */ - /* Copy/encrypt 2MB at a time */ + /* Copy/encrypt up to 2MB at a time */ + movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r12 1: - movq %r11, %rsi /* Source - decrypted kernel */ + cmpq %r12, %r9 + jnb 2f + movq %r9, %r12 + +2: + movq %r11, %rsi /* Source - decrypted area */ movq %r8, %rdi /* Dest - intermediate copy buffer */ - movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */ + movq %r12, %rcx rep movsb movq %r8, %rsi /* Source - intermediate copy buffer */ - movq %r10, %rdi /* Dest - encrypted kernel */ - movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */ + movq %r10, %rdi /* Dest - encrypted area */ + movq %r12, %rcx rep movsb - addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r11 - addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r10 - subq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r9 /* Kernel length decrement */ + addq %r12, %r11 + addq %r12, %r10 + subq %r12, %r9 /* Kernel length decrement */ jnz 1b /* Kernel length not zero? */ /* Restore PAT register */ - push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */ movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx rdmsr - pop %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */ + mov %r15, %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */ wrmsr + pop %r12 + pop %r15 + ret .L__enc_copy_end: ENDPROC(__enc_copy) |