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authorPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2018-06-06 18:38:09 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-06-16 10:45:17 +0300
commit53e4b19fcd0ce08933e0f7a7fe11654f6eac1f19 (patch)
treea9f70d9fd34bdb2eea5ffc45125b1893bbd9586a /arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
parent739ac8f4a516e62c26e1325bd59d3be03fae210e (diff)
downloadlinux-53e4b19fcd0ce08933e0f7a7fe11654f6eac1f19.tar.xz
kvm: x86: use correct privilege level for sgdt/sidt/fxsave/fxrstor access
commit 3c9fa24ca7c9c47605672916491f79e8ccacb9e6 upstream. The functions that were used in the emulation of fxrstor, fxsave, sgdt and sidt were originally meant for task switching, and as such they did not check privilege levels. This is very bad when the same functions are used in the emulation of unprivileged instructions. This is CVE-2018-10853. The obvious fix is to add a new argument to ops->read_std and ops->write_std, which decides whether the access is a "system" access or should use the processor's CPL. Fixes: 129a72a0d3c8 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c12
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 713d8861e5eb..5f758568fc44 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -814,14 +814,14 @@ static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)
static int linear_read_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear,
void *data, unsigned size)
{
- return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+ return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true);
}
static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
ulong linear, void *data,
unsigned int size)
{
- return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+ return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true);
}
static int segmented_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ static int segmented_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, false, &linear);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
- return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+ return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false);
}
static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
- return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+ return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false);
}
/*
@@ -2921,12 +2921,12 @@ static bool emulator_io_port_access_allowed(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
base |= ((u64)base3) << 32;
#endif
- r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL);
+ r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL, true);
if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return false;
if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
return false;
- r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL);
+ r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL, true);
if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return false;
if ((perm >> bit_idx) & mask)