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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-02-26 20:28:35 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-02-26 20:28:35 +0300 |
commit | d4858aaf6bd8a90e2dacc0dfec2077e334dcedbf (patch) | |
tree | ccb1934d3943fd7ed443f533409d02f4e2a5ad05 /arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | |
parent | 4a3928c6f8a53fa1aed28ccba227742486e8ddcb (diff) | |
parent | 9c5e0afaf15788bcbd1c3469da701ac3da826886 (diff) | |
download | linux-d4858aaf6bd8a90e2dacc0dfec2077e334dcedbf.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"s390:
- optimization for the exitless interrupt support that was merged in 4.16-rc1
- improve the branch prediction blocking for nested KVM
- replace some jump tables with switch statements to improve expoline performance
- fixes for multiple epoch facility
ARM:
- fix the interaction of userspace irqchip VMs with in-kernel irqchip VMs
- make sure we can build 32-bit KVM/ARM with gcc-8.
x86:
- fixes for AMD SEV
- fixes for Intel nested VMX, emulated UMIP and a dump_stack() on VM startup
- fixes for async page fault migration
- small optimization to PV TLB flush (new in 4.16-rc1)
- syzkaller fixes
Generic:
- compiler warning fixes
- syzkaller fixes
- more improvements to the kvm_stat tool
Two more small Spectre fixes are going to reach you via Ingo"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (40 commits)
KVM: SVM: Fix SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command
KVM: SVM: install RSM intercept
KVM: SVM: no need to call access_ok() in LAUNCH_MEASURE command
include: psp-sev: Capitalize invalid length enum
crypto: ccp: Fix sparse, use plain integer as NULL pointer
KVM: X86: Avoid traversing all the cpus for pv tlb flush when steal time is disabled
x86/kvm: Make parse_no_xxx __init for kvm
KVM: x86: fix backward migration with async_PF
kvm: fix warning for non-x86 builds
kvm: fix warning for CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_EVENTFD builds
tools/kvm_stat: print 'Total' line for multiple events only
tools/kvm_stat: group child events indented after parent
tools/kvm_stat: separate drilldown and fields filtering
tools/kvm_stat: eliminate extra guest/pid selection dialog
tools/kvm_stat: mark private methods as such
tools/kvm_stat: fix debugfs handling
tools/kvm_stat: print error on invalid regex
tools/kvm_stat: fix crash when filtering out all non-child trace events
tools/kvm_stat: avoid 'is' for equality checks
tools/kvm_stat: use a more pythonic way to iterate over dictionaries
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/svm.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 37 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index b3e488a74828..3d8377f75eda 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ module_param(vgif, int, 0444); static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT); module_param(sev, int, 0444); +static u8 rsm_ins_bytes[] = "\x0f\xaa"; + static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0); static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa); static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm); @@ -1383,6 +1385,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD); set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV); + set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RSM); if (!kvm_mwait_in_guest()) { set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR); @@ -3699,6 +3702,12 @@ static int emulate_on_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm) return emulate_instruction(&svm->vcpu, 0) == EMULATE_DONE; } +static int rsm_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm) +{ + return x86_emulate_instruction(&svm->vcpu, 0, 0, + rsm_ins_bytes, 2) == EMULATE_DONE; +} + static int rdpmc_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { int err; @@ -4541,7 +4550,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = { [SVM_EXIT_MWAIT] = mwait_interception, [SVM_EXIT_XSETBV] = xsetbv_interception, [SVM_EXIT_NPF] = npf_interception, - [SVM_EXIT_RSM] = emulate_on_interception, + [SVM_EXIT_RSM] = rsm_interception, [SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI] = avic_incomplete_ipi_interception, [SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS] = avic_unaccelerated_access_interception, }; @@ -6236,16 +6245,18 @@ e_free: static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) { + void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data; struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info; struct sev_data_launch_measure *data; struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params; + void __user *p = NULL; void *blob = NULL; int ret; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; - if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params))) + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params))) return -EFAULT; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -6256,17 +6267,13 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) if (!params.len) goto cmd; - if (params.uaddr) { + p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr; + if (p) { if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) { ret = -EINVAL; goto e_free; } - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, params.uaddr, params.len)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto e_free; - } - ret = -ENOMEM; blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!blob) @@ -6290,13 +6297,13 @@ cmd: goto e_free_blob; if (blob) { - if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr, blob, params.len)) + if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len)) ret = -EFAULT; } done: params.len = data->len; - if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) + if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) ret = -EFAULT; e_free_blob: kfree(blob); @@ -6597,7 +6604,7 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) struct page **pages; void *blob, *hdr; unsigned long n; - int ret; + int ret, offset; if (!sev_guest(kvm)) return -ENOTTY; @@ -6623,6 +6630,10 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) if (!data) goto e_unpin_memory; + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + data->guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset; + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; + blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len); if (IS_ERR(blob)) { ret = PTR_ERR(blob); @@ -6637,8 +6648,8 @@ static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) ret = PTR_ERR(hdr); goto e_free_blob; } - data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob); - data->trans_len = params.trans_len; + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; data->handle = sev->handle; ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error); |