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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-30 06:08:02 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-30 06:08:02 +0300 |
| commit | 6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d (patch) | |
| tree | 3f2d7fbaa9fe998787fa474c63fb1e6aa98090ab /arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | |
| parent | 942633523cde99c5bfa0329996dd839ca66a87aa (diff) | |
| parent | 64e16720ea0879f8ab4547e3b9758936d483909b (diff) | |
| download | linux-6304672b7f0a5c010002e63a075160856dc4f88d.tar.xz | |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Another set of melted spectrum related changes:
- Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines.
- Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe.
- Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and
prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is
not affected.
- A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily
warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects
that fact in the sysfs file.
- Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support.
- Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so
guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes
a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the
MSRs through KVM is still being worked on"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg
x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers
x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index ff6f8022612c..a83570495162 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -499,7 +499,8 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm) * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture * speculative execution to prevent attack. */ - FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW + /* Clobbers %rbx */ + FILL_RETURN_BUFFER RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW #endif /* restore callee-saved registers */ |