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| author | Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> | 2023-06-21 15:06:53 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2023-07-14 11:23:14 +0300 |
| commit | 74c6df413f64f349e8ae4166d97324803bf55b58 (patch) | |
| tree | 9c40c883469f953ecc688a619fa55c3709355e3a /arch/x86/crypto | |
| parent | babb80b3ecc6f40c962e13c654ebcd27f25ee327 (diff) | |
| download | linux-74c6df413f64f349e8ae4166d97324803bf55b58.tar.xz | |
crypto: x86/aesni - Align the address before aes_set_key_common()
aes_set_key_common() performs runtime alignment to the void *raw_ctx
pointer. This facilitates consistent access to the 16byte-aligned
address during key extension.
However, the alignment is already handlded in the GCM-related setkey
functions before invoking the common function. Consequently, the
alignment in the common function is unnecessary for those functions.
To establish a consistent approach throughout the glue code, remove
the aes_ctx() call from its current location. Instead, place it at
each call site where the runtime alignment is currently absent.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230605024623.GA4653@quark.localdomain/
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c index a5b0cb3efeba..c4eea7e746e7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -229,10 +229,10 @@ static inline struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx(void *raw_ctx) return (struct crypto_aes_ctx *)ALIGN(addr, align); } -static int aes_set_key_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, void *raw_ctx, +static int aes_set_key_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, + struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len) { - struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(raw_ctx); int err; if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int aes_set_key_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, void *raw_ctx, static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len) { - return aes_set_key_common(tfm, crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), in_key, key_len); + return aes_set_key_common(tfm, aes_ctx(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm)), in_key, key_len); } static void aesni_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src) @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int aesni_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int len) { return aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), - crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm), key, len); + aes_ctx(crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm)), key, len); } static int ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) @@ -893,13 +893,13 @@ static int xts_aesni_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, keylen /= 2; /* first half of xts-key is for crypt */ - err = aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), ctx->raw_crypt_ctx, + err = aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), aes_ctx(ctx->raw_crypt_ctx), key, keylen); if (err) return err; /* second half of xts-key is for tweak */ - return aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), ctx->raw_tweak_ctx, + return aes_set_key_common(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm), aes_ctx(ctx->raw_tweak_ctx), key + keylen, keylen); } |