Merge branch 'topic/enum-info-cleanup' into for-next

this is a series of patches to just convert the plain info callback
for enum ctl elements to snd_ctl_elem_info().  Also, it includes the
extension of snd_ctl_elem_info(), for catching the unexpected string
cut-off and handling the zero items.

1 files changed, 22 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index a24194681513..d973e61e450d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
  *  Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
  *  Copyright (C) 2008-2009, Red Hat Inc., Ingo Molnar
  */
-#include <linux/magic.h>		/* STACK_END_MAGIC		*/
 #include <linux/sched.h>		/* test_thread_flag(), ...	*/
 #include <linux/kdebug.h>		/* oops_begin/end, ...		*/
 #include <linux/module.h>		/* search_exception_table	*/
@@ -350,7 +349,7 @@ out:
 
 void vmalloc_sync_all(void)
 {
-	sync_global_pgds(VMALLOC_START & PGDIR_MASK, VMALLOC_END);
+	sync_global_pgds(VMALLOC_START & PGDIR_MASK, VMALLOC_END, 0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -649,7 +648,6 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 	   unsigned long address, int signal, int si_code)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
-	unsigned long *stackend;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int sig;
 
@@ -709,8 +707,7 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 
 	show_fault_oops(regs, error_code, address);
 
-	stackend = end_of_stack(tsk);
-	if (tsk != &init_task && *stackend != STACK_END_MAGIC)
+	if (task_stack_end_corrupted(tsk))
 		printk(KERN_EMERG "Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted\n");
 
 	tsk->thread.cr2		= address;
@@ -933,8 +930,17 @@ static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte)
  * cross-processor TLB flush, even if no stale TLB entries exist
  * on other processors.
  *
+ * Spurious faults may only occur if the TLB contains an entry with
+ * fewer permission than the page table entry.  Non-present (P = 0)
+ * and reserved bit (R = 1) faults are never spurious.
+ *
  * There are no security implications to leaving a stale TLB when
  * increasing the permissions on a page.
+ *
+ * Returns non-zero if a spurious fault was handled, zero otherwise.
+ *
+ * See Intel Developer's Manual Vol 3 Section 4.10.4.3, bullet 3
+ * (Optional Invalidation).
  */
 static noinline int
 spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
@@ -945,8 +951,17 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
 	pte_t *pte;
 	int ret;
 
-	/* Reserved-bit violation or user access to kernel space? */
-	if (error_code & (PF_USER | PF_RSVD))
+	/*
+	 * Only writes to RO or instruction fetches from NX may cause
+	 * spurious faults.
+	 *
+	 * These could be from user or supervisor accesses but the TLB
+	 * is only lazily flushed after a kernel mapping protection
+	 * change, so user accesses are not expected to cause spurious
+	 * faults.
+	 */
+	if (error_code != (PF_WRITE | PF_PROT)
+	    && error_code != (PF_INSTR | PF_PROT))
 		return 0;
 
 	pgd = init_mm.pgd + pgd_index(address);